Cowger v. Pocomoke City
| Decision Date | 21 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 570,570 |
| Parties | ROBERT COWGER, JR. v. POCOMOKE CITY, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Worcester County
UNREPORTED
Opinion by Berger, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
This case is before us on appeal from an order in the Circuit Court for Worcester County granting summary judgment in favor of Pocomoke City ("the City"), appellee.1 The lawsuit was filed by Robert Cowger, Jr. ("Cowger"), the appellant. Cowger alleged that the City violated the City Charter in effecting Cowger's termination as City Manager and failed to pay him all the wages he was due under Maryland law.
Cowger presents one issue for our consideration on appeal,2 which we have rephrased as follows:
Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the City complied with the required procedure of its City Charter in terminating Cowger's employment as City Manager.
For the reasons explained herein, we shall hold that the trial court did not err in granting the City's motion for summary judgment regarding the City's compliance with its City Charter. We shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On August 28, 2017, Cowger was appointed as the City Manager of Pocomoke City, Maryland. On April 15, 2019, the City Council met in a closed session to discussemployment issues related to Cowger. At that time, the City Council voted three to two in favor of preliminary Resolution No. 519, calling for Cowger's removal as City Manager. At that time, Cowger was suspended and did not perform any work for the City after that point. The following day, the City issued a press release announcing that Cowger was no longer employed as the City Manager. Through counsel, Cowger challenged the action taken at the April 15 meeting, alleging that the vote was improperly held in a closed session and that one of the City Council members did not yet have the right to vote on a proposed resolution.3
After receiving Cowger's challenge to the City's April 15 action, the City undertook a "do-over" on April 29, 2019. During the meeting on April 29, 2019, the City Council held an open session calling for the removal of Cowger as the City Manager. During this meeting, the City Council adopted preliminary Resolution No. 519 calling for Cowger's removal. This version of the Resolution provided that Cowger was suspended from duty and was owed the balance of his salary plus two months' severance pursuant to Section C-22 of the City Charter. The document memorializing the adoption of preliminary Resolution 519 contained a line providing that the Resolution was introduced on April 15 and passed on April 29. Cowger was then paid a severance for the months of May andJune of 2019. Further, during the litigation in the trial court, the City paid Cowger the balance of his April salary, plus interest.
On May 24, 2019, Cowger requested, in writing, a public hearing on his proposed removal pursuant to Section C-22 of the City Charter. In response, the City Council held a public hearing on June 18, 2019 with Senior Judge David B. Mitchell acting as the moderator. After the public hearing, on June 20, 2019, the City adopted final Resolution No. 519, terminating Cowger as City Manager.
On July 26, 2019, Cowger filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Worcester County against the City, seeking reinstatement as City Manager and an award of back pay. On August 9, 2019, the City filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. On August 22, 2019, Cowger filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and an opposition to the City's motion. The City filed a reply on August 23, 2019. The trial court held a hearing on the outstanding motions on December 10, 2019 and denied both parties' motions. On December 13, 2019, the City filed a motion for reconsideration and an answer to Cowger's complaint. That same day, Cowger filed an opposition to the City's motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied the City's motion for reconsideration on December 31, 2019.
Cowger filed an amended complaint on January 14, 2020. That same day, the City filed an answer to Cowger's amended complaint and a motion for partial summary judgment as to counts II and III of the amended complaint. On January 16, 2020, Cowger filed an opposition to the City's motion for partial summary judgment and the City filed areply. On February 7, 2020, the trial court ordered that the City's motion would not be ruled upon until discovery was completed. The City filed an amended answer on February 11, 2020. On May 19, 2020, the City filed an additional motion for summary judgment. Cowger filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on May 27, 2020. Both parties filed an opposition.
The trial court held a motions hearing regarding the parties' competing summary judgment motions on July 13, 2020. During the hearing, the trial court explained on the record that it would deny Cowger's motion for summary judgment and grant the City's motions for summary judgment as to all three counts. Cowger filed a notice of appeal on August 10, 2020. The trial court issued its written opinion on September 16, 2020. In its written opinion, the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment as to Counts I and II. The trial court, however, granted Cowger's motion for summary judgment as to Count III. On September 17, 2020, the City filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court's judgment, alleging that the court erroneously stated in its opinion that Cowger was not paid severance for May and June, resulting in its granting of Cowger's motion for summary judgment as to Count III. Cowger filed a reply on September 29, 2020 and an additional notice of appeal on October 14, 2020. On October 16, 2020, the trial court entered an order granting the City's motion to alter or amend its judgment and revised its earlier judgment, granting the City's motion for summary judgment as to Count III. Cowger filed an additional notice of appeal on October 20, 2020.4
"Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides, in relevant part, that 'the court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" O'Connor v. Balt. Cnty., 382 Md. 102, 110 (2004) (quoting Md. Rule 2-501(e)). "We review a trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we construe all 'reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the undisputed facts against the moving party.'" Six Flags Am., L.P. v. Gonzalez-Perdomo, 248 Md. App. 569, 580 (2020) (quoting Mathews v. Cassidy Turley Md., Inc., 435 Md. 584, 598 (2013)).
"When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must make the threshold determination as to whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists." Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 579 (2003). Further, we must look to determine "'whether the trial court's legal conclusions were legally correct.'" Fraternal Order of Police Montgomery Cnty. Lodge 35 v. Montgomery Cnty. Executive, 210 Md. App. 117, 128 (2013) (quoting Montgomery Cnty., Md. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery Cnty. Lodge 35, Inc., 427 Md. 561, 572 (2012)). "We review de novo . . . the interpretation of a statute" or charter. Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 (2012) (internal citations omitted); see also O'Connor, supra. 382 Md. at 113.
Before turning to the question of law, we must first determine whether the trial court properly determined that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. O'Connor, supra, 382Md. at 110-11. "We construe the facts properly before the [C]ourt, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. at 111 (citing Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 155 (2003)). The mere presence of a factual dispute will not "render summary judgment improper[,]" as the dispute must be material. Id. (citing Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 738 (1993)).
In our view, the trial court did not err in determining that no material dispute of fact exists. There is no dispute that the removal of the City Manager is governed by the City Charter. Further, the parties agree that there was a closed meeting held on April 15, 2019 to discuss Cowger's employment. The parties also do not dispute that the City Council held a public hearing on April 29, 2019 and adopted preliminary Resolution No. 519 calling for the removal of Cowger and that a public hearing was held, at Cowger's request, on June 18, 2019. Finally, on June 20, 2019, the parties agree that the City Council held a public hearing adopting final Resolution No. 519 calling for Cowger's removal. "The only [dispute] is the legal effect of the undisputed facts." Id. at 112.
We now turn to the question of whether the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cowger argues that the trial court erred by ruling, as a matter of law, that the City removed Cowger as City Manager in accordance with the procedural requirements of the City Charter. Specifically, Cowger argues that the City Charter requires the City Council to hold no less than four separate public meetings to effectuate the City Manager'sremoval.5 The City argues that the City Council complied with the procedural requirements of the City Charter by adopting a preliminary resolution and then a final resolution in two separate public meetings.
Section C-22 of the City Charter provides that:
The [City] Council shall appoint the City Manager for an indefinite term and may remove him by a majority vote of its members. At least thirty days before such removal shall become...
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