Courtney v. Giant Food, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 July 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 3800.,3800. |
| Citation | 221 A.2d 92 |
| Parties | Evelyn COURTNEY, Appellant, v. GIANT FOOD, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Before HOOD, Chief Judge, and QUINN and MYERS, Associate Judges.
Plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly resulting from a fall outside defendant's premises. At the close of all the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for defendant on the ground that the jury would have to speculate on the case. This appeal followed.
During the trial, plaintiff testified that while on her way to shop at defendant's store, she tripped and fell over a sheet of chicken wire normally used by defendant to protect its shrubbery display. She further stated that had the wire been rolled up, she would have seen it. Three witnesses corroborated her testimony that this sheet of wire was the color of the sidewalk, was very thin, and could not be seen because it was dusk and the overhead lights had not been turned on. There was also testimony regarding her damages and defendant's prior notice of the alleged dangerous condition. Defendant presented evidence that the wire was in a roll, and showed that plaintiff had so stated in the pretrial deposition. It also denied any actual or constructive notice of the condition. The court, in directing a verdict for defendant, stated:
Appellant contends that the trial judge incorrectly interpreted the applicable law and erred in directing the verdict. We agree.
It is fundamental that in acting on a defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and may only take the case from the jury if no reasonable man could reach a verdict in his favor. Shewmaker v. Capital Transit Co., 79 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 143 F.2d 142 (1944); Great A & P Tea Co. v. Aveilhe, D.C.Mun.App., 116 A.2d 162 (1955). Although the specific ground assigned for the granting of defendant's motion was that the jury would have to speculate, we are not limited to a determination of the correctness of this position since we may affirm the trial court's action if it is proper upon any ground urged in the motion for a directed verdict. Jones v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 123 A.2d 364 (1956). The questions before us, then, are whether the jury would have had to speculate, and, if not, whether there was evidence upon which reasonable men might have differed as to negligence and the other elements of liability. Shewmaker v. Capital Transit Co., supra.
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...to the plaintiff, and may only take the case from the jury if no reasonable man could find the defendant liable. Courtney v. Giant Food, Inc., D.C.App., 221 A.2d 92, 93 (1966). In reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion, we are governed by the same standard. Gaither v. District of ......
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...could reach a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Sims v. East Washington Railway Co., 222 A.2d 641, 642 (D.C.1966); Courtney v. Giant Food, Inc., 221 A.2d 92, 93 (D.C. 1966). In making this decision, the court may neither determine issues of fact nor weigh the testimony presented. Felder v.......
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Wilkins v. Dist. of Columbia
...a word of art with a definite and limited meaning.” Jimenez v. Hawk, 683 A.2d 457, 461 (D.C.1996) (quoting Courtney v. Giant Food, Inc., 221 A.2d 92, 94 (D.C.1966)). When courts applying D.C. law say that the “[s]ufficiency of the evidence to support a claim for relief may not be establishe......
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Wilkins v. Dist. of Columbia
...is a word of art with a definite and limited meaning." Jimenez v. Hawk, 683 A.2d 457, 461 (D.C. 1996) (quoting Courtney v. Giant Food, Inc., 221 A.2d 92, 94 (D.C. 1966)). When courts applying D.C. law say that the "[s]ufficiency of the evidence to support a claim for relief may not be estab......