Cowdrey v. A.T. Transport

• Decision Date: 22 May 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 72124
• Citation: 141 Mich.App. 617,367 N.W.2d 433
• Parties: William COWDREY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.T. TRANSPORT, Defendant-Appellant. 141 Mich.App. 617, 367 N.W.2d 433
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 433

367 N.W.2d 433

William COWDREY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. A.T. TRANSPORT, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 72124.

141 Mich.App. 617, 367 N.W.2d 433

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 23, 1984.

Decided April 1, 1985.

Released for Publication May 22, 1985.

[141 MICHAPP 618] Sablich, Ryan, Bobay & Pollok, P.C. by Lawrence D. Kaechele, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

Fortino, Plaxton & Moskal by Charles M. Fortino, Alma, for defendant-appellant.

Before S.J. BRONSON, P.J., and R.B. BURNS and BORSOS ^*, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right from a circuit court order of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint for breach of an oral employment contract.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that he had been employed by defendant pursuant to a contract of employment entered into in April, 1976. Plaintiff averred that defendant had breached the employment contract by discharging plaintiff without cause in December, 1981. In Count I, plaintiff [141 MICHAPP 619] sought monetary damages for breach of contract. In Count II, plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to damages for mental and emotional distress.

In his deposition, plaintiff testified that in March, 1976, he met with representatives of defendant to discuss the employment of plaintiff and his wife with defendant. At the meeting in March, wages and benefits were discussed. Plaintiff questioned defendant's representatives about job security and made a special point of inquiring about the duration of the position. Plaintiff testified that defendant's representative "[g]uaranteed us that as long as the company was in operation and we done our job, that we would never have to worry about a job * * * ". Plaintiff quoted the agent as saying, "[a]s long as you people do your job and A & T Transport is in business, you'll never have a thing to worry about". Plaintiff was subsequently hired as a terminal manager and dispatcher in April, 1976. The parties did not enter into a written contract. In December, 1981, plaintiff was discharged.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of frauds, M.C.L. Sec. 566.132(a); M.S.A. Sec. 26.922(a). The trial court granted defendant's motion, ruling that the contract was terminable at will because it was for an indefinite period of time. The court also held that damages for mental distress are not available for breach of contract.

We first address defendant's contention that the contract was for more than one year and therefore was void under the statute of frauds. For purposes of this appeal, we consider defendant's motion to be one for accelerated judgment. GCR 1963, 116.1(5). Plaintiff claims that he had an oral contract under which he could only be fired for just cause as long as the company was in operation. Where an oral contract may be completed in less [141 MICHAPP 620] than one year, even though it is probable the contract will extend for a period of years, the statute of frauds is not violated. Fothergill v. McKay Press, 361 Mich. 666, 668, 106 N.W.2d 215 (1960). In the present case, the contract could have been performed within one year. The company could have terminated its operations or plaintiff could have performed so poorly that defendant would have had just cause to discharge him within one year. Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry Co, 91 Mich.App. 254, 256-257, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979); Hrab v. Hayes-Albion Corp, 103 Mich.App. 90, 94, 302 N.W.2d 606 (1981). To the extent that the trial court granted defendant's motion on the basis of the statute of frauds defense, we find error.

We next address the trial court's ruling that the contract was terminable at will because it was for an indefinite period of time. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Supreme Court specifically rejected such a proposition and held that "a provision of an employment contract providing that an employee shall not be discharged except for cause is legally enforceable although the contract is not for a definite term * * * ". Toussaint, p. 598, 292 N.W.2d 880. The representations relied on in Toussaint to claim an employment contract terminable for just cause only are virtually identical to those relied on by plaintiff in the present case. ¹ Defendant argues, however, that the contract in the present case is a satisfaction contract under which the employer is [141 MICHAPP 621] the sole judge of the propriety of the discharge. In Toussaint, the Supreme Court rejected such an argument and held that a promise to discharge for cause or good cause only is not a satisfaction contract. Toussaint, pp. 620-621, 292 N.W.2d 880. Consequently, the trial court was in error when it found that the contract was terminable at will because it was for an indefinite period of time.

We believe, however, that the trial court properly granted summary...