Courtright v. Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Mapleton

Decision Date15 February 1927
Docket NumberNo. 37952.,37952.
Citation212 N.W. 368,203 Iowa 26
PartiesCOURTRIGHT v. CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF MAPLETON.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Monona County; A. O. Wakefield, Judge.

A demurrer to the petition of plaintiff was sustained, and the plaintiff elected to stand on the demurrer and appealed. Affirmed.Underhill & Miller, of Onawa, for appellant.

Prichard & Prichard, of Onawa, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J.

Defendant challenges, by a demurrer, the legal sufficiency of plaintiff's petition. The pleaded averments of the petition, recited in this opinion, must be considered as admitted by the demurrer.

This is an action by a public school–teacher against his employer, an independent school district, for recovery of damages for the breach of a contract between him and the board of directors of said district by reason of an alleged wrongful dismissal of said plaintiff as a teacher in said district and the cancellation of his contract of employment.

The demurrer to the petition of plaintiff states the following grounds: (1) That the question presented was not one for the court to decide, but the sole jurisdiction in said matter was in the county superintendent and the state superintendent of public instruction; (2) that the petition disclosed that the dismissal of the plaintiff and the cancellation of his contract had been affirmed by the legally constituted school authorities.

The pleaded facts challenged by the demurrer are, in substance, as follows:

The plaintiff, C. W. Courtright, on June 17, 1924, entered into a written contract with the defendant, the consolidated independent school district of Mapleton, Iowa, and by the terms thereof agreed to serve as teacher in physics and other high school subjects, and to act as athletic coach in said school district for the term of 36 weeks commencing on September 1, 1924, and in consideration therefor, to be paid $1,700 for nine school months. That Mr. Courtright entered upon his duties under said contract on September 1, 1924, and continued as teacher and athletic coach for 4 weeks and until his dismissal and the cancellation of his contract by the board on September 27, 1924. That he fully complied with the provisions of his contract until his dismissal; that the board of directors in special session passed a resolution providing:

“That the said C. W. Courtright be dismissed as a part of the faculty, and that his contract be canceled, and an order be drawn for the balance of his first month's salary due under his contract.”

That the minutes of the special session of said board recite that the meeting was held at 8:15 p. m. Saturday, September 27, 1924, at the call of the president, and that the directors of the board were present, the superintendent of schools, Attorney F. B. Lutz, and C. W. Courtright, teacher; that said minutes further recite:

“The object of the meeting was to consider the resignation or dismissal of C. W. Courtright, teacher; charges having been made against C. W. Courtright that he was unable to fulfill, carry out, and perform, his contract to the satisfaction of the patrons of the school and to the satisfaction of Supt. Martin and this board.”

That after full discussion a resolution was unanimously adopted, to wit:

“Whereas, at a meeting held on the 22d day of September, 1924, the said C. W. Courtright being present, charges having been made to the effect that he was unable to perform his part of said contract in a satisfactory manner to the patrons and to the school board, and to Supt. Martin, and whereas, at said meeting said complaints having been made known to C. W. Courtright, and, after full discussion and due consideration, it is therefore resolved by the board of directors that the said C. W. Courtright be dismissed * * * and that his contract be canceled. * * *”

That plaintiff appealed to the county superintendent of schools of Monona county, Iowa, from the action of the board, and that one of the errors alleged in his affidavit of appeal to said superintendent was:

“That the charges made as a basis for dismissal and for cancellation of said contract were not specific and definite in their nature as the law requires.”

That the county superintendent filed her opinion October 30, 1924, sustaining and affirming the action of the board. That plaintiff then appealed to the state superintendent of public instruction of Iowa from the decision of the county superintendent of schools. and on June 18, 1925, the state superintendent filed her opinion dismissing the appeal. Other matters are alleged in plaintiff's petition not material in ruling this case.

Did the petition state a cause of action? The answer calls for a reading of the statute pertinent to this inquiry. It is provided:

“The board may, by a majority vote, discharge any teacher for incompetency, inattention to duty, partiality, or any good cause, after a full and fair investigation made at a meeting of the board held for that purpose, at which the teacher shall be permitted to be present and make defense, allowing him a reasonable time therefor.” Section 4237, Code 1924.

It is further provided that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the board of directors of any school corporation in a matter of law or fact may appeal within a specified time to the county superintendent. Section 4298. An appeal may then be taken from the decision of the county superintendent to the state superintendent of public instruction. The decision, when made, shall be final. Section 4302.

[1] A school district is a quasi public corporation. It is a legal entity, and a creature of legislation endowed with such powers as are defined by statute. Rural Ind. School Dist. of Eagle et al. v. Daly et al., 201 Iowa, 286, 207 N. W. 124.

In the instant case the question for determination involves the authority of the board of the defendant school district to discharge a teacher. It must be conceded that, under the provisions of section 4237, the board of directors has the power to discharge a teacher for a cause defined in that statute, provided that the accused is informed of the accusation, given due notice of the hearing, and afforded reasonable opportunity to defend. In brief, the jurisdiction of the board to act in the premises involves two elements: (1) The subject–matter of the proceeding, and (2) the teacher. The...

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