Cowan v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc.

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Writing for the Court: Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District Judge
• Docket Number: Civil Action RDB-26-3073
• Decision Date: 01 October 2026
• Citation: Cowan v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., Civil Action RDB-26-3073 (D. Md. Oct 01, 2026)
• Parties: ELEANOR COLMERS COWAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS-SONOMA STORES, INC. d/b/a POTTERY BARN KIDS, Defendant.

1

ELEANOR COLMERS COWAN, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS-SONOMA STORES, INC. d/b/a POTTERY BARN KIDS, Defendant.

Civil Action No. RDB-26-3073

United States District Court, D. Maryland

October 1, 2026

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Richard D. Bennett, United States Senior District Judge

In this putative class action, Plaintiff Eleanor Colmers Cowan (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Cowan”) alleges that Defendant Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., d/b/a Pottery Barn Kids (“Defendant” or “Pottery Barn Kids”) sent her and putative class members materially misleading and deceptive marketing emails in violation of Maryland law. See (ECF No. 6).^[1]This action is yet another among a group of nearly identical cases filed in this Court.^[2]

Ms Cowan initiated this action on June 17, 2026, by filing a one-Count Complaint (“Complaint”) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, alleging Defendant violated Maryland's Commercial Electronic Mail Act (“MCEMA”), MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3001 et seq. (Count I). (ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 65-72). On behalf of the putative class, Ms. Cowan seeks a declaration that Defendant violated MCEMA, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3002; statutory damages of $500 per violation of MCEMA (or actual damages, if greater); reasonable attorneys' fees and costs; and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all sums awarded. (Id. ¶¶ 74-82). On August 5, 2026, Defendant removed the action to this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453(b).^[3] (ECF No. 1).

Presently pending before the Court is Ms. Cowan's Motion to Remand (“Motion to Remand”) (ECF No. 8; ECF No. 8-1), in which she argues that her Complaint (ECF No. 6) does not allege a concrete injury sufficient to establish Article III standing.^[4] (ECF No. 8-1 at 8). Defendant subsequently filed a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (“Defendant's Opposition”) (ECF No. 10),^[5] and Plaintiff replied (“Plaintiff's Reply”) (ECF No. 13). The parties' submissions have been reviewed, and no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Whether a plaintiff has established Article III standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that this Court must resolve before reaching the merits of a dispute. E.g., Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff lacks Article III standing such that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8-1) is GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's claims relate to Pottery Barn Kids' allegedly deceptive marketing practices. Plaintiff alleges that Pottery Barn Kids sends marketing emails with “false or misleading” subject lines “represent[ing] that a sale is ending, expiring, available for only a specified period, in its final hours, or the recipient's last chance to act” but then “extends or continues the same or [a] materially equivalent sale shortly thereafter.” (ECF No. 6 ¶ 3). Specifically, she alleges that:

[Pottery Barn Kids'] false-urgency subject lines have the capacity, tendency, and effect of deceiving recipients. The subject lines communicate objective timing information: that the sale is ending today, ending tonight, in its final hours, or available for only a short period. When [Pottery Barn Kids] then extends or continues the same or materially equivalent sale, the earlier deadline subject line is false or misleading.

(Id. ¶ 39). According to Plaintiff, these emails “frequently use urgency and scarcity language” that is “designed to cause recipients to open [Pottery Barn Kids'] emails, visit [Pottery Barn Kids'] website, and consider purchasing [Pottery Barn Kids'] products.” (Id. ¶¶ 25-26).

Plaintiff alleges that the repetitive, deceptive marketing emails described above violate the Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act (“MCEMA”), MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3001 et seq. (Count I). See generally (ECF No. 6 ¶¶ 1-72). Under MCEMA, a person may not send, conspire to send, or assist another in sending commercial electronic mail^[6] into or out of Maryland that contains “false or misleading information in the subject line that has the capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving the recipient.” MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3002(b). MCEMA authorizes statutory damages of $500 per violation or the email recipient's actual damages, whichever is greater. See id. § 14-3003. Notably, although Plaintiff alleges violations of MCEMA, she “never placed an order, created an online account, used a Williams-Sonoma or Pottery Barn app, applied for or used a Williams-Sonoma credit card, or otherwise clicked to accept online terms.” (ECF No. 6 ¶ 15). However, she did “provid[e] her name and email address” to receive marketing emails, and she “would have liked to receive truthful information from [Pottery Barn Kids] regarding [its] promotions.” (Id. ¶¶ 15, 53).

On June 17, 2026, Plaintiff filed this putative class action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland. (ECF No. 6). In her one-Count Complaint, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendant violated § 14-3002 of MCEMA, statutory damages of $500 per violation of MCEMA (or actual damages, if greater), reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all sums awarded. (Id. ¶¶ 74-82). On August 5, 2026, Defendants removed this action to this Court, asserting jurisdiction based on minimal diversity under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453(b).^[7] (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff then filed a Motion to Remand on August 10, 2026, (ECF No. 8), asserting untimely removal, that her Complaint did not establish a concrete injury sufficient to confer Article III standing, and that the record did not satisfy CAFA's $5 million amount in controversy requirement.^[8] (ECF No. 8-1 at 6-16). Defendant responded in Opposition on August 24, 2026. (ECF No. 10). On August 25, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Reply in which she argued that this Court's decision in LaTouche v. True Religion Apparel, Inc., Civ. No. RDB-26-00914, 2026 WL 2221402 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2026) forecloses Defendant's argument that she suffered a concrete injury from the receipt of Defendant's allegedly deceptive marketing emails alone. (ECF No. 13 at 2-3). This matter is now ripe for review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant may remove any state civil case to federal court if the plaintiff could have originally brought the case in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983). Thus, for removal to be proper, the federal court must have original jurisdiction over the case despite it being filed in state court. If “a case was not properly removed, because it was not within the original jurisdiction of the United States district courts, the district court must remand it to the state court from which it was removed.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). A defendant who removes a case bears the burden of establishing both that the federal court has jurisdiction and that the removal is procedurally correct. Pressl v. Appalachian Power Co., 842 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (removal procedures).

ANALYSIS

This case presents a threshold question of Article III standing namely, whether Ms. Cowan's Complaint (ECF No. 6) establishes that she has suffered the requisite concrete injury to continue litigation of this action in federal court. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has recently reiterated, “[w]here standing is in question, the federal court must decide the issue before reaching the merits of any claim presented” because Article III standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite to adjudication. Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Wooten, 164 F.4th 362, 365 (4th Cir. 2026) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)). As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, “Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases' and ‘Controversies.'” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “The requirement that a [p]laintiff possess ‘standing to sue' emanates from that constitutional provision.” Hutton v. Nat'l Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 619 n.5 (4th Cir. 2018). As particularly relevant to Ms. Cowan's claim, the Fourth Circuit held that “plaintiffs cannot establish a cognizable injury simply by pleading a statutory violation.” Garey v. James S. Farrin, P.C., 35 F.4th 917, 921 (4th Cir. 2022); see also O'Leary v. TrustedID, Inc., 60 F.4th 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2023) (“The intangible harm of enduring a statutory violation, standing alone, typically won't suffice under Article III-unless there's separate harm (or a materially increased risk of another harm) associated with the violation.”).

“A proper case or controversy exists only when [the] plaintiff ‘establish[es] that [she] ha[s] standing to sue.'” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 57 (alterations in original) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 818 (1997)); accord Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Such standing ensures that a plaintiff has “a ‘personal stake' in the case.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 819). Article III standing exists where (1) the plaintiff “suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;” (2) “the injury was likely caused by the defendant;” and (3) “the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at...