Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co.

Decision Date17 August 1950
Docket NumberNo. 10024.,10024.
Citation183 F.2d 652
PartiesCOWLING v. DEEP VEIN COAL CO., Inc.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Joe Vol Butt, James M. Buthod, Evansville, Indiana, S. Hugh Dillin, Petersburg, Indiana, Dillin & Dillin, Petersburg, Indiana, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Benjamin G. Cox, Terre Haute, Indiana, Charles C. Whitlock, Terre Haute, Indiana, Gerald E. Hall, Princeton, Indiana, Gambill, Dudley & Cox, Terre Haute, Indiana, for defendant-appellee Deep Vein Coal Co., Inc.

Before KERNER, DUFFY and LINDLEY, Circuit Judges.

DUFFY, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Deep Vein Coal Company, Inc., (hereinafter referred to as "Deep Vein"), moved for a summary judgment assigning five reasons for such motion. The trial judge granted the motion without indicating the basis for his action. From a judgment entered in favor of Deep Vein plaintiffs bring this appeal.

Plaintiffs, claiming to own fractional undivided interests in the oil and gas under certain lands in Gibson County, Indiana, brought this action for an injunction and an accounting and other relief. The complaint, after setting forth diversity of citizenship and requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy, alleges that Deep Vein drilled a producing oil well upon the real estate in question without the prior consent of the plaintiffs, and that the proportionate share of the oil recovered, being the property of the plaintiffs, has been appropriated and converted by Deep Vein which has failed and refused to account for same to the plaintiffs. In addition plaintiffs allege that Deep Vein is operating another producing oil well or wells on adjacent lands in such a manner as to drain the oil from under the property described in the complaint, and that the defendant Farm Bureau Oil Company (hereinafter called "Farm Bureau") has purchased from Deep Vein oil produced from the described premises, and has failed to account to plaintiffs for their proportionate share thereof.

The pleadings show and it is without dispute that on December 8, 1944, one Louise S. Davis was the owner of the entire fee simple title to 240 acres of land in Gibson County, Indiana, subject only to the interest of Citizens National Bank of Paris, Illinois, as trustee. The bank's interest was subsequently acquired by Mrs. Davis and is of no importance in a consideration of the issues now before us. On said date Louise S. Davis, joined by her husband and the trustee, executed an oil and gas lease of said premises to Deep Vein. By its terms the lease expired on December 8, 1945, unless oil or gas were previously thereto produced from said premises.

On October 4, 1945, by an instrument duly recorded on October 8, 1945, Louise S. Davis and her husband executed a mineral deed to one Milton A. Lobree, which purported to convey "an undivided one-half (½) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands * * * together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, operating and developing said lands for oil, gas and other minerals * * *." The mineral deed was expressly made subject to the oil and gas lease to Deep Vein dated December 8, 1944, but covered and included "an undivided one-half (½) interest of the oil royalty and gas rental or royalty to be paid under the terms of said lease."

On October 8, 1945, Milton A. Lobree and his wife executed several mineral deeds conveying an undivided 20/240ths interest in the oil, gas and other minerals in, under and that may be produced from said real estate to plaintiff Cowling, an undivided 15/240ths interest to plaintiff Rockey, and an undivided 15/240ths interest to plaintiff Watson.

On October 18, 1945, by an instrument recorded October 23, 1945, Louise S. Davis and husband executed what purported to be an extension of the original oil and gas lease to Deep Vein, extending said original lease until September 1, 1947, and as long thereafter as oil or gas was produced from said leased premises in commercial quantities, but that if no such oil or gas was produced before September 1, 1947, the original lease, as extended, was to be terminated.

Deep Vein's answer sets forth five defenses. It places in issue many of the material allegations of the complaint, and in addition pleads three affirmative defenses. In its second defense, Deep Vein asserts "that it has been paid for the working interest or has caused to be paid for the royalty sums for the oil removed by defendant, Deep Vein Coal Company, Inc., from said premises, except that a portion of the royalty oil has been suspended at the request of plaintiffs herein in accordance with the alleged ownership of plaintiffs as to such suspended portion, pending the determination of the issues presented by plaintiffs' complaint and that defendant is ready and willing to furnish a complete statement of all oil produced by it from said premises and of all oil sold by it from said premises, and to disburse payment therefor according to any order or judgment of the Court which may issue in the premises, should said order direct payment in a manner different than has been heretofore made by this defendant."

Defendant Farm Bureau answered that it had purchased oil from the tract in question between July 16, 1947, and May 24, 1948, and that it stands ready and willing to furnish a complete statement of all oil purchased by it from said premises and to disburse payment according to any order or judgment of the court should such order direct payment in a manner different from that which has been made by it.

Neither answer was verified.

Deep Vein moved the district court to require plaintiffs to procure and file for its use an abstract of title to the real estate claimed by them as set forth in the complaint.1 This motion was granted and thereafter plaintiffs filed such abstract. Deep Vein, invoking Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., then moved for summary judgment, based upon the pleadings, the abstract of title, and the affidavit of one Sampliner. Plaintiffs filed an affidavit of Lobree, the grantor of the mineral deeds under which they claim.

Deep Vein insists that the trial court acted correctly in ordering summary judgment in its favor based upon the pleadings, the Sampliner affidavit, and the "admissions" in the abstract of title. We cannot agree. Although plaintiff did not answer or reply to Deep Vein's affirmative defenses, an answer or reply was not required absent an order of the court. Rule 7(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They are deemed denied. Rule 8(d), id.; Radio Shack Corp. v. Radio Shack, Inc., 7 Cir., 180 F.2d 200. The pleadings considered alone present genuine issues...

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  • In re J. Baranello & Sons, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Eastern District of New York
    • 30 Noviembre 1992
    ...Epstein, 31 F.R.D. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y.1962)); see, e.g., Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.1961); Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 183 F.2d 652 (7th Cir.1950); Fremon v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 111 F.Supp. 39 (S.D.Iowa 1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 627 (8th Cir. 1954). Federal opinio......
  • Green v. Green
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 20 Enero 1955
    ...determined by Federal and not State rules. De Korwin v. First National Bank of Chicago, 7 Cir., 156 F.2d 860, and Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., Inc., 7 Cir., 183 F.2d 652, 655. And in this connection see Rule 19(a) and Neither do we think that the effort to remove Herschel as trustee of th......
  • Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 10225.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 30 Enero 1951
    ...to retain jurisdiction until the parties can seek the answer to this question in the courts of Wisconsin." Again in Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 7 Cir., 183 F.2d 652, 656, where there were no authoritative decisions as to the Indiana law, we said: "Where the Indiana courts have not render......
  • Stevens v. Loomis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • 7 Noviembre 1963
    ...Rule 19(a). Federal rules have been favored in, for example, Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 9th Cir., 289 F.2d 814; Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 7th Cir., 183 F.2d 652. State rules have been relied upon in Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 3d Cir., 179 F.2d 760, and Dunham v. Roberts......
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