Cox v. Ametek, Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:17-cv-00597-GPC-AGS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | ADAM COX, individually, by and through his durable power of attorney, VICTOR COX, and on behalf of himself and others similarly situated; MARIA OVERTON, individually and on behalf of herself and others similarly situated; JORDAN YATES, individually and on behalf of himself and others similarly situated,, Plaintiffs, v. AMETEK, INC.; THOMAS DEENEY; SENIOR OPERATIONS LLC; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,, Defendants. AMETEK, INC.; and THOMAS DEENEY; Third-Party Plaintiffs, v. GREENFIELD MHP ASSOCIATES, L.P.; KORT & SCOTT FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC; TUSTIN RANCH PARTNERS, INC.; SIERRA CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, INC.; VILLA CAJON MHC, L.P.; KMC CA MANAGEMENT, LLC; KINGSLEY MANAGEMENT CORP.; STARLIGHT MHP, LLC; and ROES 1-100, inclusive, Third-Party Defendants. SENIOR OPERATIONS, LLC, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. GREENFIELD MHP ASSOCIATES, L.P.; KORT & SCOTT FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC; TUSTIN RANCH PARTNERS, INC.; SIERRA CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, INC.; VILLA CAJON MHC, L.P.; KMC CA MANAGEMENT, LLC; KINGSLEY MANAGEMENT CORP.; STARLIGHT MHP, LLC; ROES 101-200, inclusive, Third-Party Defendants. |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO DISMISS
[ECF Nos. 31, 32, 45, and 46] Before the Court are four motions to dismiss filed by the third-party defendants (the "TPDs") in this case. Two were filed by Third-Party Defendants KMC CA Management, LLC ("KMC"); Kingsley Management Corp. ("Kingsley"); and Villa Cajon MHC, L.P. ("Villa Cajon"), who seek dismissal of the third-party complaints filed against them by Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Senior Operations ("Senior"), LLC (ECF No. 31), and Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Ametek, Inc. ("Ametek"), and Thomas Deeney (ECF No. 32). The other two motions to dismiss were filed by Third-Party Defendants Greenfield MHP Associates ("Greenfield"); Starlight MHP, LLC ("Starlight"); Kort & Scott Financial Group, LLC ("K&S"); Tustin Ranch Partners, Inc.("Tustin"); and Sierra Corporate Management, Inc. ("Sierra"), who also seek dismissal of the third-party complaints filed against them by Ametek and Deeney (ECF No. 45) and Senior (ECF No. 46). All four motions have been fully briefed by the appropriate parties. The Court refers to the third-party plaintiffs in this case—Ametek, Deeney, and Senior—as the "TPPs."
Based upon a review of the moving papers, the applicable law, and for the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motions to dismiss. The motions are denied in all respects except for the TPPs' claim for attorneys' fees under California law, which are dismissed.
Plaintiffs in this case—individuals who previously lived or currently live in three mobile home parks owned and/or operated by the TPDs—filed this action on March 24, 2017, against Ametek, Deeney, and Senior. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs' operative Amended Complaint alleges that Ametek, Deeney, and Senior caused and/or failed to mitigate the contamination of groundwater and subsurface soil in and around the mobile home parks by toxic waste originating from an aerospace equipment manufacturing facility owned by Ametek, and later Senior. (See ECF No. 5.) This case is one of four related cases currently pending before the Court relating to this alleged contamination. See also Trujillo, et al. v. Ametek, Inc., et al., No. 3:15-cv-01394-GPC-AGS; Greenfield MHP Assocs. v. Ametek, Inc., et al., L.P., No. 3:15-cv-01525-GPC-AGS; Cox, et al. v. Ametek, Inc., et al., No. 3:17-cv-01211-GPC-AGS.
