Cox v. Cox

• Decision Date: 16 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20110265–CA.,20110265–CA.
• Citation: 2012 UT App 225,285 P.3d 791,715 Utah Adv. Rep. 10
• Parties: Cheryl Lynn COX, Petitioner, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. Bruce COX, Respondent, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

285 P.3d 791

715 Utah Adv. Rep. 10

2012 UT App 225

Cheryl Lynn COX, Petitioner, Appellee, and Cross-appellant,

v.Bruce COX, Respondent, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.

No. 20110265–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Aug. 16, 2012.

Michael K. Mohrman, Tracy C. Schofield, and Jamie G. Pleune, Salt Lake City, for Appellant and Cross-appellee.

Larry B. Larsen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and Cross-appellant.

Before Judges McHUGH, DAVIS, and THORNE.

OPINION

McHUGH, Presiding Judge:

¶ 1 Bruce Cox (Husband) appeals from the trial court's order modifying his payment obligations to his former wife, Cheryl Lynn Cox (Wife).¹ Although the order granted Husband's Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree (the Petition), he contends that the trial court erred in making it effective as of the date of the trial on his Petition, rather than the date of Wife's remarriage or the month after he served his petition to modify. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Husband and Wife were married in 1980 and divorced pursuant to a stipulated Decree of Divorce (the Decree) on August 30, 2005. At the time of the divorce, the parties had two minor children. After initiating the divorce proceedings, Wife's counsel proposed a written Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (the Proposed Agreement) and submitted it to Husband for review. Husband did not retain an attorney. After some minor negotiations regarding the Proposed Agreement, the parties executed it. They also approved the Decree implementing its terms.

¶ 3 The Decree provided that Husband would pay $1,169 per month in child support until the minor children turned eighteen or graduated from high school (collectively, emancipation), whichever occurred later. Additionally, although the Decree specifically stated that “[n]either party shall be awarded alimony from the other party,” it contained a “property settlement,” whereby Husband was required to pay Wife $3,000 per month for a period of ten years. The purpose of the payment was to allow Wife to seek “training or job related skills” that she lacked at the time of the divorce. The Decree states that the $3,000 monthly payment includes Husband's child support obligation. In addition, the Decree orders that $50,000 of equity in the marital home be divided equally between the parties, with Husband's $25,000 to be secured by an equitable lien against the home and made payable upon the occurrence of certain events, including Wife's remarriage.

¶ 4 Wife remarried on December 29, 2006, but Husband did not learn of this event until 2008.² Thereafter, in June 2007, the oldest of the two children became emancipated. Despite Wife's remarriage and the oldest child's emancipation, Husband continued to pay at least $3,000 per month ³ until January 2009, when he received legal advice that he could reduce the payments to $695, the amount of his child support obligation for the remaining minor child.

¶ 5 On February 12, 2009, Husband filed the Petition, alleging a material change in circumstances based on Wife's remarriage and the older child's emancipation, and claiming that the property settlement in the Decree was actually alimony that terminated upon Wife's remarriage. After trial on the matter, the court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. It first determined that the Petition could not be treated as “a bona fide petition to modify” because Wife's remarriage and a child's emancipation were both foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Nevertheless, noting the “unusual circumstance” that the $3,000 per month property settlement payment included child support but could not be reduced when the children became emancipated, the trial court concluded that it had continuing jurisdiction under Utah Code section 30–3–5(3). SeeUtah Code Ann. § 30–3–5(3) (Supp.2012) ⁴ (providing the district court with “continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for ... distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary”).

¶ 6 On the merits, the trial court concluded that the property settlement “was in actuality an agreement to pay $3,000 per month for ten years with part of that amount designated as statutory child support as long as it was owed, and the balance to serve as support for the wife ... as alimony.” The court reasoned that Wife “made no case, either legally or factually, in support of a claim that the payments (except the child support portion) were anything other than a form of spousal support.” It also explained that “there was in fact virtually no property underlying the property settlement agreement, and [that Husband] received nothing of value in return for his promise to pay close to $300,000 over ten years.” Ultimately, the trial court concluded that the payment was alimony, despite the Decree's attempt to characterize it as a property settlement. However, the trial court did not indicate that this conclusion should be applied retroactively.

