Cox v. Cook 8212 751, No. 74

• Decision Date: 24 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74
• Citation: 43 L.Ed.2d 587,420 U.S. 734,95 S.Ct. 1237
• Parties: James D. COX, former Assistant Director for Treatment, Virginia Division of Corrections, et al. v. James R. COOK. —751
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

420 U.S. 734

95 S.Ct. 1237

43 L.Ed.2d 587

James D. COX, former Assistant Director for Treatment, Virginia Division of Corrections, et al.

v James R. COOK.

No. 74—751.

March 24, 1975.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 1975.

See 421 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 1689.

PER CURIAM.

This petition by officials of the Virginia prison system for a writ of certiorari arises out of a suit brought against them by an inmate of the Virginia State Penitentiary in which he alleged that on three occasions, between October 1968 and March 1970, he was placed in solitary confinement for misconduct without being given notice of the misconduct charged or an opportunity to meet the charge at a hearing,¹ in violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and in which he requested monetary damages and expunction of all records of the discipline.

A jury at a partial trial² found that respondent had in fact been placed in solitary confinement for misconduct without notice or a hearing. It also found that he had suffered mental but no physical damage. However, it made no finding with respect to the responsibility of any of the petitioners for his confinement. After offering respondent an additional opportunity to adduce further proof on this issue before a second jury, the trial judge ruled that respondent could recover nothing as the proof was insufficient to establish that petitioners had knowledge of or were responsible for respondent's confinement.

Respondent appealed and, without briefs or oral argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, holding that the proof below would support a finding that petitioners were ultimately responsible for respondent's solitary confinement, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

On petition for rehearing petitioners contended that the constitutional rule requiring notice and some kind of a hearing in connection with serious prison discipline determinations was created in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, in 1974, and was expressly made inapplicable to disciplinary action taken before the date of that decision. Id., at 573—574, 94 S.Ct. at 2983—2984. Thus even if respondent had proved that petitioners were responsible for his solitary confinement he could not, as a matter of law, obtain relief. The Court of Appeals denied the rehearing petition, saying that, in the district in which respondent was incarcerated, a federal decision predating Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, namely Landman v. Royster, 333 F Supp. 621 (E.D.Va.1971), required notice and a hearing in connection with serious prison discipline determinations. Petitioners contend here that Landman v. Royster, supra, was itself decided after the discipline determinations involved in this case and thus supplies no more basis for liability in this case than does Wolff v. McDonnell. We agree.

In Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, we held that a state prisoner was entitled under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to notice and some kind of a hearing in connection with discipline determinations involving serious misconduct. However, we expressly rejected the holding of the Court of Appeals in that case that

'the due process requirements in prison disciplinary proceedings were to apply retroactively so as to require that prison records containing determinations of misconduct, not in accord with required procedures, be expunged,' 418 U.S., at 573, 94 S.Ct., at 2983;

and we expressly held our decision not to be retroactive. The holding was made in the context of a request for expunction of the records of prison discipline determinations. The same result...