Covington v. Knox County Sch. System
| Decision Date | 10 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,No. 99-5210,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,99-5210 |
| Parties | (6th Cir. 2000) BURMA L. COVINGTON, NATURAL PARENT AND LEGAL CONSERVATOR OF DAVID JASON COVINGTON,v. KNOX COUNTY SCHOOL SYSTEM; KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; ALLEN MORGAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT; DONNA PARKER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRINCIPAL; LINDA K. CATHEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A KNOX COUNTY SCHOOL OFFICIAL; JOE MARLIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A KNOX COUNTY SCHOOL OFFICIAL; MAUREEN UMBEHAGEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A KNOX COUNTY SCHOOL OFFICIAL; KNOX COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville. No. 98-00207--James H. Jarvis, District Judge.
Danny Paul Dyer (briefed), Gentry, Tipton, Kizer & McLemore, Knoxville, TN, Mark P. Jendrek (briefed), Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Mary A.R. Stackhouse (briefed), Knoxville, TN, John E. Owings (briefed), Knox County Law Director's Office, Knoxville, TN, for Knox County Board of Education.
John E. Owings (briefed), Knoxville, TN, for Allen Morgan.
Robert L. Crossley, Sr. (briefed), Crossley Law Firm, Knoxville, TN, for Donna Parker.
Pamela L. Reeves (briefed), Watson, Hollow & Reeves, Knoxville, TN, for Linda K. Cathey and Joe Marlin.
William A. Young (briefed), O'Neil, Parker & Williamson, Knoxville, TN, for Maureen Umbehagen.
Mary A. R. Stackhouse (briefed), Knoxville, TN, for Knox County, TN.
Before: Batchelder and Moore, Circuit Judges; O'Malley,* District Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant Burma Covington, acting as legal conservator for her disabled son Jason, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants due to Covington's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Covington argues that her claim, which alleges violations of David's substantive due process rights by his special education school and its officials, does not arise under the IDEA and therefore does not require exhaustion. She further contends that, even if her complaint falls within the scope of the IDEA, exhaustion would be futile in the circumstances of this case and therefore is not required. Because we agree that exhaustion is futile when, as here, damages are the only suitable remedy for the plaintiff's alleged injuries and yet damages are unavailable through the administrative process, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings.
David Jason Covington was born on March 8, 1978, and was a special education student at the Knoxville Adaptive Education Center (KAEC) from 1990 until he graduated with a special education diploma in May 1996. He suffers from multiple mental and emotional disabilities.
Burma Covington alleges that, on several occasions between 1990 and 1994, Jason was locked in a "time-out room" that could only be unlocked from the outside. The time-out room, which Covington identifies as a "disciplinary measure," is described in the complaint1 as being approximately four feet by six feet, dark and "vault-like," with a concrete floor, no furniture, no heat, no ventilation, and only one small reinforced window located at least five feet above the floor. Covington claims that Jason was repeatedly locked in the time-out room for several hours at a time without supervision and was often not allowed to leave the room for lunch. On at least one occasion, Jason was allegedly made to disrobe before being locked in the time-out room. Covington further alleges that on at least one occasion, because of the lack of supervision by school officials and the long duration of his confinement, Jason was forced to relieve himself on the concrete floor of the room and to remain there with his excrement for a period of time.
As a result of these incidents, Burma Covington filed an administrative complaint with the Tennessee Department of Education on March 17, 1994. The Department of Education referred the complaint to the Knox County School System, which responded to the complaint by means of a letter that denied the allegations in part and attempted to explain the school officials' actions, but offered no other relief. Covington subsequently requested a due process hearing, as permitted by the IDEA, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), describing the reason for this request as "inappropriate discipline, including abusive confinement in a locked time out room." J.A. at 77 (). Over the next three years, this hearing and the related discovery were repeatedly scheduled, delayed, and re-scheduled. The record evidence suggests, and the district court found, that Covington was largely responsible for the delays.
Although no due process hearing had yet taken place, Covington filed a complaint in federal district court on April 3, 1998, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of Jason's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and raising state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. The complaint did not allege violations of, or even mention, the IDEA. The defendants moved for summary judgment. Following Hayes v. Unified School District No. 377, 877 F.2d 809, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1989), the district court found that Covington was required to exhaust her administrative remedies as contemplated by the IDEA, because her complaint involved the school's disciplinary practices. The court stated, "It is undisputed that the use of the 'time-out' room as a disciplinary measure was a matter mentioned in the plaintiff's IEP [Individualized Education Program] and a matter subject to the IDEA." J.A. at 283 (D. Ct. Op.). The court also noted that Covington had commenced the administrative process under the IDEA. Finding that Covington had not exhausted her administrative remedies and that she had failed to demonstrate that such exhaustion would be futile, the district court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.
Covington filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the district court's opinion was based on facts not in the record, that her cause of action does not arise under the IDEA and therefore exhaustion was not required, that exhaustion would be futile because the available administrative remedies are inadequate, and that the district court's decision results in a violation of Jason's equal protection rights. The district court denied that motion without opinion on January 13, 1999. The appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal. In her brief, Covington raises essentially the same issues that she raised below, with the exception that she appears to have abandoned her Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims, arguing only that the school's actions violated Jason's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, Covington argues for the first time on appeal that requiring her to exhaust her administrative remedies would violate Jason's Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.
This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See EEOC v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 188 F.3d 695, 701 (6th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment should be granted only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 64 F.3d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1995). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.
The IDEA provides that plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court to obtain relief that is also available under the IDEA2. See Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1025 (1990); Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933, 935-36 (6th Cir. 1989) (Crocker I). Specifically, the statutory language states as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) of this section shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)3. Furthermore, § 1415(i)(2) clearly contemplates that plaintiffs will exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing a civil action to enforce their rights under the IDEA4. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326-27 (1988) (); Crocker I, 873 F.2d at 935 (same).
Covington argues that her claim does not arise under the IDEA and therefore that exhaustion is not required in her case. Rather, she urges, her complaint concerns abusive behavior that constitutes an independent constitutional violation. We...
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