Couty v. U.S. Forest Serv.
| Decision Date | 16 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-CV-00519-EJL |
| Parties | CLEARWATER COUTY, IDAHO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Pending before the Court in the above-entitled matter are the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the parties in this environmental case. The Motions are fully briefed and ripe for the Court's consideration. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Motions are decided on the record without a hearing. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiffs, Clearwater County and Idaho County, have brought this action against the Defendants the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"); Clearwater National Forest; Faye Kruger, Regional Forester, Northern Region; and Rick Brazell, Forest Supervisor for the Clearwater National Forest. Plaintiffs challenge the Forest Service's August 2011 Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") and November 11, 2011 Record of Decision ("ROD") wherein the Forest Service proposes implementation of the Clearwater National Forest Travel Management Plan ("Travel Plan") and selection of the chosen action alternative, Alternative C Modified, designating motorized roads and trails in the Clearwater National Forest ("CNF"). (Dkt. 1.)1 In particular, Plaintiffs dispute the Forest Service's closure of approximately 200 miles of trail to motorized use where such use was previously allowed as well as other restrictions on open motorized use, bicycle use, and snowmobile use in the CNF. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief setting aside the ROD and Travel Plan and remanding the matter for further analysis.
Plaintiffs' claims are brought under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., alleging the Defendants' violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.; National Environmental PolicyAct ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq.; the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.; the 2005 Travel Management Rule; and the implementing regulations of these statutes, including the Forest Plan for the CNF. (Dkt. 1.) Defendants counter that their decisions and actions were in accord and fully complied with the applicable standards and requirements of these statutes. (Dkt. 22.) Both parties have filed Motions for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. 57, 65.)2 Three organizations have intervened as Defendants in this matter - Great Burn Study Group, Idaho Conservation League, and The Wilderness Society (collectively "Intervenors") - and have jointly filed briefing on the summary judgment motions as well. (Dkt. 59, 66, 72.) The Court finds as follows.
NEPA is a procedural statute that requires federal agencies to "assess the environmental consequences of their actions before those actions are undertaken." Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2004). NEPA serves two fundamental purposes: (1) to require agency consideration of detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts; and (2) to ensure thatthe public can both access and contribute to that body of information via comments. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 449 F.3d 1016, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). NEPA "does not mandate particular results, but simply describes the necessary process" that an agency must follow in issuing an EIS. Kettle Range Conservation Grp. v. United States Forest Serv., 148 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1116 (E.D. Wash. 2001) (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)). NEPA is designed to ensure that federal agencies take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of a proposed federal agency action. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008). Taking a "hard look" requires the agency to consider "all foreseeable direct and indirect impacts" as well as discuss "adverse impacts that do[] not improperly minimize negative side effects." N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Or. Natural Res. Council Fund v. Brong, 492 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007) () (internal quotation marks omitted).
NFMA sets forth the statutory framework and specifies the procedural and substantive requirements under which the Forest Service is to manage National Forest System lands. Congress enacted NFMA to "serve the national interest" by ensuring that "renewable resource program[s] [for the National Forests] [ ] be based on a comprehensive assessment of present and anticipated uses, demand for, and supply of renewable resourcesfrom the Nation's public and private forests and rangelands," and that the agency manage the national forest system so as to provide multiple use and sustained yield opportunities. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(3). "NFMA requires the Forest Service to develop comprehensive management plans for each unit of the National Forest System, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a), and all subsequent agency action must be consistent with the governing forest plan § 1604(i)." Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Earth Island Inst. v. United States Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1300 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(a) and (i))). "In developing and maintaining each plan, the Forest Service is required to use a systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and other sciences." Greater Yellowstone, 628 F.3d at 1149 (citation and quotations omitted); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b).
FLPMA's purpose is to manage public lands for "multiple use, [ ] with an increased emphasis on the management of the public lands 'in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.'" W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 478 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8)). FLPMA also provides that the "public lands be managed in a manner that...will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).
Judicial review of administrative agency decisions is made under the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Such review is based on the administrative record compiled by the agency - not on independent fact-finding by the district court. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). APA claims may be resolved via summary judgment pursuant to the standard set forth in Rule 56. See Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. United States Dept. Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The APA requires that the agency action be upheld unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." League of Wilderness Defs. Blue Mnts. Biodiversity Proj. v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
There are two standards governing review of agency actions under the APA. See Price Rd. Neighborhood Ass'n, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Transp., 113 F.3d 1505, 1508 (9th Cir. 1997); Alaska Wilderness Rec. & Tour. v. Morrison, 67 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 1995). Factual disputes implicating substantial agency expertise are reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard and legal issues are reviewed under the reasonableness standard. Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). These standards reflect the axiomatic distinction between "the strong level of deference we accord an agency in deciding factual or technical matters [and] that to be accorded in disputes involving predominantly legal questions." Price Rd., 113 F.3d at 1508. ). Both standards may be applied in the same case to different issues.
An agency's factual decision will be deemed arbitrary and capricious:
only if the agency relied on factors Congress did not intend it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, or offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence before the agency or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Wildland CPR, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 872 F.Supp.2d 1064, 1074-75 (D. Mont. 2012) (quoting Gardner v. United States BLM, 638 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008)). That is to say, when an agency reaches a decision based on its expert review of the facts, a reviewing court should determine only whether the decision was "arbitrary or capricious." Price Rd., 113 F.3d at 1508.
The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and courts do not substitute their judgment for that of the agency. MotorVehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Western Watersheds Proj. v. United States BLM, 181 F.Supp.3d 673, 677 (D. Ariz. 2016) (citation omitted). The arbitrary and capricious standard is ...
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