Cox v. Allen, A02A1628.
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
| Citation | 567 S.E.2d 363,256 Ga. App. 53 |
| Docket Number | No. A02A1628.,A02A1628. |
| Parties | COX v. ALLEN. |
| Decision Date | 20 June 2002 |
567 S.E.2d 363
256 Ga. App. 53
v.
ALLEN
No. A02A1628.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
June 20, 2002.
Reinhardt, Whitley, Wilmot & Summerlin, Glenn Whitley, Tifton, for appellee.
On May 21, 2001, judgment was entered for the defendant, Evelyn House Allen, and against the plaintiff, Jamie R. Cox, on her personal injury action, which was tried to a verdict. Finding no error of law, we affirm.
[256 Ga. App. 54] On May 27, 1999, Allen was driving in a southerly direction on Tift County Road 424, a dirt road, and approached the stop sign for the intersection of County Road 159, a paved road. Allen turned left onto Road 159 in an easterly direction and brought her Cadillac four-door sedan to a momentary stop diagonally across the road after entering the intersection. Cox was driving westerly on Road 159, approaching the intersection. When Cox was several hundred feet from the intersection, Allen made a left turn in front of her and stopped momentarily diagonally across her path. Cox swerved onto the other side of the road into the eastbound lane and braked. Allen completed her turn into the eastbound lane; the vehicles collided head-on. Allen received a traffic citation for failure to yield the right-of-way and entered a plea of guilty to this charge. Cox filed this personal injury action.
At the trial of the case, John J. Tyson was called by the defense and qualified as an expert witness, a law enforcement officer. Over objection, he testified that although he had neither investigated the collision nor visited the collision scene, his opinion was that Cox was driving too fast, skidded straight down the road into the path of Allen, and collided with her in the eastbound lane. Cox made timely exceptions to the failure of the trial court to give her requests to charge on OCGA §§ 40-6-202 and 40-6-390(a) and significance of a plea of guilty to a traffic citation.
1. Cox contends that the trial court erred in failing to give her request to charge on OCGA § 40-6-390(a), reckless driving. We do not agree.
Request to Charge No. 7 was not given, which read:
I charge you, members of the jury, that Section 40-6-390(a) of the Official Code of Georgia, which was in full force and effect on the day and at the time and place of the incident giving rise to this suit, provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Any person who drives any vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property commits the offense of reckless driving. In this connection, I charge you that if you find, as contended by the plaintiff, that the defendant violated this Code section, this would constitute negligence as a matter of law on the part of said defendant.
In this request to charge, the charge itself did not define the specific conduct that constituted reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property or point to specific conduct that was reckless under the facts and circumstances of this case. "However, as defined in OCGA § 40-6-390(a), reckless driving requires proof of a specific act which evidences a `reckless disregard for the safety of persons or [256 Ga. App. 55] property....'" (Emphasis omitted.) Kirkland v. State, 206 Ga.App. 27, 33(17), 424 S.E.2d 638 (1992). See Whiteley v. State, 188 Ga.App. 129, 132-133(5), 372 S.E.2d 296 (1988) (OCGA § 40-6-390(a) requires the specific reckless conduct to be alleged as an essential element of reckless driving). Thus, the written charge as submitted was an incomplete statement of the law. Id. at 132-133, 372 S.E.2d 296.
2. Cox contends that the trial court erred in not giving her Request to Charge No. 6, regarding OCGA § 40-6-202 and dealing with stopping and obstructing the free passage of vehicles on the highway. We do not agree.
Cox's Request to Charge No. 6 read:
I charge you members of the jury, that § 40-6-202 of the Official Code of Georgia, which was of full force and effect on the day and at the time and place the incident giving rise to this suit, provides in pertinent part as follows: "Outside of a business or residential district, no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, park, or so leave such vehicle off the roadway; but in every event, an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles, and a clear view of the stopped vehicles—shall be available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon the...
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...not admissibility, of the testimony. See Layfield v. Dept. of Transp. , 280 Ga. 848, 851, 632 S.E.2d 135 (2006) ; Cox v. Allen , 256 Ga.App. 53, 57, 567 S.E.2d 363 (2002). Counsel's failure to make a meritless objection cannot constitute evidence of ineffective assistance. Porter v. State ,......
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