Couse v. Canal Authority, 36443
| Decision Date | 01 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 36443,36443 |
| Citation | 209 So.2d 865 |
| Parties | John H. COUSE and Barnetta S. Couse, his wife, Petitioners, v. The CANAL AUTHORITY of the State of Florida, a body corporate under the laws of the State of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Ronald Sales and Ronald E. Jones, West Palm Beach, for petitioners.
C. Ray Greene, Jr., Jacksonville, for respondent.
Petitioners in this case were defendants in an eminent domain proceeding in the circuit court under F.S. Chapter 73 and Section 74.051, F.S.A. The court denied a motion to dismiss the proceedings, rejecting contentions that the latter statute was unconstitutional and the complaint insufficient. Following entry of an order of taking under the statutory provisions 1 authorizing transfer of possession and title in advance of final judgment on determination of value, defendants filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari to review the order. The petition was transferred ex mero motu to the district court of appeal, which declined to pass upon the issue of statutory validity but concluded:
'* * * no good reason appearing why a definitive adjudication of this issue cannot be made by the Supreme Court at this stage of the proceeding as well as after final judgment is ultimately entered in this case, we shall file our certificate to the effect that this decision involves a question of great public interest in order that the Supreme Court may again be requested to review and adjudicate the question at this time.' 197 So.2d 841, 842.
The petition was originally transferred by this Court to the district court under Rule 2.1 a(5)(d), F.A.R., 32 F.S.A., as one for review of an interlocutory order in a proceeding at law, which under the provisions of Art. V of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A., was regarded as cognizable only by the district courts of appeal where residual jurisdiction in common law certiorari is vested. Although we have in no way altered our view of Supreme Court jurisdiction as limited strictly to that defined by Article V, we now conclude from a study of the situation presented in this case, one of first impression, that the petition should not have been transferred by this Court and that the district court correctly avoided disposition of the issue of statutory validity. While the certificate might at this point be treated as vesting independent certiorari jurisdiction in this Court so as to permit determination of the merits of the petition or at least the appellate decision, 2 we feel obliged in the present posture of the case to consider the order of transfer as improvidently entered and treat first the jurisdictional issue presented by the petition.
The constitutional plan and provisions of Article V have been given searching analysis in earlier opinions holding Supreme Court jurisdiction to be exclusive in appeals from Final orders or decrees construing the Constitution or passing on validity of statutes. 3 It is also clear that issues determined on interlocutory review are not, in our appellate process, subject to question anew on appeal from the final judgment. The review of such orders by writ of certiorari from the district courts of appeal would therefore effectively extinguish or prevent the exercise by this Court of a part of its prescribed jurisdiction on appeal from final judgment in the cause. Such a result would plainly constitute an aberration in the constitutional plan which must if possible be avoided.
Although there may be some question as to whether or not an order in a proceeding under Ch. 74 is one 'at law' or truly interlocutory in nature, our disposition of the petition in the present case does not require final resolution of those issues. Only the existence of an adequate and well defined alternative appellate remedy would foreclose relief by certiorari.
Article, V, Sec. 4, by providing for Supreme Court review of interlocutory orders in chancery, which 'upon a final decree would be directly appealable' here, does imply that routine review of such orders in law actions shall be deferred until appeal from the final judgment. We think, however, that this implied limitation does not proscribe a limited review by the discretionary writ of certiorari repeatedly held to be available in the absence of other effective appellate process. We recognize, as in previous cases, 4 that the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to that prescribed in amended Article V, and that the power to use the writ of certiorari as an ultimate method of review is now vested in our courts of general appellate jurisdiction, the district courts of appeal. A point not previously considered, however, is that the additional express and unqualified provision in Art. V that the 'supreme court may issue all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction' provides ample constitutional authority for use of the writ of certiorari in the situation now presented. The writ, in sum, is essential, even indispensable, to the complete and effective exercise of the prescribed jurisdiction of this Court to decide all appeals from final judgments passing on the validity of a statute.
This conclusion dictates (and we prescribe herewith) amendment of Florida Appellate Rule 4.5 g(1), previously framed in primary reference to stay orders, to read as follows:
The writ remains ancillary in nature, as often stated in previous application of the constitutional writs provision, but our decision here represents a departure from, and effectively overrules, such pronouncements as in State ex rel. Watson v. Lee 5 that the 'all writs' provision may not be invoked 'until jurisdiction is acquired' over the cause by means of independent appellate proceedings. Certainly the writs provision in the context of amended Article V contains no...
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State v. G.P.
...State v. Brown, supra; Nellen v. State, supra; Couse v. Canal Authority, 197 So.2d 841 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), cert. discharged, 209 So.2d 865 (Fla.1968). We recognize that we are in conflict with several of our sister courts which have adopted a more expansive interpretation of the petition f......
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Dickinson v. Stone, 41377
...court may issue all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.' See also F.A.R. 4.5(g)(1); Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So.2d 865 (Fla.1968); Mize v. County of Seminole, 229 So.2d 841 Fla.Const., art. VII, § 1[d], (1968), requires that provision be made by law ......
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Johnston v. State ex rel. Carter, J--68
...other than the 'all writs' provision that follows the above quoted language which is not applicable here. See Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So.2d 865 (Fla.1968). In State ex rel. Johnston, supra, the petitioner was not seeking a writ to restrain either of the first two classes of tribunals.......
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State ex rel. Pettigrew v. Kirk, 40534
...the Governor or the Department of Business Regulations would be available under Section 4(2), Article V. Our decision in Couse v. Canal Authority (Fla.), 209 So.2d 865, construed Section 4 of Article V to mean that the 'all writs' authority encompasses power for this Court in its discretion......