Cox v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 10 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13 C 4532 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | ROBERT ALLEN COX Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Robert Allen Cox ("Plaintiff" or "Cox") seeks judicial review of a final decision of Defendant Carolyn Colvin, the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's application for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits in a March 1, 2012 written decision. Cox appealed the ruling to this Court and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that seeks to reverse the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion. The Court has carefully reviewed the administrative record but omits a detailed description of it. The parties have outlined the record in their briefs and are thoroughly familiar with the relevant evidence.
In order to qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that he is disabled. An individual does so by showing that he cannot "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last fora continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 4243(d)(1)(A). Gainful activity is defined as "the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b).
The Social Security Administration ("SSA") applies a five-step analysis to disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The SSA first considers whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity during the claimed period of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). It then determines at Step 2 whether the claimant's physical or mental impairment is severe and meets the twelve-month durational requirement noted above. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At Step 3, the SSA compares the impairment (or combination of impairments) found at Step 2 to a list of impairments identified in the regulations ("the Listings"). The specific criteria that must be met to satisfy a Listing are described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant's impairments meet or "medically equal" a Listing, the individual is considered to be disabled, and the analysis concludes; if a Listing is not met, the analysis proceeds to Step 4. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
Before addressing the fourth step, the SSA must assess a claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which defines his exertional and non-exertional capacity to work. The SSA then determines at the fourth step whether the claimant is able to engage in any of his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can do so, he is not disabled. Id. If the claimant cannot undertake past work, the SSA proceeds to Step 5 to determine whether a substantial number of jobs exist that the claimant can perform in light of his RFC, age, education, and work experience. An individual is not disabled if he can do work that is available under this standard. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(v).
A claimant who is found to be "not disabled" may challenge the Commissioner's final decision in federal court. Judicial review of an ALJ's decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which provides that "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A court reviews the entire record, but it does not displace the ALJ's judgment by reweighing the facts or by making independent credibility determinations. Eider v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). Instead, the court looks at whether the ALJ articulated an "accurate and logical bridge" from the evidence to her conclusions. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). This requirement is designed to allow a reviewing court to "assess the validity of the agency's ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review." Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the claimant is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ's opinion is adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence. Eider, 529 F.3d at 413 (citation omitted).
Following the familiar five-step analysis, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Janice Brunning found at Step 1 that Cox had not engaged in substantial gainful activity sinceMarch 21, 2009.1 She found at Step 2 that Cox suffered from the severe impairments of depression and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"). Neither of these impairments met or medically equaled a listing at Step 3, either singly or in combination. Before moving to Step 4, the ALJ found that Cox was not credible concerning the severity of his symptoms. She also assessed his residual functional capacity ("RFC"). The ALJ concluded that Cox could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels. Several non-exertional limitations were imposed. These included work that is "simple, repetitive and routine and does not involve more than two to three steps and is performed in a work environment exclusive of public contact or more than occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors." (R. 23). The ALJ found at Step 4 that Cox could perform his past relevant work. In the alternative, she concluded that other jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform if a Step 5 analysis were required. Thus the ALJ concluded that Cox was not disabled.
Cox claims that the ALJ erred by (1) incorrectly assessing his credibility, (2) failing to provide reasons for discounting the opinion of a medical source, and (3) insufficiently stating reasons for the RFC. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
If an ALJ finds that a medical impairment exists that could be expected to produce a claimant's alleged condition, he must then assess how the individual's symptoms affect his ability to work. SSR 96-7p. The fact that a claimant's subjective complaints are notfully substantiated by the record is not a sufficient reason to find that he is not credible. The ALJ must consider the entire record and "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). Factors that should be considered include the objective medical evidence, the claimant's daily activities, allegations of pain, any aggravating factors, the types of treatment received, any medications taken, and functional limitations. Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); SSR 96-7p. A court reviews an ALJ's credibility decision with deference and overturns it only when the assessment is patently wrong. Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir. 2010).
The ALJ found that Cox was not fully credible concerning the severity of his symptoms. Cox disputes this finding only by citing two limited grounds. First, he claims that the ALJ mischaracterized the record by failing to cite favorable evidence in an August 14, 2009 treatment note of therapist Christine Abt. Abt wrote that Cox "still has some suicidal thoughts that go in and out of his mind like a snap of a finger." She also noted that he had low energy and that "he does not have a plan [because] the thoughts do not last that long." (R. 517).
This does not demonstrate why the ALJ's credibility finding was incorrect. As the ALJ discussed, the bulk of Cox's treatment notes establish a different picture than this suggests. Indeed, the same entry that Cox relies on also noted that he "is not depressed, [and has] no mania." (R. 517). Only two months earlier psychiatrist Dr. Bloom stated along similar lines that Cox had no suicidal thoughts and was experiencing "euthymic mood [with] normal affect." (R. 520). Psychiatrist Dr. Dwivedi stated the same in February and April 2009. (R. 523, 527). Abt herself agreed in February 2010 that Cox was feeling "fine" andhad no suicidal ideation. (R. 495). The same was true in April 2010. (R. 500). She stated in July 2010 that Cox reported that his mood, energy level, and concentration were all "good." (R. 511).
Cox has not addressed why the sole notation he relies on is sufficient to reverse the ALJ's credibility finding. That fact that she did not mention the totality of Abt's treatment note is not, in itself, reversible. An ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in the record. Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2001). While it would have been preferable for the ALJ to have accounted for the entry that Cox cites, a credibility assessment does not have to be perfect. Outlaw v. Astrue, 412 Fed.Appx. 894, 899 (7th Cir. 2011); Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008). The burden of challenging the ALJ's conclusion falls on Cox. Showing "that a credibility determination is patently wrong in a high burden." Mueller v. Astrue, 860 F. Supp.2d 615, 631 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (internal quotes and citation omitted). Cox has not presented any argument on why the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion if she had cited Abt's August 14, 2009 comments.
Cox's only other basis for challenging the ALJ's decision is that she did not cite his Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") scores. Cox points out that therapist Abt and other therapists frequently assigned him a score of 40.2 Scores between 31 and 40 reflectsome impairment in reality testing or communication or, in the alternative, suggest a major...
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