Cox v. Cox
| Decision Date | 10 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 1--1074A145,1--1074A145 |
| Parties | Alva COX, Respondent-Appellant, v. Sarah F. COX, Petitioner-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Minor & Fields, Evansville, for respondent-appellant.
James D. Lopp, Sr., James D. Lopp, Jr., Evansville, for petitioner-appellee.
The parties to this action were married after a whirlwind courtship and the petitioner Sarah F. Cox, appellee herein, left her home in Olney, Illinois and went to Oregon to marry the appellant, Alva Cox.
Sarah was 59 years of age and Alva was 68 years of age when the parties were married on May 13, 1969. Sarah had been married three times before and was the mother of eight children, while Alva had been married four times before and had one child.
The parties hereto resided in Oregon for some time and moved back to Olney, Illinois and spent a winter in Florida and also some time in Mexico and were residing at Petersburg, Indiana when Sarah brought the action for the dissolution of the marriage on February 1, 1974.
After trial of the cause, the court decreed a dissolution of the marriage and set the real estate owned in Indiana off to Alva, subject to the lien of the alimony judgment to Sarah and awarded Sarah $22,000 alimony and her attorney a fee of $2,000 in addition to the original preliminary fee of $250 which Alva had paid.
Three issues are raised in this appeal, namely: (1) that the finding of the court in awarding Sarah F. Cox an alimony judgment in the amount of $22,000 is excessive; (2) that the finding of the court in awarding Sarah F. Cox an alimony judgment in the amount of $22,000 is not supported by sufficient evidence, and (3) the allowance of $2,000 attorney's fee for plaintiff's attorney is excessive. Issues one and two will be grouped and treated herein as one pursuant to Rule AP. 8.3(A)(7).
The evidence showed that at the time of the marriage to Sarah, Alva was worth in contracts, cash and personal property the sum of $135,802.52 and at trial time was worth $134,868. Sarah, at the time of the marriage, owned a house in Olney, Illinois, worth $2,500 and another house which she sold for $5,500 and on which Alva paid off a $1,300 indebtedness.
Alva and a former wife moved from Illinois to Oregon where he and his then wife sold a trailer park for $75,000 of which the purchaser paid down $50,000 and $700 was to be paid per month to each of the said parties on the contract of purchase.
Alva, then in Florence, Oregon, purchased in 1965 for $32,000, land on which he developed a trailer park, selling it in 1971 for $80,000 on a conditional sales contract with a $20,000 down payment and the balance of $60,000 to be paid in payments. This contract was still in existence at the time of the trial of this cause. Subsequent to this sale Alva and Sarah moved to Petersburg, Indiana, where Alva purchased a trailer court for $23,000 and on which he spent $20,000, making his total investment $43,000.
Alva contends that Sarah did nothing to enhance the property in its value either in Oregon or at Petersburg, Indiana, and had no cash investment and therefore her award of alimony was excessive. The record discloses a serious conflict in the evidence on this point as there is an abundance of evidence in the record that Sarah, while in Oregon, did the work of a man in repairing and remodeling buildings on the trailer court as well as in construction of new buildings, helping to lay tile, digging ditches and building roads. She also testified that as to the Petersburg, Indiana trailer park she did the same kind of work and as much or more than in Oregon. She maintains that when the Petersburg property was purchased there were six trailer spaces that were usable and at the time she left there were 38 spaces usable.
Sarah also testified that when they wintered in Florida they received $100 per week income for taking care of a trailer court, plus a trailer furnished which was for their joint services.
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