Cox v. Laycock

• Decision Date: 30 January 2015
• Docket Number: No. 20140764.,20140764.
• Citation: 779 Utah Adv. Rep. 66
• Parties: Spencer J. COX, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor for the State of Utah, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Claudia LAYCOCK, in her official capacity as District Court Judge in the Fourth Judicial District, Millard County, State of Utah, Respondent. Jim Dyer, Steve Maxfield, T.J. Lovato, Scott Blackburn, Russell Jones, Wendy Leathum, and Todd MacFarlane, Third–Party Cross–Petitioners, v. Norma Brunson, in her official capacity as Millard County Clerk; The Honorable Claudia Laycock, in her official capacity as District Court Judge in the Fourth Judicial District, Millard County, State of Utah; and Spencer J. Cox, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor for the State of Utah, Third–Party Cross–Respondents.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

779 Utah Adv. Rep. 66

Spencer J. COX, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor for the State of Utah, Petitioner,

v.The Honorable Claudia LAYCOCK, in her official capacity as District Court Judge in the Fourth Judicial District, Millard County, State of Utah, Respondent.

Jim Dyer, Steve Maxfield, T.J. Lovato, Scott Blackburn, Russell Jones, Wendy Leathum, and Todd MacFarlane, Third–Party Cross–Petitioners,

v.Norma Brunson, in her official capacity as Millard County Clerk; The Honorable Claudia Laycock, in her official capacity as District Court Judge in the Fourth Judicial District, Millard County, State of Utah; and Spencer J. Cox, in his official capacity as Lieutenant Governor for the State of Utah, Third–Party Cross–Respondents.

No. 20140764.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Jan. 30, 2015.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Nehring, Associate C.J., filed partial dissent, which Parish, J., joined.

Lee, J., filed opinion for the court in part and partial dissent, which Durrant, C.J., joined.

[345 P.3d 691]

Sean D. Reyes, Att'y Gen., Thom D. Roberts, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Steven Maxfield, Kanosh, Utah, for real party in interest pro se.

Dwight G. Beckstrand, Kanosh, Utah, for real party in interest Jim Dyer.

Kathleen M. Liuzzi, Salt Lake City, for real party in interest James I. Withers.

Todd MacFarlane, Kanosh, Utah, for real parties in interest T.J. Lovato, Russell Jones, Wendy Leathum, Scott Blackburn, Todd MacFarlane.

Richard Waddingham, Delta, Utah, for real party in interest Millard County.

Associate Chief Justice NEHRING authored the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, IV, and VI, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice DURHAM, Justice PARRISH, and Justice LEE joined, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part V, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice DURHAM, and Justice PARRISH joined, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which Justice DURHAM and Justice PARRISH joined. Associate Chief Justice NEHRING authored a dissent with respect to Part II, in which Justice PARRISH joined. Justice LEE authored the opinion of the Court with respect to Part II of his opinion, in which Chief Justice DURRANT and Justice DURHAM joined, an opinion dissenting in part, in which Chief Justice DURRANT joined, and concurring in part with respect to Part III of his opinion.Justice NEHRING, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 This matter comes before us by a petition for extraordinary writ filed by Utah Lieutenant Governor Spencer Cox regarding the Republican primary election for Millard County Commissioner Seat A. The lieutenant governor challenges an August 14, 2014 district court order that set aside the election and ordered the Millard County Clerk to hold a new election as soon as possible.

¶ 2 In an order issued September 5, 2014, we granted the lieutenant governor's petition and affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's order. We affirmed that portion of the order that set aside the election. However, we vacated the part of the district court order requiring the Millard County Clerk to hold a new election. Recognizing that the election code does not address the specific circumstances presented here, we concluded that it was not the intent of the legislature that a political party be without a candidate on the general election ballot when the primary election has been set aside. We therefore looked to the most analogous provisions of the Code to guide us. Utah Code section 20A–1–501 supplies procedures for filling candidate vacancies in various situations, and we ordered that the Republican candidate be filled according to the procedures in subsection (1)(c)(iii). We explain our order more fully here.

¶ 7 On August 1, 2014, the district court held a hearing on the matter in which Mr. Dyer, the Voters, and Mr. Withers were present and represented by counsel. Millard County Clerk Brunson also appeared as a witness.

