Courtney v. Remler
| Decision Date | 29 June 1985 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2:83-2347-1. |
| Citation | 612 F. Supp. 967 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Ronald Hendrix COURTNEY, Plaintiff, v. Albert N. REMLER, Devaul L. Henderson, Jr., Dwain E. Ball, Erling D. Speer, Bernie Hirsch, Bernie Slotin, Robert M. Crumley, James E. Wright, E.K. Van Winkle, Jr., d/b/a Hotel Investments, A Limited Partnership, Defendants. |
Joel D. Bailey, Beaufort, S.C., for plaintiff.
J. Rutledge Young, Jr., Charleston, S.C., for defendants.
The defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden is on the moving party to show the absence of any genuine issue of fact. Adickes v. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 153, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1606, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). For the reasons stated below, this court is of the opinion that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted.
On October 1, 1979, Ronald Hendrix Courtney and his wife, Deborah Marie Courtney, were honeymooning at the Islander Inn, a hotel located on Hilton Head Island, South Carolina. Two black males armed with pistols and wearing coverings over their heads forced their way into the Courtney's room, bound, gagged, and robbed them, ransacked their luggage and the room, assaulted Mr. Courtney, then raped and assaulted Mrs. Courtney.
On May 12, 1981, Mrs. Courtney brought an action in the Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas against the owners of the hotel. She alleged that the defendants were negligent and reckless in designing, constructing, maintaining, supervising and operating the hotel. Her case was removed to this court on June 9, 1981. See, Deborah Marie Courtney v. Albert N. Remler, et al., C/A # XX-XXXX-X. After extensive discovery, it was tried before this court without a jury on February 22-24, 1983. On June 29, 1983, this court issued its order finding that the defendants operated, maintained and reasonably supervised the Islander Inn, 566 F.Supp. 1225. In addition, this court held that the owners had taken reasonable measures to ensure the safety of the Inn's guest, even though they should have foreseen the possibility of criminal attacks on those guests. This judgment was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. It was affirmed and the appeal dismissed on September 25, 1984, 745 F.2d 50. A motion for a rehearing en banc was denied by the Fourth Circuit on October 25, 1984.
In the meantime, on August 25, 1983, Mr. Courtney brought suit against the same defendants in the Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas for the loss of his wife's consortium. He also sought to recover for personal injuries sustained in the same incident. His case was likewise removed to this court. After answering and raising as a defense that Mr. Courtney was collaterally estopped from bringing his action, the defendants, on March 7, 1984, filed this motion for summary judgment. Oral arguments were heard on the motion on May 1, 1984. At that time the court held its decision in abeyance until the Fourth Circuit ruled in Mrs. Courtney's appeal.
After her case was decided by the Fourth Circuit and the petition for rehearing denied, the court asked for additional briefs on the collateral estoppel issue. These briefs were subsequently filed on October 31, 1984, by Mr. Courtney, and on November 14, 1984, by the defendants. At that time, Mr. Courtney moved to amend his complaint to add John Hamilton and Stefan Simmons, the alleged perpetrators of the assault on the Courtneys, as additional party defendants. He also moved to remand the case to the Beaufort County Court on Common Pleas because the two new criminal defendants were residents of the State of South Carolina. If the amendment was allowed, it would destroy diversity jurisdiction. Finally, Mr. Courtney moved to have guardians ad litem appointed for Hamilton and Stefan.
On February 14, 1985, the court heard additional oral arguments on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Supplemental memoranda were received by the court from the defendants and the plaintiff on March 1 and 4, respectively.
Mr. Courtney brings this action in his own right and as a husband for loss of consortium and personal injuries received during the assault. The defendants argue that Mr. Courtney is collaterally estopped from litigating those issues of fact which were decided in Mrs. Courtney's case. The defendants do not argue that the husband has no right to assert a claim. Their motion is not based upon the earlier adverse judgment. However, before reaching the merits of this argument, the court finds it necessary to canvas the long and somewhat confusing South Carolina case law on loss of consortium and collateral estoppel.
