Cowman v. Hansen

Citation250 Iowa 358,92 N.W.2d 682
Decision Date14 October 1958
Docket NumberNo. 49430,49430
PartiesMartha COWMAN, individually, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Ernest Cowman, Jr., deceased, and Ernest Cowman, Sr., Appellants, v. Pearl HANSEN, d/b/a 'Shorty's Place', Thelma A. Mason, d/b/a 'Ray's Place', Oswald August Stangl, d/b/a 'Tap and Grill', Patrick O. Stangl and Ralph M. Geith, d/b/a 'Pat and Ralph's Tavern', Pierre H. Bousquet, Adolph Larson, Western Surety Company, and American Surety Company, Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Frederick D. Lewis, Jr., and McMullin, Running, Test & Gardner, Des Moines, for appellants.

Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, Des Moines, and E. Raymond Mick, Carl W. Murphy, Johnson & Johnson, and Bert A. Bandstra, Knoxville, for appellees.

LARSON, Justice.

Plaintiffs' action at law for damages is divided into six counts. The first five counts thereof are based upon civil liability arising out of the Dram Shop Law, appearing as chapter 129, Code of 1954, I.C.A. Count VI is based upon negligence under the common law. Pursuant to certain amendments, beer as defined in section 124.2, subsection 10 of the Code, I.C.A., was identified as the beverage served by defendant tavern owners. Allegedly, this caused the intoxication of Raymond F. Vohl and established a legal cause of action against the defendants for the death of Ernest Cowman, Jr., who was fatally injured later in an automobile accident resulting from the negligent driving of Vohl. Motions to dismiss by defendants, based upon the theory that the Dram Shop Law in Iowa does not apply because beer containing less than four per cent of alcohol by weight is nonintoxicating by legislative definition, were sustained by the trial court. The trial court also dismissed plaintiffs' Count VI for the reason that 'the common law provided for no relief or remedy' under the circumstance, and plaintiffs appeal.

This appeal presents but two issues: (1) Did the legislature, by enacting section 125.2 of the Code, I.C.A., exclude from the pre-existing law in chapter 129 of the Code, I.C.A., beer containing less than four per cent of alcohol by weight; and (2) Does the common law recognize a right of action in tort against a dispenser of alcoholic beverages for injury or damage caused by a consumer after he has left the establishment?

Chapter 129, Code of 1954, I.C.A., provides in section 129.2 as follows:

'Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who shall be injured in person or property or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name against any person who shall, by selling or giving to another contrary to the provisions of this title any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages.'

Substantially, the provisions of this statute have remained unchanged since the Code of 1873. It has appeared in Title VI of the Code since 1924. In 1933 the legislature enacted what is known as the Liquor Control Act, which also became a part of Title VI, and at that time made a distinction between beer and other alcoholic beverages. It adopted section 124.2, subsection 10, which provided that beer containing not more than four per cent alcohol by weight should come under the provisions of chapter 124 and be dispensed in a different manner than other beverages containing a greater per cent of alcohol. At the same time it amended section 1923, which now appears in the Code as section 125.2, by striking the period after the word 'whatever' and inserting in lieu thereof the words, 'provided, however, that the words 'liquor' or 'intoxicating liquor' wherever used in title six of the code of Iowa, 1931, shall not be construed to include beer * * * containing not more than three and two-tenths per centum (3.2%) of alcohol by weight.' Subsequently it was again amended raising the 3.2% to 4%. This section now provides:

'The word 'liquor' or the phrase 'intoxicating liquor' when used in this title, shall be construed to include alcohol, brandy * * * and all intoxicating liquor whatever provided, however, that the words 'liquor' or 'intoxicating liquor' wherever used in this title of the code, shall not be construed to include beer, * * * containing not more than four per cent of alcohol by weight.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Plainly stated, these sections of the Code are a mandate that we shall not construe beer containing not more than four per cent alcohol intoxicating wherever the term 'intoxicating liquor' is used in Title VI. The words used admit of no other meaning.

