Cowart v. Jordan
Decision Date | 25 October 1947 |
Docket Number | No. 31673.,31673. |
Parties | COWART. v. JORDAN. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. "If a servant is employed to do certain work for his master and employs another person to assist him, the master is liable for the negligence of the assistant only when the servant had authority, ex-press or implied, to employ him, or when the act of employment is ratified by the master."
2. Where the owner of an automobile uses it privately for business purposes, or publicly as a taxicab, he can not be held liable for an injury caused by the car while operated by a person unknown to the owner and without his express or implied permission.
3. Where the uncontradicted evidence shows that M, under his contract with C, the defendant, to operate the taxicab, was without authority to permit anyone else to use or operate the taxicab for any purpose whatsoever, it was not within the power of M to permit anyone else to use the taxicab either in the course of the owner's business, or otherwise. In neither event could M, to this extent, extend the scope of his agency without the consent of his principal, C.
Error from City Court of Albany; Clayton Jones, Judge.
Suit by Mrs. W. D. Jordan against Mathias Cowart for injuries sustained in automobile collision. Verdict for plaintiff, defendant's motion for new trial was overruled, and defendant brings error.
Judgment reversed.
Mrs. W. D. Jordan brought suit against Mathias Cowart for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained as the result of a collision between an automobile being operated by the plaintiff and an automobile owned by the defendant, Cowart, which was being operated at the time of the collision by one Charlie Lee Mitchell. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff; the defendant made a motion for new trial based on the general grounds; this motion was overruled, and the defendant excepted.
The evidence shows that the defendant owned one automobile which he operated "from the line" of the New Deal Taxicab Company. The New Deal Taxicab Company was not a taxicab business owned and operated by the defendant. It was simply a name under which the defendant and other independent owners of automobiles each operated his automobile as a taxicab. Each owner, including the defendant, paid a stated monthly amount for each automobile that he operated "from the line" which was intended and used solely for the purpose of paying the expense of maintaining and operating an office, including a telephone and the salary of a girl to answer the telephone and receive calls for taxi-cabs. Each cab was under the sole and exclusive direction and control of its owner, with no authority in any of the other owners of taxicabs which were operated from the line of the New Deal Taxicab Company, to control the manner of its operation. The owner of a cab could put his car on the line or take it off whenever he saw fit. The several owners of cabs operating under the name and style of the New Deal Taxicab Company employed no person who was given any authority or control over the cabs being operated from that line. The owner of each cab collected the fares earned by his cab and was under no duty or obligation to account therefor to any of the other owners. Hence, it appeared that the extent of the defendant's operation of a "taxicab business" under the name of New Deal Taxicab Company was simply the independent operation of one taxicab from a stand, called the New Deal Taxicab Company, the expenses of which, as above stated, were paid by the defendant and the other independent owners and operators of taxicabs from that stand.
The one taxicab owned by the defendant was operated on a commission basis by Jessie Maddox. The defendant testified in part as follows: On cross-examination * * *"the defendant testified: * * *"
On re-direct examination the defendant testified: * * *"
The plaintiff relied upon the testimony of Charlie Lee Mitchell to show that the defendant was bound because of the general custom of employees of owners operating taxicabs to employ substitute drivers. Mitchell testified in effect that there were persons who had obtained taxi driver's permits who did not have regular jobs driving a cab, who hung around the various cab companies, including the New Deal Taxicab Company, and would drive extra when anyone would hire them. The witness did not, in fact, know of any custom at the New Deal Taxicab Company whereby an employee of an owner of a cab would, when he became tired, employ such an extra driver to drive the...
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Hagin v. Powers
...substitute servant. As stated in Carter v. Bishop, 209 Ga. 919, 928, 76 S.E.2d 784, 790 (1953), quoting from Cowart v. Jordan, 75 Ga.App. 855, 860, 44 S.E.2d 804 (1947): 'The relationship of master and servant can not be imposed upon a person without his consent, express or implied. The def......
- Cowart v. Jordan