Cove Assocs. Joint Venture v. Sebelius

• Decision Date: 26 March 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 1:10–cv–01316 (BJR), 1:10–cv–01356 (BJR).,s. 1:10–cv–01316 (BJR), 1:10–cv–01356 (BJR).
• Citation: 848 F.Supp.2d 13
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: COVE ASSOCIATES JOINT VENTURE d/b/a/ Life Care Center of Scottsdale, Plaintiff v. Kathleen SEBELIUS, Secretary United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant. Select Speciality Hospital–Denver, Inc., et. al., Plaintiffs v. Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

848 F.Supp.2d 13

COVE ASSOCIATES JOINT VENTURE d/b/a/ Life Care Center of Scottsdale, Plaintiff

v.Kathleen SEBELIUS, Secretary United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Select Speciality Hospital–Denver, Inc., et. al., Plaintiffs

v.Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary United States Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Nos. 1:10–cv–01316 (BJR), 1:10–cv–01356 (BJR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 26, 2012.

Andrew C. Bernasconi, Scot Thomas Hasselman, Reed Smith LLP, Washington, DC, Steven B. Roosa, Reed Smith LLP, Princeton, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Javier M. Guzman, Mitchell P. Ze, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARBARA JACOBS ROTHSTEIN, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on the parties' motions and cross-motions for summary judgment filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The motions were filed in Select Specialty Hospital–Denver, Inc. v. Sebelius, 1:10–cv–01356 (BJR) and Cove Associates Joint Venture d/b/a/ Life Care Center of Scottsdale v. Sebelius, 1:10–cv–01316 (BJR). The cases involve substantially similar factual allegations and procedural history, and implicate identical statutes, regulations and interpretive guidance. Accordingly, the court will address all of the outstanding motions in this order.

The cases comprise challenges to two final decisions of Defendant Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Defendant” or the “Secretary”), in which she denied Medicare reimbursement for certain “bad debts” Select Specialty Hospital–Denver, Inc. (“Select Specialty”) and Cove Associates Joint Venture d/b/a/ Life Care Center of Scottsdale (“Scottsdale”) (collectively referred to as “Plaintiffs” or the facilities) incurred as a result of treating patients eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid (known as dual-eligible beneficiaries or “dual-eligibles”). The Secretary denied reimbursement to Plaintiffs on the grounds that the facilities failed to comply with the agency's “must-bill” policy—a policy that requires a provider to bill its state's Medicaid program for costs associated with dual-eligibles before claiming payment for such costs as Medicare bad debt.

Plaintiffs move this court for relief from the Secretary's final decisions, alleging that they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with the law. Defendant opposes the motions and moves with its own motions, requesting that the court uphold the Secretary's decisions. Having reviewed the brief and having entertained oral argument, the court finds as follows.

II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUNDA. The Medicare Program

The Medicare program, established by Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, commonly known as the Medicare statute, pays for covered medical care provided primarily to eligible aged and disabled persons. See42 U.S.C. § 1395, et seq. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) is the operating component of the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) charged with administering the Medicare program. The program consists of four main parts; Part A, at issue here, provides coverage for the costs of hospital services, related post-hospital services, home health, and hospice care. See42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c–1395i–5. This includes skilled nursing services. See42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(2)(B).

Skilled nursing facilities (“SNF”) and Long Term Care Hospitals (“LTCH”) may participate in the Medicare program as a “provider” of services by entering into a “provider agreement” with the Secretary. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc, 1395x(u). During the period at issue here, CMS contracted with private insurance companies to act as “fiscal intermediaries” (“FIs”) and assist in the day-to-day operations of the Medicare program. See42 U.S.C. § 1395h (2004). The FI determines the payment to be made to a provider based on audits of annual cost reports submitted by the provider. 42 C.F.R. § 413.20. To receive payment from Medicare for services rendered, the provider is required to file a Medicare cost report with its FI at the end of a cost reporting year. 42 C.F.R. § 413.20. The FI is responsible for reviewing the cost report and issuing a Notice of Program Reimbursement (“NPR”) which sets forth the amount of allowable Medicare payments. 42 C.F.R. § 405.1803.

A provider that is dissatisfied with a NPR decision may appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (“PRRB” or the “Board”), an administrative tribunal within HHS established to hear Medicare reimbursement disputes. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 oo(a). A decision of the PRRB is final unless the Secretary, on her own motion, reverses, affirms or modifies the Board's decision. See42 U.S.C. § 1395 oo(f).

