Cowlitz Cnty. v. Univ. of Wash.
| Decision Date | 16 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 3:19-cv-06250-RBL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | COWLITZ COUNTY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, et al., Defendants, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor. |
ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT AND MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM/MOTION TO STRIKE
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants University of Washington and Angelina Godoy's (collectively "UW") Motion to Remand to State Court [Dkt. # 17] and Plaintiffs Cowlitz County and Cowlitz County Youth Services Center's (collectively "Cowlitz") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim/Motion to Strike [Dkt. # 15]. The underlying dispute in this case concerns a records request by UW seeking documents held by Cowlitz. The documents contain information about juveniles being held at an immigration detention center that Cowlitz operates pursuant to a contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
After Cowlitz informed ICE of UW's request, ICE notified Cowlitz that release of the records was barred by 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. Cowlitz then filed this declaratory judgment action in state court, after which the United States intervened on behalf of ICE. The U.S. removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), a broad statute that gives the federal government and its officers substantial leeway to obtain a federal forum. UW asserts that removal was nonetheless improper because the state court designated the U.S. as a "party-plaintiff," and Cowlitz similarly argues that the U.S. cannot counterclaim against Cowlitz because they are both plaintiffs. For the following reasons, the Court resolves this tangle of procedural arguments by DENYING both Motions and designating the U.S. a defendant.
On June 5, 2018, Angelina Godoy of the UW Center for Human Rights submitted a records request to Cowlitz. State Court Records, Dkt. # 13-1, at 20. The request sought to ascertain the amount and duration of detainments between 2013 and 2018 at the Cowlitz County Juvenile Facility, which Godoy identified as "one of 3 facilities in the nation approved to house unaccompanied minors for ICE/ORR for a period exceeding 72 hours." Id. Cowlitz responded to Godoy's request, informing her that it was governed by Cowlitz County Superior Court General Rule 31.1 (GR 31.1) and would take about 30 days to complete. Id. at 23-25. Cowlitz also reached out to ICE for its input on the request, to which ICE replied that everything "look[ed] good." Id. at 28, 31. Cowlitz, via the Superior Court, fulfilled Godoy's request on July 9. Id. at33-34. Godoy then submitted another request for the admittance date of each juvenile, which was also fulfilled. Id. at 37, 39-40.
On July 18, Godoy submitted a third records request, this time seeking a copy of the underlying agreement between Cowlitz and ICE, as well as the "complete jail file (redacted to conceal personally-identifying information) for all minors housed in Cowlitz County facilities for ICE from 1/1/2015-7/15/2018". Dkt. # 13-1 at 43. Godoy later clarified that she was "interested in reviewing a copy of each arrestee's facesheet, depicting charges, arrest reports, holds for other agencies, book-in and book-out dates, any ICE detainers, and transfer information," but not medical information. Id. at 55.
Cowlitz again reached out to ICE about Godoy's request, and ICE responded on September 18. ICE did not object to the release of its agreement with Cowlitz, but the agency informed Cowlitz that the jail file documents could not be disclosed to UW. Dkt. # 13-1 at 62. ICE explained that release was barred by 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, which prohibits state and local governments from "disclos[ing] or otherwise permit[ting] to be made public the name of, or other information relating to" detainees held on behalf of ICE. On October 10, Cowlitz informed ICE that the records were scheduled for release on October 17. Id. at 64. The next day, a representative of the U.S. Department of Justice contacted Cowlitz requesting an extension and reaffirming ICE's position regarding 8 C.F.R. § 236.6. Id. Cowlitz agreed to the extension and did not release the jail file documents. Id. at 68.
On December 5, Cowlitz reached out to the representative of the Washington Office of Attorney General assigned to UW. Dkt. # 13-1 at 72-73. Cowlitz explained the situation and requested assistance navigating the clash between state law and federal regulations, noting that some courts had held that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 bars any disclosure but that a recent Eastern Districtof California case held that it did not. Id. (citing United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1093 (E.D. Cal. 2018)). Cowlitz also mentioned that ICE was "poised" to challenge its effort to release the documents with redactions. Id. at 72. On a subsequent call, Godoy and an AG representative informed Cowlitz that UW would not file a court action to compel release but that it would like Cowlitz to fulfill the request with any necessary redactions. Id. at 148. Unsure of its obligations, Cowlitz initiated the present action.
Cowlitz filed its action for declaratory relief against UW in Cowlitz County Superior Court on February 1, 2019. Dkt. # 1-1. Specifically, among several other requests related to GR 31.1 and the PRA, Cowlitz asks that the Court declare that it may respond to UW's request "subject to such restrictions and protections on further release of such records to the general public as may be deemed necessary and reasonable by the Court for purposes of compliance with 8 C.F.R. § 236.6." Id. at 7-8; see also Cowlitz Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. # 13-1, at 220 ().
In its Answer, UW likewise seeks a declaration (1) that the juvenile detention documents are subject to the same disclosure obligations under state law regardless of whether such records are managed under the local court system, and (2) that 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 does not bar release of the Cowlitz records. Dkt. # 31-1 at 167. UW also requests "[t]hat the Court order release of the redacted records to the University under RCW 13.50.010(8) and/or 13.50.280, for purposes of legitimate research for educational and/or public purposes." Id.
On May 30, 2019, the U.S. moved to intervene in the case as a party defendant. Dkt. # 13-1 at 175. To justify its entrance into the case, the U.S. pointed out that it was opposed to both Cowlitz and UW because neither aimed to protect the documents from disclosure. Id. at 176. UW did not object to the U.S. intervening but argued that it should be as a plaintiff because the U.S.'s interests were directly opposed to those of UW, the preexisting defendant. Id. at 200. Further, UW contended that Washington law requires a party seeking to prevent disclosure of records to initiate an action—i.e., proceed as a plaintiff. Id. For its part, Cowlitz suggested that the U.S. be allowed into the case "either as an intervenor or as a defendant." Id. at 301. The Superior Court granted the U.S.'s motion to intervene but joined the U.S. as a plaintiff. Id. at 334-35.
On December 30, 2019, the U.S. removed this case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Dkt. # 1. The U.S. then filed an "Answer and Counterclaim" against Cowlitz asserting that, under 8 C.F.R. § 236.6, the disputed documents are federal property that cannot be made public by any state or local government. Dkt. # 8 at 7-8. The U.S. claims that it has property rights over the documents and that their release is forbidden by § 236.6, meaning that the PRA does not require disclosure or that the PRA is preempted by § 236.6. Id. Accordingly, the U.S. seeks declaratory and injunctive relief preventing Cowlitz from releasing the documents. Id. at 8-9.
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), or the Federal Officer Removal Statute, dates back to 1815. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 126 (1989). The Statute was enacted to prevent states from "arrest[ing] . . . the operations of the federal government" by prosecuting federal officers withimpunity under state law. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880)). Over the decades, however, § 1442(a)(1)'s scope has expanded significantly. Today, it reads as follows:
The current Statute is the result of many amendments, one of which occurred in 1996 when Congress added the portion allowing "[t]he United States or any agency thereof" to remove. City of Cookeville, Tenn. v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 390 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing S.Rep. No. 104-366, at 6-7, 30-31 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4202, 4210-11). This was a direct reaction to International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 79-82 (1991), which held that the pre-1996 version of the Statute only supported removal by federal officers. Id. at 388-89. In 2011, Congress further amended the Statute by "expand[ing] the language to...
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