Cox v. Dawson
| Decision Date | 06 February 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 86402,86402 |
| Citation | 911 P.2d 272,1996 OK 11 |
| Parties | Bennie COX, Petitioner, v. Ralph DAWSON, Respondent. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Larry Dickerson, Poteau, for Petitioner.
Jerry L. Smith, Tulsa, for Respondent.
The issue of first impression presented is whether, after initial appointments were made to the Oklahoma Mining Commission (Commission) beginning October 1, 1986, the Legislature intended that subsequent appointments under 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1 1 should be for terms ranging from one to seven years or that all appointments would be for seven years. We find that pursuant to 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1, appointments made after October 1, 1986, to the Oklahoma Mining Commission were intended to be for seven-year terms. We assume original jurisdiction and settle title to the office in the petitioner, Bennie Cox (Cox). 2
In October of 1993, Cox was appointed to fill a vacancy to position number 2 on the Commission. The appointment expired on January 1, 1995; and Cox was reappointed for a seven-year term ending January 1, 2002. The Senate confirmed both appointments. On September 19, 1995, Governor Keating informed Cox by letter that he believed that position number 2 on the Commission carried only a two-year term rather than a seven-year one and that his appointment expired on January 1, 1995. 3 Governor Keating named the respondent, Ralph Dawson (Dawson), to Cox's seat on the Commission. Cox went to the Commission's regularly scheduled meeting on October 19, 1995. When he was denied the right to participate as a Commissioner, he filed this original action. Oral argument before the Court was held on December 6, 1995.
TO THE OKLAHOMA MINING COMMISSION WERE
INTENDED TO BE FOR SEVEN-YEAR TERMS.
Cox urges us to construe 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1 4 as providing varying initial appointments ranging from one to seven years for the nine positions on the Mining Commission with all subsequent appointments intended to be for seven-year terms. Dawson asserts that the language of § 1 providing specific term limits for certain positions on the Mining Commission is clear and unambiguous and that the statute is not open to construction. We disagree.
The appointment scheme found in 45 O.S.1995 § 1 became effective on October 1, 1986. The scheme provides for nine members to be appointed--one member each to serve terms ranging from one to five years with two members to serve six-year and seven-year terms. When § 1 was enacted, Governor George Nigh appointed nine members to the staggered terms outlined in the statute. It is undisputed that, except for those appointments made to unexpired terms, 5 all subsequent appointments have been for seven-year terms. The Oklahoma Senate has participated in the appointment process by confirming appointees to these seven-year terms.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to discern the Legislative intent. Generally rules of statutory construction will not be applied to a statute if the will is clearly expressed. 6 Nevertheless, because an ambiguity may arise other than from the words used by the Legislature, the application of constructive aids may be necessary. 7
Under our case law, we hesitate to construe any statute that appears clear and unambiguous. Only when the circumstances make it unmistakable that there has been a legislative oversight will the Court intervene to clarify statutory enactments. Here, the facts cannot be ignored. Counsel for the respondent, Ralph Dawson (Dawson), conceded before this Court in oral argument that the failure to make it clear that the terms in 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1 were seven-year staggered terms was a legislative oversight. Even without this concession, the repeated acts of the Chief Executives of this State from both parties, the Senate's non-partisan confirmation of fourteen commissioners, and the Legislature's approval of the statute's interpretation by the approval of the Mining Commission's rules indicate that the wording of the statute itself is unclear. 8 These factors--the concession at oral argument that the failure to provide for seven-year terms subsequent to the initial appointments made under § 1 was a legislative oversight; the senatorial confirmations of multiple commissioners; the Legislature's acceptance and approval of Mining Commission Rules providing for seven-year terms; the Legislature's consistency in providing set terms for appointments to other boards and commissions 9--all indicate that the Legislature intended the Mining Commission appointments to be for staggered seven-year terms. Because application of the literal words of § 1 would result in a scheme not intended by the Legislature, we construe the statute only to avoid an absurdity--a result clearly not intended by the Legislature--and to give the statute its intended import. 10 Section 1 is ambiguous because of what it does not say--it does not delineate with certainty the terms of the appointees to the Mining Commission. Instead, it operates only as an initial-appointment statute guaranteeing that subsequent appointments will be staggered. On first reading, it appears to require initial appointment of members to certain time slots varying from one to seven years without making any provisions for subsequent appointments. 11 Having determined that the statute is unclear, we may resort to available sources of interpretative assistance to determine the Legislature's intent. 12
In Oral Roberts Univ. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 714 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Okla.1986), this Court recognized the rule that the interpretation or construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to the highest respect from the courts, specifically when the administrative construction is definitely settled and uniformly applied. An agency which has long applied an interpretation may not reverse its position absent a cogent reason--i.e. a compelling, forceful, or conclusively convincing ground. We held in Oral Roberts that the Tax Commission's assertion that a different interpretation of the word "church" should be applied because the Legislature had so specified was not sufficient to reverse the agency's interpretation of the term. The holding was premised on the fact that the Legislature had not spoken to the issue.
We also recognized in Oral Roberts that the Legislature had opportunities to amend the statute at issue and that its failure to do so, its slight amendments of the statute and its re-enactment of the statute subsequent to the Tax Commission's interpretation resulted in the Legislature adopting the construction given by the agency. The Oral Roberts opinion contains the following quote from Peterson v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 395 P.2d 388, 391 (Okla.1964):
"... where the legislature convened many times during this period of administrative construction without expressing its disapproval, such silence may be regarded as acquiescence in or approval of the administrative construction."
We found that the Legislature's re-enactment of the statute at issue in Oral Roberts resulted in its adoption as a matter of law of the Tax Commission's construction.
Commission has authority to adopt rules.
The Mining Commission adopted Rule 460:1-3-1 on February 15, 1990. As authority for adopting Rule 460:1-3-1, Rule 460:1-1-1 states:
The rule was submitted to the Governor and to both houses of the Legislature on February 22, 1990. The Governor approved the rule on April 6, 1990; and legislative approval occurred on April 17, 1990. 13 The Rule provides:
"Appointment, tenure and status
The organization of the Commission is declared to be that as enumerated in 45 O.S. Section 1, as amended, or as may otherwise be established by law.
(1) The Commission, is comprised of nine (9) members, appointed by the Governor and subject to approval by the Senate, for seven (7) year staggered terms.
(2) The Commission shall constitute a body corporate of the State of Oklahoma with the authority to exercise all powers conferred upon it by, but not limited to 45 O.S. Section 1(A) as amended.
(3) Each member shall be a qualified elector of the State.
(4) The nine member Commission shall consist of persons with varied backgrounds; at least one in engineering or geology; one in labor or worker's safety; one in agriculture or soil conservation; one in transportation; one in economic development or banking; one in public utilities; one in natural resources; and two at large."
It is clear that the Mining Commission interpreted § 1 to provide for seven-year staggered terms. The Legislature approved the Rule as written. It has convened in regular session three times since Rule 460:1-3-1 was promulgated. Although the Legislature amended 45 O.S. § 45 in 1995--four years after the Mining Commission adopted the rule construing the statute, it did not change the language relating to appointment of Commission members. 14 Legislative inaction in...
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