¶ 8 The district court issued its Memorandum Decision, Ruling, and Order on August 14, 2014. At the outset, the court noted that “petitioners had probably filed this case against the wrong respondent.” Nonetheless, the court heard and ruled on the case because neither party raised the issue of improper parties. The court discussed each of Mr. Dyer's allegations in turn and ultimately concluded that “the validity of this election cannot be established.” The court determined that at least seven ballots were incorrectly counted and one voter was prevented from legally voting; therefore, because only five votes separated the candidates, the eight votes in question were sufficient to grant relief. The court explained that it could not determine for whom those illegal votes had been cast, and thus could not ascertain which candidate received the highest number of votes in order to declare a winner. Instead, the district court set aside the election results and ordered the county clerk to organize a new election immediately. Neither party appealed the district court's order.

¶ 9 On August 26, 2014, the lieutenant governor filed a petition for extraordinary writ with this court challenging the district court order. The lieutenant governor petitions this court because he asserts that, as chief elections officer for the state of Utah, he “is substantially impacted by” the district court order. And because he was not named as a party below and cannot appeal the order, he therefore contends that he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The lieutenant governor seeks to vacate the district court order and affirm the certified results of the primary election.

¶ 10 The lieutenant governor raises three arguments in his petition. First, he contends that the district court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Mr. Dyer's petition due to a lack of standing. Second, the lieutenant governor alleges that Mr. Dyer's challenge did not meet the statutory requirement for election contests because the lieutenant governor reads the statute to “require [ ] proof” of a different result “if you added or subtracted the actual votes.” He asserts that because the district court could not determine for whom the erroneous votes were cast, there is no proof that the illegal votes would have changed the result. Thus, in the absence of a final determination that Mr. Dyer would have won, he argues that there can be no valid contest of the election and the district court had no basis to issue its

[345 P.3d 693]

order. Third, the lieutenant governor argues that the district court acted outside its powers when it ordered the clerk's office to hold a new election.

¶ 11 On September 3, 2014, Judge Laycock filed a response to the lieutenant governor asking this court to affirm the district court order. The response asserts that the district court had jurisdiction below and that it properly set aside and ordered a new election.

¶ 12 Mr. Dyer also filed a response and opposition to the lieutenant governor as a real party in interest. Mr. Dyer argues that he had standing because he was not required to name the county clerk as a party to the action below. Additionally, he asserts that the lieutenant governor is not an appropriate party to file a writ in this matter because his role as chief election officer is purely supervisory. He further argues that the lieutenant governor's filing of the petition amounts to improper advocacy on the part of Mr. Withers's candidacy.

¶ 13 Millard County and the Millard County Clerk also entered the fray, agreeing with the lieutenant governor's petition that the district court acted beyond its statutory authority in ordering the new election. The county and county clerk also noted that the clerk's office considered options for holding a new election, but that it “could not comply with the statutory deadlines imposed by Utah law.”

¶ 14 Finally, in addition to responding to the lieutenant governor, the Voters, acting through counsel or pro se, submitted a third-party cross-petition. They requested that this court affirm the district court's order to set aside the primary election, but alternatively requested that both candidates be included on the November general election ballot as unaffiliated candidates, even if that requires “suspend[ing] or modif[ying]” the statute “as necessary.”

¶ 15 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A–3–102(2).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 16 This matter is before us by petition for extraordinary writ under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B. The granting of relief is discretionary, and “[u]nlike a party filing a direct appeal, a petitioner seeking rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief has no right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's mishandling of a particular case.” ² “The question of whether to grant a petition for extraordinary relief lies within the sound discretion of this court.” ³

¶ 17 Rule 65B provides for the scope of review when, as here, wrongful use of judicial authority is alleged: “[T]he court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.” ⁴ We have held that “[a] court wrongfully uses its judicial authority when it abuses its discretion.” ⁵ When the issue before the court involves statutory interpretation, “a mistake of law may constitute an abuse of discretion.” ⁶ However, even where a mistake of law or abuse of discretion is found, this court nonetheless retains discretion whether to grant the relief requested.⁷ Thus, we have explained that “a court must look to the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought in deciding whether to grant extraordinary relief.” ⁸ Therefore, we review the district court order for abuse of discretion, retaining our discretion to grant any relief.

ANALYSIS

¶ 18 We first consider whether to grant the lieutenant governor's petition for...