I. Statutes that are clear and unambiguous are not subject to interpretation by the courts. No principle of law has received more attention in decisions and in legal treatises. Mallory v. Jurgena, Iowa, 92 N.W.2d 387; Hindman v. Reaser, 246 Iowa 1375, 72 N.W.2d 559; Dingman v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 90 N.W.2d 742; Tucker v. Nason, Iowa, 87 N.W.2d 547; Hahn v. Clayton County, 218 Iowa 543, 255 N.W. 695; Palmer v. State Board of Assessment and Review, 226 Iowa 92, 94, 283 N.W. 415, and cases cited therein; Jones v. Thompson, 240 Iowa 1024, 1036, 38 N.W.2d 672, 678. In the letter case we clearly stated the rule in Iowa that, 'The only legitimate purpose of statutory construction * * * is to ascertain the legislative intent. And when the language of the statute is so clear, certain, and free from ambiguity and obscurity that its meaning is evident from a mere reading, then the canons of statutory construction are unnecessary, because there is no need for construction * * *. We need not search beyond the wording of the statute.' We must refuse to do so here. When the general assembly said 'wherever used in this title', its meaning is quite clear.

Admittedly, this amendment illustrates both the good and evil of reference amendments. 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, § 36, page 57. If perchance the legislature did not wish to amend the Dram Shop Act, the use of the words 'wherever used in this title' were unfortunate, for they are so clear they permit of no deviation. Then, too, if there was to be a deviation, where in Title VI would the exception or exceptions apply? Does the law permit us that lawmaking power? Obviously it does not.

In Eysink v. Board of Sup'rs of Jasper County, 229 Iowa 1240, 1244, 296 N.W. 376, 378, we laid down the rule which is applicable here, as follows:

'It must be remembered that it is only where a statute is of doubtful or uncertain meaning that courts are at liberty to apply rules of construction. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the expressed terms of the statute. This court has no power to write into the statute words which are not there. These rules are of course elementary and do not require the citation of authorities. * * * As this court observed in a case involving the construction of the Sales Tax Act, 'in construing this statute, we are bound by the definition of terms made use of by the Legislature. * * * 'the Legislature is its own lexicographer.'' Sandberg Co. v. Iowa State Board of Assessment and Review, 225 Iowa 103, 107, 278 N.W. 643, 645, 281 N.W. 197.'

We agree with the trial court and the defendants that here the legislature has been its own lexicographer insofar as Title VI of the Code is concerned. It is presumed to have known of the provisions of chapter 129 of the Code, and that it was in Title VI of the Code when enacting the amendment to what is now section 125.2. It redefined 'liquor' and 'intoxicating liquor' as used in Title VI of the Code, and by clear and definite reference made it applicable throughout the title without exception.

Those who feel the legislature actually did not intend to distinguish between a whisky and beer drunk in the application of our civil damage act must take their case to the general assembly for correction. We concede the logic of plaintiffs'argument against any distinction as far as the public welfare is concerned, but it is clearly addressed to the wrong government body. It is a proper matter for the legislature to consider, and if perchance the reference 'wherever used in this title' was too broad, only that body can make the correction. In the meantime we must presume that it well knew it could have excepted chapter 129 of the Code, I.C.A., from that definition of 'intoxicating liquor', but did not.

The Dram Shop Act being a civil damage act, its extent and conditions, of course, are clearly within the power of the creator, our legislature. It can extend or diminish the right and provide the remedy as it sees fit. It is its own lexicographer, and common-law and dictionary definitions must yield when the legislature, by express enactment, defines its own terms. Muscatine City Water Works v. Duge, 232 Iowa 1076, 1082, 7 N.W.2d 203; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 315; 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, §§ 261, 262, 263.

We find no quarrel with plaintiffs' contention that, when construction is appropriate, we should construe such a statute so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. It simply is not applicable here. Their contention that there is an ambiguity involved herein due to the fact that chapter 129 itself was not specifically amended to exclude four per cent beer as nonintoxicating, is not persuasive. It is quite clear that the general assembly wished only to avoid much needless repetition, and indeed it would be hard to find a place where the legislative intent to amend generally was more clearly expressed. The proviso 'that the words 'liquor' or 'intoxicating liquor' wherever used in this title * * *', is all inclusive. As before pointed out, it even goes farther. There is a mandate to the courts that no construction should be made that will permit the inclusion of beer...

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