On June 20, 2017, Senior filed a third-party complaint against the TPDs. (ECF No. 12.) Ametek and Deeney did the same on June 27, 2017. (ECF No. 14.) Both third-party complaints assert that the TPDs are at least partially liable for Plaintiffs' damages because the TPDs knowingly withheld information about the contamination from Plaintiffs when executing rental agreements. The third-party complaints group the TPDs based on alleged past and present ownership interests in the three mobile home parks atissue in this case; they refer to the "Greenfield TPDs" (Greenfield, K&S, Tustin, and Sierra), the "Villa Cajon TPDs" (Villa Cajon, KMC, and Kingsley), and the "Starlight TPDs" (Starlight, Sierra, K&S, and Tustin). (See ECF Nos. 12 at 2-3; 14 at 2-4.)
The TPPs allege that one or more of the Greenfield TPDs has managed the Greenfield mobile home park since 1993, and have owned it since June 2004; one or more of the Villa Cajon TPDs has owned the Villa Cajon mobile home park since late 2009 or early 2010; and one or more of the Starlight TPDs has owned and operated the Starlight mobile home park since May 2015. (ECF Nos. 12 at 7-9; 14 at 7-9). As a result of public notices by the State of California and/or the TPDs' due diligence during their acquisition of these properties, the third-party complaints allege, the TPDs were or should have been aware of "the environmental conditions" impacting the three mobile home parks. (Id.) The TPPs allege that the TPDs were on actual, constructive, or inquiry notice of the contamination originating from the TPPs' facility, information about which would have been found in the records of the San Diego County Department of Health, the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board, or the California Department of Toxic Substances Control. (ECF Nos. 12 at 9-12; 14 at 9-12.) The TPPs also allege that, despite the fact that the TPDs brought suit against the TPPs in 2015 over the contamination of their properties, the TPDs did not disclose this lawsuit to their residents for approximately a year and a half. (ECF Nos. 12 at 12-13; 14 at 12-14.) As a result, the TPPs claim, the TPDs violated their duties "to deal honestly with Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, in negotiating lease agreements and disclosing information or concerns which residents of their respective Parks would find material in deciding to live at such Parks." (ECF Nos. 12 at 13; 14 at 13.)
The TPPs' third-party complaints assert claims of (1) equitable indemnity, (2) comparative indemnity, and (3) declaratory relief, and seek attorneys' fees. (See ECF Nos. 12 at 14-17; 14 at 14-17.)
The TPDs move to dismiss the TPPs' claims under Federal Rules of CivilProcedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
A motion under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular claim. " Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). The TPDs' jurisdictional challenge here is facial; they offer no evidence to prove that the allegations in the third-party complaint relevant to the Court's jurisdiction are not true, and—as discussed further below—they contend generally that a party in the TPPs' position may not assert a claim against the TPDs. Because "[t]he district court resolves a facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)," Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014), the Court applies the legal standard appropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to the TPPs' jurisdictional challenge.
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the complaint as not containing sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief. "To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While "detailed factual allegations" are unnecessary, the complaint must allege more than "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
"Equitable indemnity allows one tortfeasor to seek either full or partial indemnityfrom a joint tortfeasor on a comparative fault basis." San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Monsanto Co., No. 15-cv-578-WQH-JLB, 2016 WL 5464551, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016). The TPDs argue that the TPPs cannot seek such indemnity from the TPDs because (1) the TPPs lack standing to bring such a claim, and (2) the third-party complaints do not allege facts stating a plausible claim for indemnification.
The TPDs contend that the TPPs lack standing to assert their third-party claims because the TPPs have not been harmed by the TPDs' conduct. (ECF Nos. 31-1 at 5-6; 32-1 at 5-6; 45-1 at 4-5; 46-1 at 4-5.) The Court disagrees.
The TPDs' claims are prototypical contribution actions envisioned by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a). That rule permits a defendant to bring a third-party action against "a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (emphasis added). The TPDs, according to the third-party complaints, may be liable to the TPPs for at least some of the damages sought by Plaintiffs. Courts in this district have rejected similar jurisdictional challenges to impleader actions under Rule 14(a) premised on the theory that the defendant/third-party plaintiff has not yet been injured by the third-party defendant. See, e.g., Hallam v. Gemini Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-2442-CAB-JLB, 2015 WL 11237479, at *2-4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2015); ...
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