Covey v. U.S., Civ 00-4028.
| Decision Date | 21 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ 00-4028.,No. CR 95-40110.,Civ 00-4028.,CR 95-40110. |
| Citation | 109 F.Supp.2d 1135 |
| Parties | John COVEY, Movant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Gary Conklin, Sioux Falls, SD, for petitioner.
Rita D. Allen, United States Attorney's Office, Sioux Falls, SD, for respondent.
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Movant, John Covey, brought a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending that the Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Judgment in a Criminal Case signed by the Court on July 10, 1996, sentencing him to 33 months' incarceration and three years' supervised release and imposing a fine in the amount of $1,000.00, a special assessment of $50.00 and restitution in the amount of $500.00. (CR 95-40110, Doc. 35.) Movant pled guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment charging movant with abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)(1), 2246(3) and 1152. The abusive sexual contact occurred at a residence in Wagner, South Dakota. The government has conceded that the crime was committed on originally allotted land which has passed out of Indian hands within the Yankton Sioux Reservation.1
In his motion, movant contends that his criminal Judgment was obtained without federal jurisdiction in light of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 188 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir.1999) (Gaffey II), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2717, 147 L.Ed.2d 982 (2000). The government contends that in view of the litigation and subsequent appeals regarding jurisdiction on the Yankton Sioux Reservation, retroactive application of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Gaffey II, would produce substantial injustice and hardship and requests that movant's motion be denied.
The Yankton Sioux Tribe brought a declaratory judgment action in this Court to enforce the Tribe's right to regulate a landfill site the Tribe claimed was within the exterior boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation. On June 14, 1995, this Court ruled that the agreement with the Yankton Sioux Tribe for the sale of surplus lands, ratified in 1894, did not disestablish or diminish the exterior boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation as such were set out in the 1858 treaty between the United States and the Yankton Sioux Tribe. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management Dist., 890 F.Supp. 878 (D.S.D.1995) (subsequent history omitted). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Court's decision. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management Dist., 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir.1996) (subsequent history omitted). The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certiorari and the Supreme Court held that the 1894 Act of Congress ratifying the 1892 Agreement with the Yankton Sioux Tribe for the sale of surplus Tribal lands terminated the reservation status of the unallotted, ceded lands, thereby diminishing the Yankton Sioux Reservation. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 118 S.Ct. 789, 139 L.Ed.2d 773 (1998). Based on the "conflicting understandings about the status of the Reservation, together with the fact that the Tribe continues to own land in common," the Supreme Court restricted its holding to whether the unallotted, ceded lands were severed from the Reservation and remanded the case for further proceedings. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. at 357-58, 118 S.Ct. 789.
The Yankton Sioux Tribe then filed in this Court a complaint for injunctive relief and for declaratory judgment against the Charles Mix County State's Attorney, the Charles Mix County Commission, and the Governor and Attorney General of the State of South Dakota. The Tribe sought a judgment declaring that all lands within the original boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation not ceded by the 1894 Act of Congress constitute the Yankton Sioux Reservation, falling within the jurisdiction of the Yankton Sioux Tribe and the United States government. The United States moved to intervene on its own behalf and for the benefit of the Yankton Sioux Tribe. The Court then held that the 53rd Congress did not disestablish the Yankton Sioux Reservation in 1894, and that the unceded lands continue their reservation status. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey, 14 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1159-60 (D.S.D.1998) (Gaffey I).
The Eighth Circuit then held that the Yankton Sioux Reservation had not been disestablished, but that it had been diminished by the loss of those lands originally allotted to Tribal members which had passed out of Indian hands. Gaffey II, 188 F.3d at 1030. The Eighth Circuit denied all parties' petitions for rehearing and the mandate was issued on December 22, 1999. The Yankton Sioux Tribe and the State of South Dakota filed petitions for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Those petitions were denied by the Supreme Court on June 26, 2000. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2717, 147 L.Ed.2d 982 (2000).
Movant contends the Eighth Circuit's ruling in Gaffey II, that the Yankton Sioux Reservation is further diminished by the loss of those lands originally allotted to tribal members which have passed out of Indian hands, should be applied retroactively and therefore, the Judgment in movant's case should be vacated. The government, on the other hand, contends the ruling in Gaffey II should only be applied prospectively, leaving movant's final criminal Judgment undisturbed. The government primarily relies on the decisions in United States v. Cuch, 79 F.3d 987 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 963, 117 S.Ct. 384, 136 L.Ed.2d 301 (1996) and Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 93 S.Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ed.2d 873 (1973) in advancing the argument that Gaffey II should only be applied prospectively.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Marine Equip. Management Co. v. United States, 4 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir.1993). Federal courts "have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto." Id. There is a body of federal common law, but federal common law does not separately confer any jurisdiction upon the federal courts, as that must come from either the Constitution or legislation passed by Congress. Federal courts have jurisdiction over claims founded upon federal common law by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972) (); Boyster v. Roden, 628 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8th Cir.1980) (). In cases in which a holding and a rule is to be applied prospectively only, those cases have involved a constitutional basis for the prospective-only application. Those cases include the Supreme Court's decision in Gosa, 413 U.S. at 685, 93 S.Ct. 2926, and numerous other federal cases. Federal court jurisdiction cases present an anomaly in that even if it is desirable for federal courts to have jurisdiction in some cases before the courts, no jurisdiction can be found to exist if it has not previously been granted by the Constitution or Congress.
A federal prisoner "claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (emphasis added). Section 2255 further instructs that "[i]f the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate." Id. (emphasis added),
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Gaffey II clearly establishes that the Court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence on movant as set forth in the Judgment dated July 10, 1996. (CR 95-40110, Doc. 35.) The government contends that because the Court appeared to possess jurisdiction in movant's criminal case on the date Judgment was entered and the time for appeal has expired, movant cannot obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 despite the subsequent ruling by the Eighth Circuit in Gaffey II which establishes that the Court did not have jurisdiction in movant's criminal case. The government attempts to distinguish the cases on collateral review from cases on direct appeal when Gaffey II was decided. Cases on direct appeal or otherwise not final when Gaffey II was decided are subject to the decision. United States v. Duysak, 205 F.3d 1348, 1999 WL 1220079 (8th Cir. Dec.14, 1999) (unpublished opinion) ()
The Supreme Court recognized that different categories of cases exist in determining whether a judicial decision should be applied retroactively. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548-551, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). The instant case falls within the third category identified in Johnson, which involves a ruling that "a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place." 457 U.S. at 550, 102 S.Ct. 2579. The Supreme Court recognized that full retroactivity applies in such cases, wherein "the court has relied less on...
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