The Secretary has delegated her authority to review PRRB decisions to the Administrator of CMS. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 oo(f)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1875(a)(1). A provider dissatisfied with a decision of the PRRB or the Secretary, if the Secretary reviews the Board's decision, may seek judicial review of that decision by filing a civil action within 60 days of the date that notice of the final decision is received. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 oo(f)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1877(b).

B. The Medicaid Program

Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as the Medicaid statute, establishes a cooperative federal-state program that finances medical care for the poor, regardless of age. See42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v. To participate in Medicaid, a state must submit a plan to the Secretary that sets forth, among other things, financial eligibility criteria, covered medical services, and reimbursement methods and standards. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a), 1396a(b), 1396b. If the Secretary approves the state's Medicaid plan, the state's payments are considered to be expenditures made “under” the state plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(1). Expenditures made under the state plan, in turn, are matched by federal funds according to a percentage formula tied to the per-capita income in the state, with the percentage ranging from fifty percent to eighty-three percent of the cost of medical services provided under the plan. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b; 1396d(b). “Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely optional, once a state elects to participate, it must comply with the requirements of Title XIX.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980).

Unique problems are presented by the existence of persons who qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid (so-called “dual eligibles”), a group composed chiefly of elderly poor individuals. In many cases, they cannot afford Medicare Part A deductibles and coinsurances. For this reason, Medicaid allows states to use Medicaid dollars to pay the cost-sharing obligations of dual-eligible individuals. See42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(E)(i). Because the federal government heavily subsidizes Medicaid, this enables states to shift a large portion, though not all, of the cost of caring for the elderly poor to the federal treasury. Plaintiffs “[do] not admit residents whose primary pay source is Medicaid,” but they do admit dual-eligible beneficiaries. ( Cove Associates Joint Venture d/b/a/ Life Care Center of Scottsdale v. Sebelius, 1:10–cv–01316 (BJR) Administrative Record (“C–AR”), C–Dkt. No. 10 at 186, 277;Specialty Hospital–Denver, Inc. v. Sebelius, 1:10–cv–01356 (BJR) Administrative Record (“S–AR”), S–Dkt. No. 15 at 639.).

C. Medicare “Bad Debts”

Prior to July 1, 1998, the Medicare program paid SNFs and LTCHs for furnishing care to Medicare beneficiaries based on a retrospective determination of the facilities' “reasonable cost” as defined in the Secretary's regulations and identified in a provider's annual cost report. See42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f(b), 1395x(v)(1)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 413.1 et seq. Beginning on July 1, 1998, Congress established a prospective payment system under which facilities are reimbursed through prospectively-fixed rates. See42 U.S.C. § 1395yy(e); 42 C.F.R. § 413.300 et seq. However, certain other Medicare payments continued to be retrospectively determined and reimbursed on a reasonable cost basis, including the unpaid deductible and coinsurance obligations of Medicare beneficiaries—or “bad debts”—at issue here. 42 C.F.R. § 413.89(a), (h).

The Secretary has issued regulations regarding the financial documentation that providers must maintain for reimbursement purposes. 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.20, 413.24. The regulations require providers to “maintain sufficient financial records and statistical data for proper determination of costs payable under the program.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.20(a). The Secretary's regulations also define “bad debts” as:

amounts considered to be uncollectible from accounts and notes receivable that were created or acquired in providing services. “Accounts receivable” and “notes receivable” are designations for claims arising from the furnishing of services, and are collectible in money in the relatively near future.

42 C.F.R. § 413.89(b)(1); see Provider Reimbursement Manual (“PRM”) § 302.1 (ex. 1 at 3–3).

Unpaid patient obligations in general are treated as reductions in revenue rather than reimbursable “costs” of furnishing care. 42 C.F.R. § 413.89(a), (c). However, because the Medicare statute provides that the Secretary's regulations may not result in the costs of Medicare-covered services being shifted to non-Medicare patients (or their payers), see42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(i), the regulations provide for reimbursement of Medicare bad debts so that the costs of Medicare services covered by such amounts are not borne by other patients. 42 C.F.R. § 413.89(d). This policy is known as the prohibition against cost-shifting or cross-subsidization.

Medicare is the primary insurer for dual-eligibles and covers medically necessary services. Medicaid acts as the secondary payer. To prevent windfalls for providers that might otherwise have...