Cox v. Cox, No. 2003-SC-0706-DG.

Decision Date25 August 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2003-SC-0706-DG.
Citation170 S.W.3d 389
PartiesHarold Dale COX, Appellant, v. Shannon Kay COX (Now Esslinger), Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Paul V. Hibberd, Pregliasco Straw-Boone, Louisville, Counsel for Appellant.

Adam Clayton Miller, Danville, Counsel for Appellee.

GRAVES, Justice.

This case involves the registration and enforceability of a Texas judgment as a "foreign judgment" under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA), KRS 426.950-426.975. Appellant, Harold Dale Cox, and Appellee, Shannon Cox Esslinger, married in Texas in July 1998. The parties subsequently moved to Danville, Kentucky, where they purchased property. Appellee remained in Kentucky until July 15, 2000, when she relocated to Texas. On January 19, 2001, Appellee filed an original Petition for Divorce in the District Court of Smith County, Texas.

Appellant received via United States mail a Texas Citation for Personal Service Decree, and was personally served with notice in Danville by a Boyle County Deputy Sheriff. Appellant did not respond to the Petition for Divorce. The District Court of Smith County, Texas, entered a Final Decree of Divorce on October 2, 2001. The Decree divided the marital estate and returned to the parties their non-marital assets. The Decree also granted an equitable lien in favor of Appellee in the amount of $87,079.72. The lien was assessed against the real and personal property held by Appellant in Boyle County, Kentucky.

On December 7, 2001, Appellee filed a Notice and Affidavit of Foreign Judgment in the Boyle Circuit Court. In response, Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, Alter, Amend or Vacate. The trial court denied Appellant's motion. Appellee then filed a Motion for Enforcement of Foreign Judgment, which the trial court granted in an order entered on June 20, 2002. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. We granted review.

I.

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by authenticating a Texas judgment imposing a financial burden on him when the Texas court lacked in personam jurisdiction to do so.1 Appellant claims that in personam jurisdiction could have been established by the State of Texas only if he established minimum contacts with Texas such that the entry of a judgment did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).

Appellee argues that the Texas judgment should be afforded full faith and credit under the UEFJA. Appellee also argues that Appellant should have raised and preserved the jurisdiction issue before the Texas trial court, and by failing to do so, he purposefully availed himself to the jurisdiction of that court.

The case requires us to review some fundamental principles of civil procedure regarding in personam jurisdiction. In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), the United States Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process Clause, a state cannot assert in personam jurisdiction over a defendant unless that defendant was personally served with process in that state, or voluntarily appeared before the court. Id. at 733.

International Shoe Co., supra, expanded the personal jurisdiction reach of courts beyond the rule enunciated in Pennoyer. The Court held that even when a defendant is not served within the forum state, due process is satisfied when the state subjects a non-resident defendant to in personam jurisdiction so long as the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state, and the assertion of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154. The Court discussed several factors to be considered in evaluating whether minimum contacts exist. These factors include: the quantity and quality of the activities; whether the activities of the defendant were continuous and systematic; whether the defendant availed himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state; and whether the defendant's activities in the state gave rise to the cause of action. Wilson v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589, 592-93 (Ky.2002)(citing International Shoe Co., supra).

Since International Shoe Co., supra, the United States Supreme Court has applied and elaborated upon its test in a wide range of cases. See Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978)(in a child custody dispute, a state could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident merely because he acquiesced in his daughter's desire to live with her mother in the forum state); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980) (due process analysis of personal jurisdiction includes defendant's ability to foresee being hauled into court in a forum state); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) ("Once it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with `fair play and substantial justice.'")

In Wilson, supra, this Court applied a three-part personal jurisdiction test from the Sixth Circuit case Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968). This test has previously been used by the Court of Appeals on numerous occasions. See e.g., Tube Turns Division of Chemetron Corp. v. Patterson Co., Inc., 562 S.W.2d 99 (Ky.App.1978). We will again use this three-part analysis, as it...

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6 cases
  • Evans v. Hess
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 8 d5 Abril d5 2016
    ...jurisdiction may be established by a party's availing himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state (Cox v. Cox, 170 S.W.3d 389 (Ky. 2005) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemp. Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed......
  • Robinson v. Robinson
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 1 d5 Dezembro d5 2006
    ...___ S.W.3d ___, 2006 WL 658938 (Ky.App.2006)(Opinion Final, May 5, 2006); Allen v. Devine, 178 S.W.3d 517 (Ky.App. 2005); Cox v. Cox, 170 S.W.3d 389 (Ky.2005); Fowler v. Sowers, 151 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Ky. App.2004); Fenwick v. Fenwick, 114 S.W.3d 767, 779 (Ky.2003); Scheer v. Zeigler, 21 S.W.......
  • Gibson v. Gibson
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 22 d5 Dezembro d5 2006
    ...refer to "subject-matter" jurisdiction, while we believe the correct concept is "in personam" or "personal" jurisdiction. Cox v. Cox, 170 S.W.3d 389 (Ky.2005). 4. This order specifically states that Sheri and the children had resided in North Carolina since 5. Sheri describes this order as ......
  • Marrs v. Walters Automobiles, Inc.
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • 31 d5 Janeiro d5 2014
    ...(Ky. App. 2012) (quoting Doe v. Golden & Walters, PLLC, 173 S.W.3d 260, 270 (Ky. App. 2005) (footnotes omitted)). See also Cox v. Cox, 170 S.W.3d 389 (Ky. 2005). 4. KRS 417.170 states:(1) Upon application made within ninety (90) days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant, t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • § 13.01 Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property Title CHAPTER 13 The Divorce Action
    • Invalid date
    ...v. Sammons, 479 So.2d 223 (Fla. App. 1985).[42] Smith v. Smith, 167 Idaho 568, 473 P.3d 837 (2020).[43] See: Kentucky: Cox v. Cox, 170 S.W.3d 389 (Ky. 2005); Tennessee: Johnson v. Johnson, 24 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1058 (Tenn App. 1997). Virginia: Mock v. Mock, 11 Va. App. 616, 400 S.E.2d 543 (......

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