¶ 7 The trial court next considered when Husband's obligation to pay Wife the $3,000 per month ceased. First, it acknowledged that alimony obligations generally terminate automatically upon the receiving spouse's remarriage. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 30–3–5(9). Nevertheless, the trial court determined that there were equitable reasons to delay termination of the $3,000 payments in this case until December 1, 2010, the day of the trial on Husband's Petition. First, the court reasoned that Wife “relied, in good faith, on the expectation that support payments of as much as $3,000 per month would continue for a full ten years” and that up until the court's decision, it was reasonable for Wife to believe that “she still ha[d] some time to complete necessary training to improve her earning ability.” Second, the trial court indicated that because Wife had separated from her new husband and Husband stopped paying most support in the beginning of 2009, Wife had limited means to repay the alimony. As its third equitable consideration, the trial court found that Wife would be unable to reimburse Husband for all of the amounts she received after her remarriage and that Husband was “in a far better financial position than [Wife] to bear the loss incurred up to the present.” For the same reasons, the trial court rejected Husband's alternative argument that alimony should terminate on March 1, 2009, the first month after service of the Petition on Wife. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78B–12–112(4) (2008) (“If the tribunal orders that the support should be modified, the effective date of the modification shall be the month following service on the parent whose support is affected.”).

¶ 8 Applying the day of trial as the termination date, the trial court calculated the obligations of the parties, concluding that Wife was “entitled to a credit against [Husband] for unpaid alimony due and owing through November 30, 2010 in the amount of $32,055[ ].” However, the court also determined that because Wife failed to pay Husband his $25,000 equity interest in the marital home upon her remarriage as required by the Decree, Husband was “entitled to a credit against [Wife] ... and interest thereupon in the amount of $32,515 [ ].” Comparing those amounts, the trial court calculated that the net balance due to Husband was $460.

¶ 9 Finally, although the trial court determined that Husband was the prevailing party, it concluded that it was equitable for the parties to bear their own fees and costs. The trial court based this decision on the meritorious arguments on both sides and Wife's greater need. Husband filed a timely appeal.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 10 Husband contends that the trial court erred in making the effective date of its ruling the date of trial, which is nearly four years beyond Wife's remarriage. Specifically, Husband argues that the plain language of Utah Code section 30–3–5(9) does not permit the trial court to extend alimony payments based upon equitable considerations. See generallyUtah Code Ann. § 30–3–5(9) (Supp.2012). The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 6, 233 P.3d 836. In determining the correct interpretation of the statute, “our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.” Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2011 UT 83, ¶ 18, 268 P.3d 170 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do so by first looking “to the plain language of the statute,” presuming “that the legislature used each word advisedly and read [ing] each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 11 Next, Husband claims that even if the trial court was not required to terminate Husband's obligation to pay Wife $3,000 per month as of the date of her remarriage, it was required to relieve Husband of that obligation as of the month following service of the Petition on Wife. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78B–12–112(4) (2008) (providing that if the court grants a petition to modify a spousal support order, “the effective date of the modification shall be the month following service”). The trial court's statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review for correctness. See Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ¶ 6, 233 P.3d 836.

¶ 12 Finally, Husband argues that the trial court erred by determining that the question of whether his monthly payment obligation decreased upon the emancipation of the older minor child was moot. We review the issue of mootness de novo, affording no discretion to the trial court. See Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele Cnty., 2009 UT 48, ¶ 7, 214 P.3d 95.

ANALYSIS

I. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Terminate Husband's Payments to Wife as of the Date of Wife's Remarriage.

¶ 13 Utah Code section 30–3–5(9) provides, in relevant part, that “[u]nless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a...