Cox v. Jones

• Decision Date: 06 February 1906
• Citation: 73 N.H. 504,63 A. 178
• Parties: COX et al. v. JONES et al.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

63 A. 178

73 N.H. 504

COX et al.

v. JONES et al.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Belknap.

Feb. 6, 1906.

Exceptions from Superior Court; Stone, Judge.

Bill by Edwin Cox and others against Himes V. Jones and others to restrain the execution of a contract to light the streets of the Meredith village fire district, made between the district and the Meredith Electric Light Company. The defendants' demurrer was sustained, subject to the plaintiffs' exception. Exception overruled.

The allegations of the bill are in substance as follows: The plaintiffs are taxpayers in the district. In August, 1904, the district made a valid contract with responsible parties to light its streets for one year from September 1st, and on September 7th made a contract with the Meredith Electric Company to light the streets for the term of five years from that date. The action of the district in making the latter contract was hasty and ill-advised, and the contract would not have been made if the district had not been governed by prejudice. The light furnished under the first contract was in every way adequate for the purpose for which it was provided. If the defendants are not enjoined, the plaintiffs, together with the other taxpayers in the district, will be compelled to pay not only for lighting the streets, but also the damages which may be recovered because of the district's failure to perform its first contract. A written memorandum of the contract in question was presented to and adopted by the district meeting, and a commitee of seven voters were directed by the meeting to execute the same in behalf of the district. A majority only of the committee signed.

Jewett & Plummer and Jewell, Owen & Veazey, for plaintiffs. Charles B. Hibbard, Prank M. Beckford, and Bertram Blaisdell, for defendants.

YOUNG, J. The plaintiffs say that the court had jurisdiction to enjoin the defendants because (1) the contract with the defendant company was illegal; and (2) it was not for the interest of the district to make such a contract. The plaintiffs' first position has no foundation to rest upon; for the mere fact that the district intended when it made the second contract to refuse to carry out the first would not make the second illegal, even if its refusal to complete the first contract would make it liable for all the damages the parties with whom that contract was made should sustain by reason thereof. A municipal corporation, as well as an individual, may refuse to proceed with...