In South Carolina, loss of consortium as a severable action was first recognized in the case of Priester v. Southern Railway Company, 151 S.C. 433, 149 S.E. 226 (1929). In that case, an action was brought by the husband to recover damages sustained by him as a result of personal injuries received by his wife in an automobile-train collision. The defendant entered a general denial and the affirmative defense of res judicata based upon an earlier defense verdict in the wife's case. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that an action earlier brought in the United States District Court by the wife, which resulted in a judgment for the defendant, was not a complete bar to the right of the husband to bring his action. The trial judge did not err in refusing to direct a verdict on the ground that a judgment had been entered in favor of the defendant in the United States Court. The court stated that the causes of action in the two cases were entirely different and distinct. A judgment in favor of a defendant in one action is not a bar to an action on the other. The applicability of collateral estoppel, however, was not raised in the Priester case nor was it even discussed by the court's majority opinion.
In Gillespie v. Ford, 222 S.C. 46, 71 S.E.2d 596 (1952), the wife brought an action to recover for injuries sustained by her when her automobile collided with the defendant's automobile at an intersection. The complaint alleged simple negligence. At the trial of the first action, the wife testified she was driving on the wrong side of the road. The court held that her testimony, uncontradicted, would be contributory negligence per se. For this reason, the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant.
In the second action brought by the husband, Gillespie v. Ford, 225 S.C. 104, 81 S.E.2d 44 (1954), the complaint alleged fundamentally different and distinct acts on the part of the defendant. The simple negligence claim in the wife's case became a wilfull, wanton and gross allegation. In the second case, the wife testified that she was on the correct, or right, side of the road, not on the left. The court held that this change in testimony, while a subject for cross-examination, became a factual question for the jury which was not presented in the first case. The issue of collateral estoppel was not raised by the parties and not discussed by the court. The actions remained separate and distinct and the bar of res judicata did not apply. The analysis turned on the "new" allegations against the defendant coupled with the "new" acts of the wife.
In 1982, there was a significant change in the South Carolina common law, and the South Carolina Supreme Court expressly recognized the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a distinct and severable principle from the doctrine of res judicata. In Irby v. Richardson, 278 S.C. 484, 298 S.E.2d 452 (1982), the court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded a party from relitigating a factual issue which was outcome determinative in previous litigation. The focus for the court deciding this legal issue is whether one had the full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant issue effectively in a prior action. In that same year, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided Graham v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins., Co., 277 S.C. 389, 287 S.E.2d 495 (1982). The court expanded the rule on collateral estoppel to disregard any privity requirement. Res judicata was distinguished from collateral estoppel. The court noted that collateral estoppel "rested upon the wholesome principal which allows every litigant one opportunity to try it case on the merits, but limits him, in the interest of the public, to one such opportunity." 277 S.C. at 391, 287 S.E.2d at 496, citing Jenkins v. Atlantic Coastline Railroad Company, 89 S.C. 408, 71 S.E. 1010 (1911).
In 1981, before the Irby and Graham decisions, this court held in the case of Watkins v. M & M Tank Line, Inc., 527 F.Supp. 290 (D.S.C.1981), that the husband of a woman injured in an automobile-truck collision could estop the employer of the truck driver from relitigating the issue of respondent superior by using the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel. By permitting the offensive use of collateral estoppel, the court held that a finding of liability in the previous loss of consortium case was dispositive of the scope of employment issue in the subsequent action.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in Watkins v. M & M Tank Lines, 694 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1982). It held that the South Carolina Supreme Court under Priester, Gillespie, and Hiott v. Contracting Services, 276 S.C. 632, 281 S.E.2d 224 (1981), would refuse to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the facts of that case because it involved a consortium claim. It is significant, however, that the Watkins case involved no new allegations against the defendant. The plaintiff in Watkins did not seek to have the...
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