Cox v. Krammer
Decision Date | 25 July 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 20020696-CA.,20020696-CA. |
Citation | 76 P.3d 184,2003 UT App 264 |
Parties | John William COX, Petitioner and Appellee, v. Brenda Lyn KRAMMER fka Brenda Lyn Cox, Respondent and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
George B. Handy and Raymond B. Rounds, Ogden, for Appellant.
Laura Rasmussen, Daniel L. Wilson & Associates, and F. Kim Walpole, Vlahos & Walpole, Ogden, for Appellee.
Before Judges JACKSON, BENCH, and THORNE.
¶ 1 Brenda Lyn Krammer appeals the trial court's denial of her request for attorney fees and order splitting the cost of an in-home custody evaluation with John William Cox. We affirm.
¶ 2 Cox and Krammer were divorced in February 1999. Upon agreement of the parties, the district court ordered joint legal custody of the couple's minor child. The court designated Krammer as the physical custodian and granted Cox visitation. In June 2000, Cox filed a motion to modify custody, asking that he be designated the custodial parent. Cox claimed that custody and visitation should be modified because Krammer was not financially stable, the child was being abused or neglected, and the child was being raised in a religion different than Cox.
¶ 3 At a pre-trial conference before a court commissioner, the commissioner ordered an in-home evaluation and directed Cox to pay the cost of this evaluation. The motion to modify custody was then heard by the district court, where it was denied. In its order, the district court stated that "there has been no substantial or material change of circumstances occurring after the [divorce] [d]ecree was entered in this matter to justify a change in custody of the child." The district court then ordered Krammer to pay one-half of the cost of the in-home evaluation. In response to Krammer's request for fees, the district court found Cox's motion had "serious merit and was brought in good faith" and ordered each party to pay their own attorney fees. Krammer appeals.
¶ 4 Krammer argues that she is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5(5) (Supp.2002). Krammer also argues that the district court exceeded its authority when it overruled the commissioner's pretrial order and directed the parties to split the cost of the in-home evaluation. Resolution of both of these issues requires that we engage in statutory interpretation. "[A] district court's interpretation of a statutory provision is a question of law that we review for correctness." Davis County Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, ¶ 9, 52 P.3d 1174.1
¶ 5 Krammer argues that she is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section 30-3-5(5) (Supp.2002), which provides:
[i]f a petition for modification of child custody... is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
Id. (emphasis added). When interpreting statutes "[w]e look first to the statute's plain language as evidence of the legislature's intent, and give effect to that plain language unless the statute is ambiguous." Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ¶ 27, 70 P.3d 1.
¶ 6 Krammer argues that the court must order a losing party to pay attorney fees to the prevailing party unless it finds the motion to modify has merit and was asserted in good faith. Thus, Krammer argues, "[i]f the [c]ourt does not make a finding in favor of [Cox] on both, not just one of those requirements, it becomes mandatory for the Court to award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney[ ] fee."
¶ 7 We disagree with Krammer's reading of section 30-3-5(5). Relying upon the plain language of the section, we conclude that Krammer would have been entitled to an attorney fee award only if the district court had found that Cox's motion was without merit and brought in bad faith. Here, the district court made a specific finding, both in its conclusions of law and in its final judgment, that Cox's motion had "serious merit" and had been brought in good faith.2 Thus, pursuant to section 30-5-5, Krammer is not entitled to attorney fees.
¶ 8 In the alternative, Krammer argues that she is entitled to attorney fees because the district court failed to support with specific factual findings its conclusions that Cox's motion had merit and had been brought in good faith. Krammer relies upon case law interpreting Utah Code Annotated section 78-27-56 (2000) to argue that she must be awarded fees unless the trial court makes specific factual findings to support its conclusion that there was no bad faith and its subsequent decision to deny fees under section 30-5-5(5).3 However, Krammer's reliance on section 78-27-56 is misplaced. Like section 30-5-5, section 78-27-56 requires a finding of bad faith and lack of merit as a trigger before attorney fees can be awarded. As previously stated, the trial court found Cox's motion to have "serious merit" and to have been brought in good faith. Consequently, Krammer does not meet the requirement of section 78-27-56. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of Krammer's request for attorney fees.
¶ 9 Next, relying on rule 6-401(2)(K) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration,4 Krammer argues that the district court erred when it directed her to pay half the cost of the in-home evaluation, because pretrial orders issued by commissioners cannot be modified by the district court. We disagree.
¶ 11 A plain reading of this text suggests that commissioners have the authority to issue two types of orders: (1) pre-trial orders necessary to the orderly progression of the proceedings; and (2) recommendations submitted to the trial court concerning the outcome of the controversy. Moreover, the plain language of the rule also suggests that only the commissioner's recommendations are to be considered the order of the court prior to submission to the trial court, and only the recommendations are subject to the objection provisions of the rule. See Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 6-401(4). Pre-trial orders, on the other hand, are always subject to modification by the trial court. It would defy logic to conclude that pretrial orders made by a trial judge are subject to modification, but that a commissioner's pretrial orders were not. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16 (establishing pre-trial procedures); Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 97 (Utah 1981) ( ); Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137, 256 P.2d 238, 241 (1953) (...
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