Courtney v. State

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: MURPHY
• Citation: Courtney v. Oklahoma, 722 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2013)
• Decision Date: 15 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–7028.,12–7028.
• Parties: Jason Wayne COURTNEY, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. State of OKLAHOMA, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; Jacob Smith, Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper, in his individual capacity, Defendants–Appellees.

722 F.3d 1216

Jason Wayne COURTNEY, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.State of OKLAHOMA, ex rel., DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; Jacob Smith, Oklahoma Highway Patrol Trooper, in his individual capacity, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–7028.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

July 15, 2013.

David R. Keesling (Timothy S. Kittle with him on the briefs), Richardson Richardson Boudreaux Keesling, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Devan A. Pederson, Assistant Attorney General (Kevin L. McClure, Assistant Attorney General, with him on the brief), Oklahoma Attorney General's Office, Litigation Division, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before KELLY, MURPHY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Jason Wayne Courtney appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants in his action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Trooper Jacob Smith and the State of Oklahoma ex rel the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety (the “State”). Courtney's claims arise from a traffic stop on the Muskogee Turnpike during which he was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Oklahoma law. SeeOkla. Stat. tit. 21 § 1283(A). Courtney alleges Smith violated his constitutional rights by unreasonably extending the scope of the traffic stop and arresting him without probable cause. Courtney also asserts state-law causes of action against the State for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and conversion. The district court granted the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, concluding Smith was entitled to qualified immunity and the State was immune from liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. SeeOkla. Stat. tit. 51 § 155(4). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms in part and reverses in part.

II. Background

The underlying material facts are undisputed. On October 25, 2010, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Smith observed Courtney's vehicle traveling on the Muskogee Turnpike at eighty-two miles per hour. The posted speed limit was seventy-five miles per hour. Further, Courtney did not dim his headlights as he passed Smith's patrol car. Smith initiated a traffic stop. Courtney did not stop immediately, but continued through a traffic light and pulled into an open, well-lighted gas station, stopping only after Smith briefly sounded his siren.

After Courtney came to a complete stop, Smith approached Courtney's vehicle and instructed Courtney to exit and take a seat in the front of the patrol car. Smith explained to Courtney he was stopped for speeding and failure to dim and that he would be issued a warning. While preparing a written warning, Smith asked Courtney questions about his travel plans. Courtney stated he was driving from his home in Tennessee to work in Tulsa after spending the weekend with his family. He further stated Tulsa was the only place he could find work, and that he returned to Tennessee about every three weeks to visit his family. During this discussion, Smith observed what he believed to be signs of extreme nervousness, including Courtney's heart beating through his shirt; his carotid artery visibly pulsing; heavy breathing; continuous yawning; nervous laughter; and shaky, sweaty hands. Smith became suspicious Courtney was engaged in criminal activity. He nonetheless returned Courtney's license and paperwork to him and wished him a safe trip.

As Courtney was returning to his vehicle, Smith asked him if he would be willing to answer a few more questions. Courtney declined. Smith then ordered Courtney to stop and return to the patrol car. Smith explained to Courtney that he was suspicious of criminal activity and asked him if he had any illegal drugs, large amounts of cash, or firearms in the vehicle. Courtney told Smith he had a gun in the trunk. Smith called for another unit and had a police canine sniff Courtney's vehicle for drugs. The dog did not alert.

While the dog sniff was in progress, Smith requested Courtney's criminal record. A report was sent to Smith's patrol vehicle via the Interstate Identification Index (“Triple I”). The report included an entry indicating Courtney had been adjudicated guilty of felony breaking and entering in probate court in Alpena County, Michigan on May 5, 1998. Further, the report indicated the charge was disposed of through a “juv adjudication.” Smith showed the screen to Courtney, but Courtney did not recall any felony conviction and stated he did not have a felony on his record. Smith was aware at the time that the offense occurred more than twelve years prior and that Courtney would have been under eighteen years of age when it occurred. Despite initially expressing hesitation to other officers, Smith ultimately arrested Courtney for possession of a firearm after former conviction of a felony, in violation of Okla. Stat tit. 21 § 1283(A).

Courtney was held for thirty-six hours at the Muskogee County Jail. His vehicle and gun were seized pursuant to the arrest. On October 26, 2010, Courtney's attorney contacted the Muskogee County District Attorney's office and informed the district attorney that Courtney did not have a felony conviction on his record. The district attorney ordered that Courtney be released; no charges were filed. Upon his release, Courtney was able to retrieve his vehicle after payment of the impound fees. Smith, however, did not turn the gun in to the Muskogee County Sheriff's office until November 9, 2010. On November 12, 2010, Courtney's attorney sent the State a notice under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 156, stating, inter alia, that the gun had not yet been returned. The gun was not returned to Courtney until October 13, 2011, almost one year after it was seized.

Courtney brought suit against Smith and the State. Courtney asserted claims against Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging in two separate counts he was subjected to the unconstitutional seizure of his person and property, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Courtney asserted state-law claims against the State for false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, and conversion. The district court granted summary judgment to the Defendants on all of Courtney's claims. Regarding Courtney's § 1983 claims, the court concluded Smith was entitled to qualified immunity. Further, applying Overall v. State ex rel. Department of Public Safety, 910 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Okla.Civ.App.1995), the court concluded the State was immune from Courtney's state-law claims under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act.

III. DiscussionA. Standard of Review

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Becker v. Bateman, 709 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.2013). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “This court reviews summary judgments based on qualified immunity differently than other summary judgments. When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.” Becker, 709 F.3d at 1022 (quotation omitted). In determining whether a right is clearly established, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). This court maintains the discretion to decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.

B. Constitutional Claims

Courtney's § 1983 challenge to the seizure of his person has two components. First, he alleges Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the time necessary to issue the traffic warning. Second, he alleges Smith lacked probable cause to arrest him. As a preliminary matter, however, we first address Smith's argument that because he could have arrested Courtney for speeding and failing to dim his headlights, the extended detention and ultimate arrest did not violate Courtney's constitutional rights. Relying primarily on three Supreme Court cases, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008), Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004), and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001), Smith argues that when a traffic stop is supported by probable cause that a motorist has committed even a minor traffic offense, it is impossible for the subsequent stop to be unreasonably extended because the officer could arrest the motorist for the traffic offense. At minimum, Smith argues that any violation of Courtney's constitutional rights was not clearly established because Moore,Devenpeck, and Atwater inject sufficient uncertainty into the law of traffic stops. See Reichle v. Howards, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2095–96, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (discussing Supreme Court authority which had “injected uncertainty” into clearly established law in the qualified immunity context). Smith's reading of Moore, Devenpeck, and Atwater is flawed.

In Atwater, the Court held an officer may constitutionally arrest an offender for minor traffic offenses, such as failure to...