Cowden v. Montgomery Cty. Soc. for Cancer Control
Decision Date | 27 January 1984 |
Docket Number | No. C-3-81-436.,C-3-81-436. |
Citation | 591 F. Supp. 740 |
Parties | Richard N. COWDEN, Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY SOCIETY FOR CANCER CONTROL, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
James M. Moore, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff.
Margo Evans, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant Montgomery County Soc. for Cancer Control.
Gregory P. Dunsky, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant United Way, Inc.
DECISION AND ENTRY DECLARING DEFENDANT UNITED WAY'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. # 3) TO BE MOOT; GRANTING DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE MOTIONS TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL AND GRANTING DEFENDANT SOCIETY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT I OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND GRANTING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAID MOTION DIRECTED TO COUNT II OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT; GRANTING DEFENDANT SOCIETY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE PRAYED FOR RELIEF OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES; CLARIFICATION OF TIME LIMITATIONS ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT UNITED WAY'S MOTION IN LIMINE; FURTHER PROCEDURES ORDERED OF COUNSEL; CONFERENCE CALL TO BE SET AFTER RECEIVING PLAINTIFF'S SUBMISSION
This matter is before the Court for resolution of several motions presently pending. Defendant United Way has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as to United Way pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Doc. # 3). Defendant, Montgomery County Society for Cancer Control has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Counts I and II of the Complaint (Doc. # 15) and a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Demand for a Jury Trial (Doc. # 21). Defendant, United Way, Inc. of Dayton, has filed a Motion in Limine (Doc. # 18), and has also filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Demand for a Jury Trial (Doc. # 19).
The captioned cause was filed by Plaintiff, Richard N. Cowden, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 13311 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), the Civil Enforcement provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Plaintiff, formerly an employee of Defendant Montgomery County Society for Cancer Control (the Society), alleges that various acts and omissions of both the Society and the United Way, Inc. of Dayton (the United Way), constituted violations of Plaintiff's rights under the pension plan and under various ERISA provisions.
The Society is an affiliated agency of the United Way, Inc., of the Dayton area. The pension plan, which appears to be the focal point of the present dispute, is a defined benefit plan administered by United Way and underwritten by the National Health & Welfare Mutual Life Insurance Association, Inc. ("NHW"). (Complaint, Exhibit A)
In Count I, Plaintiff notes that the Society has the responsibility of providing the United Way with salary information on its employees for the purpose of enabling the United Way to calculate the employees' levels of retirement benefits. According to Plaintiff, the Society has understated Plaintiff's salary in its reporting to the United Way and as a result he will receive substantially reduced benefits if he retires in 1980.
Count II alleges that Plaintiff has, during the course of his employment, attempted on several occasions to obtain information concerning his pension rights and benefits, that the Society refused to provide him with the requested information and that, the Society intentionally discriminated against him in various ways in his employment because he attempted to obtain said information.
In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant United Way has known of and condoned the alleged wrongful conduct of the Society, and has also wrongfully denied Plaintiff information concerning his pension rights and benefits and has breached its "duty" to Plaintiff with respect to his pension rights and benefits, deferred annuity and hospitalization benefits and in various other unspecified ways.
For all of the various wrongs alleged to have been committed by each of the Defendants, Plaintiff seeks to recover an unspecified amount of compensatory damages, as well as $50,000 in punitive damages, from each of the Defendants. Plaintiff has also requested that this matter be tried to a jury.
Plaintiff alleges that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this controversy pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (cited in note 1) and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) which provides:
Certain paragraphs of Counts II and III of Plaintiff's complaint do appear to allege claims that, if true, would be properly redressible under the provision just cited which permits a beneficiary of a pension plan to bring a civil suit to recover benefits and to clarify and enforce his rights under his pension plan. Many of the paragraphs of Plaintiff's Complaint, however, appear to focus less on preserving Plaintiff's rights to his benefits under the plan and more upon the obligations and duties of the employer and plan administrator, as detailed in various ERISA statutory provisions as well as under the plan. Though Plaintiff does not specify which statutory provisions he feels Defendants have violated, it would appear that Plaintiff is alleging that the Defendants have failed to comply, inter alia, with the information reporting and disclosure requirements contained in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a), 1022, 1024(b)(3), and 1025(a) and (c) and that they have interfered with his rights under the pension plan in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1140.2 Moreover, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendant United Way has somehow breached its fiduciary duty as detailed in 29 U.S.C. § 1104,3 though it is not at all clear from the Complaint how the wrongs alleged could be construed as violations of this section.
