Cowan v. City of Mount Vernon

• Decision Date: 27 March 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 12–CV–6881KMK.
• Citation: 95 F.Supp.3d 624
• Parties: Vanessa COWAN, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

95 F.Supp.3d 624

Vanessa COWAN, Plaintiff

v.The CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 12–CV–6881KMK.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed March 27, 2015.

Benjamin Lewis Felcher Leavitt, Esq., Leavitt Legal PLLC, White Plains, NY, for Plaintiff.

Jessica Christine Moller, Esq., Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Garden City, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

PlaintiffVanessa Cowan(“Plaintiff” or “Cowan”) brings this Action against Defendants The City of Mount Vernon(the “City”), DaMia Harris(“Harris”), and Hamp Miller(“Miller”)(collectively “Defendants”), alleging sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.(“Title VII”) and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq.(“NYSHRL”), violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, negligent supervision, assault, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.¹Before the Court is Defendants' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment, seeking summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims that Defendants violated her right to Equal Protection, that Defendants retaliated against her, and that Miller engaged in intentional infliction of emotional distress.(Defs.' Mot. For Partial Summ. J.(Dkt. No. 27).)For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I.Background

A.The Facts

Plaintiff was employed by the City to work in the Youth Bureau from March 29, 2010 until March 28, 2011.(Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement (“Defs.'56.1”)¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 28);Aff. of DaMia Harris–Madden (“Harris Aff.”)¶¶ 2, 17 (Dkt. No. 32).)²During Plaintiff's employment, Harris was employed by the City as the Executive Director of the City's Youth Bureau, (Defs.' 56.1¶ 2; Aff. of Jessica C. Moller(“Moller Aff.”) Ex. G (“Harris Tr.”) 8–9 (Dkt. No. 33);HarrisAff. ¶ 1), and Jennifer Coker–Wiggins was employed by the City in the positions of Deputy Commissioner of Human Resources and Commissioner of Human Resources, (Defs.' 56.1¶ 3; Moller Aff. Ex. H (“Coker–Wiggins Tr.”) 9, 31).Coker–Wiggins was the City's first Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner of Human Resources and had no prior experience running a human resources department.(Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl's 56.1”)¶¶ 3, 56–57 (Dkt. No. 47);Coker–WigginsTr. 10–15, 29–32.)

Harris first hired Plaintiff as a Community Worker Aide.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 5;HarrisTr. 25;HarrisAff. ¶ 2; Moller Aff. Ex. E (“Cowan Tr.”) 27–28.)For the first few weeks that Plaintiff worked as a Community Worker Aide, her job consisted of performing various clerical-type duties, such as typing, as an administrative assistant for Harris.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 6;HarrisTr. 25;HarrisAff. ¶ 2;CowanTr. 28–30.)Because Plaintiff demonstrated an interest in working with the students served by the Youth Bureau, Harris assigned Plaintiff to work with the “Students Taking Responsibility, Ownership Now in Graduating” Program, known as “S.T.R.O.N.G.”(“STRONG”) in the Spring of 2010.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 7;HarrisTr. 26;HarrisAff. ¶ 3;CowanTr. 30–32.)STRONG, which is is operated by the Youth Bureau in the Mount Vernon High School, works with high school students to improve their academic performance and character development, and provides them with career exposure and cultural enrichment opportunities.(Defs.' 56.1¶¶ 8–9; Moller Aff. Ex. F (“Miller Tr.”) 32;HarrisAff. ¶¶ 4–5;CowanTr. 34.)Plaintiff remained a Youth Bureau employee during the time that she worked for STRONG.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 12;HarrisTr. 27.)

Miller was employed by the City as the Director of STRONG and served as Plaintiff's direct supervisor throughout the time that Plaintiff worked for the Youth Bureau.

(Defs.' 56.1¶¶ 10–11;MillerTr. 28, 32, 63, 163;Aff. of Hamp Miller, Jr. (“Miller Aff.”)¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 31);HarrisTr. 32, 180–81;HarrisAff. ¶ 4;CowanTr. 95–96.)When Plaintiff first started working with STRONG she retained the title Community Worker Aide.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 13;HarrisTr. 64–66.)Harris, with input from Miller about Plaintiff's work performance, and general input from Coker–Wiggins about Plaintiff's need for full-time employment, decided to appoint Plaintiff to a Project Coordinator position.(Defs.' 56.1¶¶ 13, 15;HarrisTr. 68–75, 231.)According to Defendants, effective September 20, 2010, Plaintiff was given a temporary appointment to a full-time Project Coordinator position that expired on March 31, 2011, which meant that after that date Plaintiff would not have been compensated.(Defs.' 56.1¶¶ 17–18;HarrisTr. 83–84, 87–88, 150;HarrisAff. ¶ 7;Coker–WigginsTr. 68.)Plaintiff disputes this fact, stating that she was “given an appointment for a ‘six month probationary term[,]’ ... within the purview of the [City]Civil Service Law,” under which “a probationary employee can be terminated at the end of [her] term but [her] term will not simply ‘expire.’ ”(“Pl.'s 56.1”¶¶ 17–18(citations omitted).)At the time Plaintiff was appointed to the Project Coordinator position, Harris was not aware of any major problems with Plaintiff's performance.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 19;HarrisTr. 75;HarrisAff. ¶ 9.)Plaintiff agrees, but also states that Harris was aware at the time that she hired Plaintiff as Project Coordinator, that Plaintiff did not meet the educational or experience requirements of the position.(Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 19.)

