Coverstone v. Davies

• Decision Date: 25 January 1952
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: COVERSTONE v. DAVIES et al. MOCK v. DAVIES et al. MOCK et al. v. DAVIES et al. L. A. 21949, 21950, 21951.

Page 876

239 P.2d 876

38 Cal.2d 315

COVERSTONE v. DAVIES et al.

MOCK v. DAVIES et al.

MOCK et al. v. DAVIES et al.

L. A. 21949, 21950, 21951.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Jan. 25, 1952.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1952.

C. Paul DuBois, Los Angeles, and R. D. Mock, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Wm. E. Lamoreaux, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, H. Burton Noble, City Atty., Frank L. Kostlan, Asst. City Atty., Robert E. Michalski, Deputy City Atty., all of Pasadena, Crider, Runkle & Tilson, Donald Ruppe, and Anderson, McPharlin & Conners, all of Los Angeles, for respondents.

SPENCE, Justice.

Warren Coverstone and William L. Mock, by their respective guardians ad litem, brought actions against the sheriff of Los Angeles County and five of his deputies; the city manager, chief of police and three police officers of the City of Pasadena; and their respective sureties; charging (a) false arrest, (b) malicious prosecution, (c) assault and battery, and (d) conspiracy and trespass, based upon the arrest of these plaintiffs and their subsequent trial wherein they were acquitted. Rolla D. Mock and Velma M. Mock, the parents of William L. Mock, also brought an action against the same defendants for an alleged violation of their right of privacy predicated upon the publicity attendant upon the arrest and trial of their son. The three cases were consolidated for trial. At the close of plaintiffs' cases, nonsuits were granted as to all defendants on their motions therefor. Plaintiffs have appealed from the judgments entered accordingly.

Plaintiffs contend that the nonsuits were improper because they had made out prima facie cases against all defendants. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and disregarding conflicts, in accordance with the settled rule in testing the propriety of nonsuits, Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81, 85, 147 P.2d 604; Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal.2d 83, 84-85, 156 P.2d 441; McCurdy v. Hatfield, 30 Cal.2d 492, 493, 183 P.2d 269, we have concluded that plaintiffs' contentions cannot be sustained, and that the judgments of nonsuits were therefore proper.

On January 17, 1947, a group of students from Pasadena Junior College had gathered near the intersection of Sierra madre Boulevard and Sierra Madre Villa in Los Angeles County. Their purpose was to view a 'hot-rod' race. Plaintiffs Warren Coverstone and William Mock were in the group, but claimed upon the trial that they did not know that a race had been proposed or was in progress. Defendants Mansell and Hoskins, two of the deputy sheriffs involved, arrived on the scene in a patrol car and ordered the group to stay together. Shortly thereafter these officers were reinforced by Captain Cook and Deputy Davies of the Sheriff's office and Officer Frakes and two other uniformed officers from the Pasadena City Police.

At the behest of Officer Frakes, the students were taken into custody and escorted to the Sheriff's Altadena Substation. There Coverstone and Mock were segregated from the group because they were over eighteen years of age, and were taken to the city jail by Deputies Mortenson and Knezevich. The youths were received at the city jail and conducted through the usual procedure, including booking, photographing, and fingerprinting. They were searched and their personal belongings were removed. After seversl hours they were released upon their own recognizance, and their personal belongings were returned. On January 20, 1947, they were arraingned on a complaint signed by defendant Davies which charged violation of Penal Code section 407 (unlawful assembly). They pleaded not guilty, and were subseqnently tried on the charge and acquitted.

Plaintiffs contend that the aboverecited facts are sufficient upon which to predicate a cause of action for unlawful arrest, in that the arrests were made without a warrant and the criminal proceeding terminated in a verdict of not guilty. While for the purposes of pleading, it has been held that the illegality of an arrest is presumed upon allegations of an arrest without a warrant and a subsequent confinement, Kaufman v. Brown, 93 Cal.App.2d 508, 512, 209 P.2d 156; Mackie v. Mabassador Hotel & Investment Corp. 123 Cal.App. 215, 221, 11 P.2d 3, such resumption cannot warrant submission of a cause to the jury where as here the record demonstrates the legality of the arrest. The fact that plaintiffs Coverstone and Mock were exonerated in the criminal proceeding has no bearing upon the legality of the arrest. (Cf. Neves v. Costa, 5 Cal.App. 111, 118, 89 P. 860; Wilson v. Loustalot, 85 Cal.App.2d 316, 325, 193 P.2d 127, to the effect that the finding of guilt in the subsequent criminal proceeding cannot legalize an arrest unlawful when made. The converse would appear to be equally true.) Since it is settled that a peace officer may lawfully make an arrest for a public offense committed or attempted in his presence (Penal Code, § 836), the critical question presented in this case is whether the acts done in the presence of the arresting officer justified the arrests being made without a warrant.

