Cox v. Lee
| Decision Date | 17 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-20-0275-PHX-DMF,CV-20-0275-PHX-DMF |
| Parties | John Cox, Plaintiff, v. Coralie Lee, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this matter on February 5, 2020 (Doc. 1). On February 10, 2020, the Court directed that the Clerk of the Court seal Plaintiff's Complaint because it contained the minor child's name; the Court directed that Plaintiff submit a redacted complaint (Doc. 7). On February 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed a redacted Complaint but failed to fully redact the minor child's name (Doc. 9). The Court again directed that the Clerk of the Court seal Plaintiff's redacted Complaint (Doc. 9) and ordered that Plaintiff file a fully redacted complaint (Doc. 11). On March 11, 2020, Plaintiff subsequently filed another redacted Complaint (Doc. 17). The subsequently redacted Complaint (Doc. 17) still contains the minor child's name on page 5, line 24. The Court will direct that the Clerk of the Court seal the redacted Complaint at Doc. 17, redact the minor's name in the redacted Complaint (Doc. 17) at page 5, line 24, and refile the newly redacted Complaint.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") (Doc. 8), Plaintiff's March 3, 2020, response to the motion to dismiss and counter motion for entry of default (Doc. 16), Defendants' reply to the motion to dismiss combined with a motion to strike Plaintiff's counter motion for entry of default (Doc. 19), and Plaintiff's amended response to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 23). The motions are ripe for decision. All the named parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Docs. 14, 21, 22).
The Court notes that Defendant's reply to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) references subject matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff addressed federal versus state court subject matter jurisdiction in his amended response to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 23). Plaintiff's amended response to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 23) was improperly filed without leave of Court, but the Court will not strike such because the Court will review all the parties' arguments in light of the Court's own question about whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the matters raised in the Complaint.
The Complaint is brought on behalf of a minor child by his biological father, John (Jack) Cox, "as Next Friend, natural guardian, and designated Social Security representative payee". The Complaint regards the minor's "thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00) plus interest in Social Security backpay" which the Complaint alleges "is being wrongfully withheld from" the minor and John (Jack) Cox. The named defendants are the material already grandparents of the minor and their family trust. The Complaint alleges that the named defendants and undescribed but fictitious defendants are "intentionally depriving" the minor of the thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00) plus interest in funds belonging to the minor that were previously received by the minor's mother as Social Security payments for the minor.
The Complaint alleges that the thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00) plus interest in Social Security backpay was paid due to the disability of the minor's now deceased mother, upon whom the minor was dependent. The Complaint alleges that on October 19, 2015, the Commissioner of Social Security found the minor's since deceased mother to have been disabled and found that the minor was her dependent.The Complaint alleges that the minor's since deceased mother was the minor's payee, and on or about October 19, 2015, the minor's since deceased mother received social security back payments as the minor's payee in the amount of thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00). The minor's since deceased mother deposited the thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00) in a bank account, but later turned such monies over to the minor's maternal grandparents, who are defendants in this action. Thereafter, the minor's mother died of cancer. The Complaint alleges that on or about December 26, 2016, the Commissioner of Social Security chose John (Jack) Cox to be the minor's successor representative payee. The Complaint does not allege that the defendants were at any time designated as payees for the minor by the Commissioner of Social Security.
The Complaint seeks declaratory judgment that the minor is the owner of the thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00). The Complaint further seeks an order that the defendants pay the thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00) plus interest into the Court. The Complaint seeks that the Court distribute the thirty-five thousand five hundred eleven dollars ($35,511.00) to the minor by direct payment to Plaintiff John (Jack) Cox. Finally, the Complaint seeks for the Court to "advise Social Security of the existence and nature of these funds and pay same over to Social Security to be handled by Social Security as required of them by 20 CFR § 404.2060" and to "allow Mr. Cox to plead the Social Security Administration into this matter".
The Complaint alleges subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331; 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), (b), and (i); 42 U.S.C. §1007 et seq.; and various administrative regulations pertaining to Social Security Administration benefits. The Complaint specifically states that "this is not a 42 U.S.C. [§] 405(g) case". Also, as noted above, the Complaint requests declaratory judgment that the minor is the owner of the funds at issue.
The Court has an independent obligation to determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."
This Court is a limited jurisdiction court; this court has no jurisdiction beyond that conferred upon it by federal statute. Brandt v. Bay City Super Mkt., 182 F.Supp. 937, 939 (N.D. Cal. 1960). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) requires that a complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction." Further, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). The United States Supreme Court has stated that a federal court must not disregard or evade the limits on its subject matter jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Thus, the Court is obligated to evaluate its subject matter jurisdiction in each case and to dismiss a case when such jurisdiction is lacking. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Unlike state courts, federal courts only have jurisdiction over a limited number of cases, and those cases involve either a question of federal law (federal question jurisdiction) or a significant controversy between citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. By a plain reading, neither 42 U.S.C. § 405(a), (b), and (i); 42 U.S.C. §1007 et seq.; nor the various administrative regulations pertaining to Social Security Administration Employee benefits cited by Plaintiff confer jurisdiction of this Court. The Court will review and consider potential apparent and stated basis for subject matter jurisdiction for the matters raised in the Complaint.
For federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that district courts have jurisdiction over "all civil actions that arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The federal question jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, is applicable only when the plaintiff sues under a federal statute that creates a right of action in federal court. See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807-12 (1986); see also Utley v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 811 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1987). For example, a complaint that alleges only a federal constitutional violation, for example, is insufficient.The Court's "limited jurisdiction cannot be invoked so simplistically." Yokeno v. Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 340 F.3d 1033, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986)) (it is a "long-settled understanding that the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction"). "[A] complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' " Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
Further, federal district courts, as courts of original jurisdiction, may not serve as appellate tribunals to review errors allegedly committed by state courts. MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1987); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296 (1970) (). Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) ().
In 28 U.S.C. §1332, the United States Code specifies the requirements for federal subject matter...
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