To the extent the Complaint seeks to enforce the Society's and United Way's compliance with their respective obligations under the ERISA provisions, such as those just cited, as well as under the plan, the action is maintainable under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) which provides:
See, Kross v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 534 F.Supp. 251, 253 (N.D.Ill.1982) (suit to
enforce 29 U.S.C. § 1140 brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)); McGinnis v. Joyce, 507 F.Supp. 654, 657 (N.D.Ill.1981) ( ); Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Industries, 490 F.Supp. 534, 535 (E.D.Wisc.1980) ( ); see also, West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir.1980) ( ).
The Court finds that the above clarification of the provisions pursuant to which this action is properly maintainable is a necessary preliminary step to addressing certain of the pending motions, to which the Court now turns.
On August 26, 1981, the United Way filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as it relates to the United Way on the grounds that Plaintiff's Complaint failed to allege any wrongful conduct on the part of United Way and, thus, had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (Doc. # 3) Subsequent to the filing of that motion, Plaintiff filed and Amended Complaint wherein specific allegations are made concerning acts and omissions by the United Way which Plaintiff claims entitle him to some form of relief. (Doc. # 6)
As the Amended Complaint appears to have cured the defect in the originally filed Complaint and as Defendant United Way has filed an Answer to this Amended Complaint (Doc. # 7), the Court finds United Way's Motion to Dismiss to be moot.
Both Defendants have filed motions to strike Plaintiff's demand for a jury trial in this matter claiming that the ERISA civil enforcement provisions pursuant to which this action has been filed provide for equitable actions which are not properly triable to a jury.
To the extent the present suit states a claim that is actionable under Section 1132(a)(3), the clear language of the statute irrefutably corroborates the Defendants' contention that the present action is equitable. A plaintiff may, pursuant to Section 1132(a)(3), bring an action to "enjoin" violative conduct or to seek "other appropriate equitable relief." The parties have not cited, nor has the Court identified, any case in which a court has questioned the purely equitable nature of a 1132(a)(3) claim. To the contrary, the courts addressing the issue have accepted without question the equitable nature of such actions. See, e.g., Wardle v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir.1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112, 101 S.Ct. 922, 66 L.Ed.2d 841 (1981); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980); McGinnis v. Joyce, 507 F.Supp. 654 (N.D.Ill.1981); Stamps v. Michigan Teamsters Joint Council No. 43, 431 F.Supp. 745 (E.D.Mich.1977).
Any controversy that has existed as to whether the Civil Enforcement provisions of ERISA provide for an equitable or legal cause of action has focused on Section 1132(a)(1)(B) actions. Though one court held that such actions were...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Felton v. Unisource Corp.
...on contract, but statute of limitations for statutory rights and recovery of wages most analogous); Cowden v. Montgomery Co. Soc. For Cancer Control, 591 F.Supp. 740, 755 (S.D.Ohio 1984) (no analogy to state claim; ERISA is a statutory right). Finally, in Gladich v. Navistar Inter. Transp. ......
-
Trustees of Wyoming Laborers Health and Welfare Plan v. Morgen & Oswood Const. Co., Inc. of Wyoming
...F.Supp. 1302, 1305-06 (E.D.La.1984); Haynes v. O'Connell, 599 F.Supp. 59, 62 (E.D.Tenn.1984); Cowden v. Montgomery County Society for Cancer Control, 591 F.Supp. 740, 754-55 (S.D.Ohio 1984); Nolan v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 588 F.Supp. 1375, 1379 (E.D.Mich.1984). But see Teamsters Pension......
-
Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Kraftco, Inc., s. 84-5518
...Nolan v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 588 F.Supp. 1375, 1379 (E.D.Mich.1984). But see Cowden v. Montgomery County Society for Cancer Control, 591 F.Supp. 740, 755 (S.D.Ohio 1984) (applying statute for actions based "upon a liability created by statute"). Tennessee law specifies a six-year limi......
-
UNITED ELEC., RADIO & MACH. WORKERS v. Amcast Indus.
...v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983); Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.1980); Cowden v. Montgomery County Soc. for Cancer Control, 591 F.Supp. 740 (S.D.Ohio 1984). However, exceptions exist to the general prerequisite of exhaustion. In Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indu......