Covington County School Dist. v. Magee

Decision Date28 January 2010
Docket NumberNo. 2008-IA-01207-SCT.,2008-IA-01207-SCT.
PartiesCOVINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. Lutricia MAGEE, Individually and on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Lonnie C. Magee, Jr., Deceased, and all Others who are Entitled to Recover Under the Wrongful Death and Survival Statute.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

William Buckley Stewart, Sr., Robert P. Thompson, Ridgeland, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gerald Patrick Collier, Attorney for Appellee.

Before CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON and PIERCE, JJ.

CARLSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Lutricia Magee, individually and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Lonnie C. Magee, Jr., deceased, and all others who are entitled to recover under the wrongful-death statute, filed suit against the Covington County School District, alleging negligence and res ipsa loquitur. The Covington County School District filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Covington County Circuit Court granted in part and denied in part. Finding that the circuit court erred by failing to grant the District's motion for summary judgment in toto, we reverse the circuit court's order and render judgment here in favor of the Covington County School District.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. On August 8, 2007, Lonnie C. Magee, Jr. (Lonnie), age seventeen, was a student at Mount Olive Attendance Center and a member of the school's football team. During the course of football practice on an admittedly hot August day, Lonnie collapsed. Emergency medical personnel arrived to find Lonnie unresponsive. CPR and all other lifesaving efforts ultimately failed, and Lonnie was pronounced dead at the Covington County Hospital in Collins, Mississippi. Heat stroke allegedly was the cause of Lonnie's death.

¶ 3. On February 25, 2008, Lutricia Magee (Magee), individually and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Lonnie C. Magee, Jr., deceased, and all others who are entitled to recover under the wrongful-death statute, filed her First Amended Complaint1 in the Circuit Court of Covington County, asserting claims of negligence and res ipsa loquitur. The Covington County School District (the District) subsequently filed its Answer and Defenses on March 20, 2008, and its Motion for Summary Judgment on May 14, 2008. Magee filed her response, and the District filed its rebuttal. On June 20, 2008, a hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment, Judge Robert G. Evans presiding. Judge Evans ruled: "I believe there does exist genuine issues of material fact. And over-simplifying the questions intentionally, I'll put it into one and say the question is whether the school district provided a safe environment." The trial court subsequently entered an Order, stating "that genuine issues of material fact exists [sic] and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, but granted, in part, as to Plaintiff's claim of Res Ipsa Loquitur." As a result, the District filed its Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order and for Stay of Trial Court Proceedings, asserting the trial court erred in denying, in part, its motion for summary judgment.2 This Court granted the District's petition for interlocutory appeal.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4. The District couches the issue before the Court in these terms:

Whether the claims of the [plaintiff] against the [District] are based upon the District's exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion be abused, thereby entitling the District to immunity from the [p]laintiff's claims pursuant to [the Mississippi Tort Claims Act].

On the other hand, Magee couches the issue(s) before the Court as follows:

Whether the claims of the [plaintiff] against the [District] are based upon the District's exercise of ordinary care in reliance upon, or the execution or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a statute, ordinance, or regulation?

Whether [the District] has a statutory duty to provide a safe environment for its students and to minimize risks to its students and whether this duty applies to decisions and/or conduct related to allowing football practice to be conducted in dangerously hot and humid temperatures?

We thus combine and rephrase these issues into one issue for the sake of today's discussion.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT, IN TOTO, THE DISTRICT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

¶ 5. This Court's well-established standard of review for a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo. Waggoner v. Williamson, 8 So.3d 147, 152 (Miss.2009) (citing One South, Inc. v. Hollowell, 963 So.2d 1156, 1160 (Miss.2007); Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956 (Miss.2007)). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact(s) exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact." Waggoner, 8 So.3d at 152-53 (citations omitted). Further, "[p]artial summary judgment is also permissible under our rules, utilizing the same criteria for a grant or denial of a summary judgment and the same standard of review on appeal." Id. at 153 (citations omitted). See Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

¶ 6. The District argues that its alleged acts or omissions were not ministerial, but discretionary in nature, thereby entitling the District to immunity (exemption from liability) pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d). Magee, however, contends that the District failed to perform its statutory duty to provide a safe environment for its students; therefore, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(b) is triggered, and it is an issue of fact as to whether the District exercised ordinary care. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-9(1)(d), (b) (Rev. 2002).

¶ 7. The District constitutes a "governmental entity" and a "political subdivision" pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 (Rev.2002). The MTCA provides the exclusive remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for the act or omission which gave rise to the suit. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1) (Rev.2002). The intent of the MTCA is to provide immunity from suit to the state and its political subdivisions; however, the MTCA waives immunity for claims for money damages arising out of the torts of government entities and employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment to the extent set forth in the MTCA. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-3(1), 11-46-5(1) (Rev.2002). This waiver of immunity is subject to exemptions. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9 (Rev.2002). Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-9 states, in pertinent part:

(1) A governmental entity and its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties shall not be liable for any claim:

. . .

(b) Arising out of any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity exercising ordinary care in reliance upon, or in the execution or performance of, or in the failure to execute or perform, a statute, ordinance or regulation, whether or not the statute, ordinance or regulation be valid;

. . .

(d) Based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused;

. . .

Miss Code Ann. §§ 11-46-9(1)(b), (d) (Rev. 2002).

¶ 8. The District submits that its alleged conduct constitutes discretionary behavior, whereas Magee argues that a school district's statutory duty to provide a safe environment has been positively imposed by law, thus its actions and duties are ministerial. "A duty is discretionary if it requires the official to use her own judgment and discretion in the performance thereof." Stewart ex rel. Womack v. City of Jackson, 804 So.2d 1041, 1048 (Miss.2002) (citations omitted). On the other hand, "an act is ministerial `(if) the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or under conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion.'" Id. (quoting L.W. v. McComb Separate Mun. Sch. Dist., 754 So.2d 1136, 1141 (Miss.1999)). If the District's conduct is deemed ministerial, it is then protected from liability only if ordinary care is exercised in performing or failing to perform the statutory duty or regulation. Id. (quoting Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234, 1240 (Miss.1999)).

¶ 9. Magee argues that the District failed to exercise ordinary care in reliance upon, or in the execution or performance of, or in the failure to execute or perform, a statute, ordinance or regulation. See Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(b) (Rev. 2002). Magee relies on Mississippi Code Section 37-9-69 as well as this Court's mandate that school personnel are required to use ordinary care in administering public schools, and "[s]chools have the responsibility to use ordinary care to provide a safe school environment." L.W., 754 So.2d at 1142-43 (citations omitted). See also Pearl Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Groner, 784 So.2d 911, 915 (Miss.2001); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Simpson County Pub. Sch. Dist., 847 So.2d 856, 857 (Miss.2003). Magee's reliance, however, is misplaced. Section 37-9-69 states:

It shall be the duty of each superintendent, principal and teacher in the public schools of this state to enforce in the schools the courses of study prescribed by law or by the state board of education, to comply with the...

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