It is not disputed that the group was assembled to view a 'hot-rod' race. Such illegal purpose renders the action of the group knowingly participating therein an unlawful assembly within the meaning of section 407 of the Penal Code. When the officers arrived upon the scene, they had the authority to arrest all those engaged in the commission of the unlawful act, and in our view they were entitled to act on reasonable appearances in determining who were parties to the offense. It is patent that the officers acted upon probable cause in arresting Mock and Coverstone as members of the unlawful assembly. Such being the case, the arrests were lawful as being arrests for acts committed in the officers' presence.

Thus as was said in Garske v. United States, 8 Cir., 1 F.2d 620, 622, a search and seizure case: 'It is the wellestablished doctrine now throughout the United States that for a crime, which they have probable cause to believe is being committed in their presence, though it be a misdemeanor, duly authorized peace officers may make arrest without a warrant.' Or to state the same proposition in another fashion, a public offense is committed in the presence of an officer within the meaning of a statute such as Penal Code § 836, when 'circumstances exist that would cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime has been committed in his presence.' Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App. 361, 364, 18 N.E.2d 277, 279. Such rule, stated in the one form or the other, is consistently followed in the federal courts, United States v. Wiggins, D.C., 22 F.2d 1001, 1002; Peru v. United States, 8 Cir., 4 F.2d 881, 883; United States v. Stafford, D.C., 296 F. 702, 704-705, and in many state courts, State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 229, 125 A. 636; Hill v. Day, 168 Kan. 604, 215 P.2d 219, 224; Commonwealth v. Chaplin, 307 Ky. 630, 636, 211 S.W.2d 841; Giannini v. Garland, 296 Ky. 361, 366, 177 S.W.2d 133; Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 481-482, 152 P.2d 886; People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 872, 194 N.Y.S. 326; Bock v. City of Cincinnati (Tapp v. City of Cincinnati), 43 Ohio App. 257, 261-263, 183 N.E. 119, error dismissed, 124 Ohio St. 666, 181 N.E. 879; 124 Ohio St. 667, 181 N.E. 888; Noce v. Ritchie, 109 W.Va. 391, 392, 155 S.E. 127; State ex rel. Verdis v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 120 W.Va. 593, 597, 199 S.E. 884; State v. Rigsby, 124 W.Va. 344, 349-350, 20 S.E.2d 906. With respect to such misdemeanor as is here involved, the rule is embodied in the common law of England, 9 Halsbury's Laws of England sec. 117, p. 88, and has found expression in section 142 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts. As stated in State ex rel. Neville v. Mullen, 63 Mont. 50, 58, 207 P. 634, 636: 'Whatever else may be said upon that subject, the utmost that can be exacted of the officer who arrests without a warrant is that the circumstances shall be such that upon them alone he would be justified in making a complaint upon which a warrant might issue.'

Plaintiffs, however, cite and rely upon language in certain California cases to the effect that the doctrine of probable cause is inapplicable to arrests without a warrant in cases of misdemeanor. Were v. Dunn, 80 Cal.App.2d 936, 943, 183 P.2d 128; Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal.App.2d 713, 718, 176 P.2d 372; People v. Perry, 79 Cal.App.2d supp. 906, 908-909, 180 P.2d 465. The Ware and Collins cases involved situations in which the arrests were made upon the complaint of others. The facts indicated that no offense had been committed in the presence of the arrsting officers. The facts in the Perry case, on the other hand, appear to be somewhat similar to those presented here, although it does not appear whether the officer was justified in making any arrest under the circumstances, let alone the arrest in question. However, we deem the language of the perry case, and any implication in the language of the other cases, to be incorrect insofar as such language denies the application of the doctrine of probable cause to a sitution in which an officer makes an arrest for acts done within his presence, which acts would cause a reasonable person to conclude that a public offense is being committed by the person who is arrested.

When an arrest for a misdemeanor is made upon the complaint of one other than the arresting officer, it is proper to require the securing of a warrant to justify the arrest. Ware v. Dunn, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 936, 183 P.2d 128. However, to make the same requirement, when the officer sees that in all probability a public offense is being committed in his presence, would be to hamper law enforcement officers in their every day enforcement of the law. Peace officers would be reluctant to make arrests for fear that they would be held liable for having made an honest and reasonable mistake. It is thus manifest...