As a Project Coordinator, Plaintiff worked solely with STRONG and was “responsible for managing all the day-to-day functions of a program site, [and] to a certain degree[,] personnel, planning, screening, student recruitment, press releases, field trip organization, and in some instances, answering phones, interacting with parents, [and] interacting with school staff.”(Defs.' 56.1¶ 20;MillerTr. 171;HarrisAff. ¶ 8.)Some of the job duties performed by Plaintiff as a Project Coordinator were similar to the job duties that she had performed as a Community Aide, but Plaintiff's job duties expanded as a Project Coordinator.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 21;HarrisTr. 65–67;MillerTr. 19–20.)Plaintiff was advised what her job duties as a Project Coordinator were and what was expected of her in that position.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 22;MillerTr. 140–41.)Harris was “extremely demanding with regard to the ... STRONG Program” and held people accountable for their performance.(Defs.' 56.1¶ 23;MillerTr. 98–99.)

Throughout the time that Plaintiff worked for the Youth Bureau, the City had an established written anti-harassment policy that prohibited sexual harassment (the “Policy”).(Defs.' 56.1¶ 43;Coker–WigginsTr. 27, 34;Aff. of Judy Williams (“Williams Aff.”)¶ 2 Ex.A (Dkt. No. 30).)The Policy provided a description of (i) what constituted prohibited sexual harassment, (ii) set forth a complaint procedure for employees to report instances of harassment, which provided that such reports could be made verbally or in writing and that all complaints of harassment would be investigated promptly, and (iii) prohibited retaliation against any employee who made a good faith complaint of harassment under such policy.(Defs.' 56.1¶¶ 44–47; Williams Aff. Ex.A.) The Policy was distributed to all City employees, including Plaintiff.(Defs.' 56.1¶¶ 48, 51;Coker–WigginsTr. 40–41;CowanTr. 288.)Coker–Wiggins conducted numerous training sessions on the Policy for City employees, during which she reviewed the complaint procedure set forth in that policy, and the City brought in an outside professor from a local college to conduct sexual harassment training sessions for its employees.(Defs.' 56.1¶¶ 49–50;Coker–WigginsTr. 35, 39–42;MillerTr. 187–91, 195.)Plaintiff attended several of these training sessions.(Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 60.)Plaintiff alleges that during these sessions, City employees were informed that in the absence of written, audio recorded and/or video recorded evidence, employees would have insufficient evidence to proceed with a sexual harassment complaint and were also severely admonished about the adverse employment consequences associated with making false claims of sexual harassment.(Pl.'s 56.1¶¶ 49, 61.)³

Plaintiff alleges that Miller sexually harassed Plaintiff, culminating in a vicious assault that occurred in or around January 2011.(Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 67.)For the purpose of the instant Motion, Defendants do not contest the allegations of sexual harassment that Plaintiff makes in her Amended Complaint, and, accordingly, the Court accepts them as true.From April 2010 until September 2010, Plaintiff and Miller shared an office in the Mount Vernon High School and were the only two individuals in that office.(Am. Compl. ¶ 24.)Throughout Plaintiff's employment, Miller engaged in a continuous and constant course of sexual harassment, discrimination, and intimidation, and created a hostile workplace.(Id.¶ 25.)Specifically, on a daily basis, Miller made comments about Plaintiff's body, her appearance, and his desire to have sexual relations with her.(Id.¶ 26.)Miller also physically touched Plaintiff in a sexual manner, including feeling her back, pinching her buttocks, slapping and/or squeezing her buttocks, and grabbing her chest.(Id.¶ 27.)From April 2010 to September 2010, Miller exposed his penis to Plaintiff at least 20 times.(Id.¶ 28.)Miller also made comments to Plaintiff that he would leave his wife if he could and that Plaintiff“shouldn't be single” because she had “children to support.”(Id. )

To intimidate Plaintiff and make her feel powerless to stop his harassment, Miller would constantly state to Plaintiff that he“had a special relationship” with Harris and that Plaintiff would be well advised not to report any of his conduct to Harris.(Id.¶¶ 29, 34.)When Plaintiff complained to her co-worker, Elizabeth Abel(“Abel”), about the sexual harassment, Miller commented to Plaintiff that she should not make any reports to Abel if she wanted to...