Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.

• Citation: 319 F. Supp. 92
• Decision Date: 26 October 1970
• Docket Number: No. 4-70-Civ. 373.,4-70-Civ. 373.
• Parties: David L. COX, individually and as Chairman, BRAC Lodge 3027, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

319 F. Supp. 92

David L. COX, individually and as Chairman, BRAC Lodge 3027, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 4-70-Civ. 373.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

October 26, 1970.

William G. Mahoney, Highsaw & Mahoney, Washington, D. C., Si Weisman, Hvass, Weisman, King & Allen, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiffs.

Henry Halladay, Dorsey, Marquart, Windhorst, West & Halladay, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

LARSON, District Judge.

This matter comes before this Court as a result of the granting of defendant's motion for a change of venue from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs ultimately seek a declaratory judgment that certain actions of the defendant are in violation of the Railway Labor Act and an injunction permanently enjoining those acts. The issue to be considered presently is plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction pending a hearing on the merits.

The action arises out of a labor dispute between plaintiff Union representing its membership, and defendant Airline. The collective bargaining contract between the parties which became effective on April 11, 1967, contains in Article XXVIII a duration clause which reads as follows:

"All provisions of this Agreement except as otherwise specifically provided for herein, shall continue in full force and effect until September 30, 1969, and thereafter from year to year unless written notice of intended change desired after September 30, 1969, is served in accordance with Section 6, Title I, of the Railway Labor Act, as amended by either party hereto, at least sixty (60) days prior to September 30, 1969, or September 30 in any year thereafter." Agreement between Northwest Airlines, Inc., and Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees.¹ (Effective date—April 11, 1967) Article XXVIII, p. 124.

On July 29, 1969, BRAC, in accordance with Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45 U.S.C.A. § 156),² and the provision in the collective bargaining agreement cited above, served notice that it wanted to modify certain provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Northwest served BRAC with its counter notice on July 31, 1969. With negotiations stalemated, BRAC on or about February 12, 1970, requested the services of the National Mediation Board (Board). The mediator assigned to the dispute advised the Board that his best efforts to engineer an amicable settlement had been unsuccessful. On May 28, 1970, the Board duly notified the parties of the mediator's report and urged them to submit their differences to arbitration. BRAC refused arbitration in a letter to the Board dated June 1, 1970. Northwest, apparently after receiving (on June 3) a copy of the June 1, 1970, BRAC correspondence, sent the Board a letter indicating that it was taking the Board's request to arbitrate under advisement. The Board on June 5, 1970, notified BRAC and Northwest that its services had been terminated under the terms of the Railway Labor Act. No Presidential Emergency Board was appointed to investigate and report on the dispute; hence on or after July 6, 1970, BRAC and Northwest were free to resort to self-help. Thus, on June 12, 1970, BRAC notified Northwest that if the dispute was not settled by July 7, 1970, that BRAC employees would strike at 1:00 A.M. local time on July 8, 1970. Northwest's final offer to BRAC, made on July 6, was rejected by the Union. A last minute effort, on July 7, to reach agreement failed and the work stoppage began as scheduled.

On July 7 Northwest sent two letters to its employees. One, apparently sent in anticipation of the strike, outlined Northwest's final offer to BRAC and indicated that employees who continued to work during the strike would receive pay and benefits set forth in the letter. These were, both parties agreed, substantially the same as the terms contained in Northwest's "final offer." The second letter was, according to Northwest, in response to reports that BRAC had notified all Union members that they would be fined if they crossed picket lines in the event of a strike.³ It promised employees who continued to work that:

1. They would be protected by Northwest from paying any fines or penalties which BRAC might impose.

2. Northwest would guarantee them against reprisals or discrimination during or after the strike.

3. There would be no enforcement of union membership for nonstriking employees who stopped paying dues or quit the Union because of the strike.

Plaintiffs, in their complaint, allege that Northwest, by using the devices set forth in the two letters, is violating the Railway Labor Act. The specific allegations are first that the offer of individual contracts to nonstriking employees based on the rates of pay and working conditions contained in Northwest's "FINAL OFFER," and the guarantee that there would be no enforcement of Union membership for those who stopped paying dues or quit the Union because of the strike constitute a violation of Section 2 Seventh of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 152), which prohibits a carrier from changing "the rates of pay, rules or working conditions of its employees, as a class as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act." Secondly, plaintiffs claim that Northwest's promise not to enforce Union membership along with its guarantee against fines and penalties which the Union might impose constitute a violation of Section 2 Fourth of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. § 152). That portion of the Act, insofar as relevant, provides "it shall be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees, * * * or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce them to join or remain or not to join or remain members of any labor organization." (Emphasis supplied.)

The purpose of a preliminary injunction ordinarily is to maintain the status quo between the parties until rights can be fully determined by full trial on the merits.⁴ However, this Court has the power to shape relief in a manner which protects the basic rights of the parties,⁵ even if in some cases it requires disturbing the status quo.⁶ A preliminary injunction should be granted only upon a clear showing by the applicant of his right to such relief,⁷ and where the situation clearly demands it.⁸

This Court, when making its determination as to the appropriateness of this extraordinary relief, considers four essential factors.

1. Have the petitioners made a strong showing that they are likely to prevail upon the merits?⁹ This does not mean that petitioners must show with absolute certainty that they will prevail at trial,¹⁰ but they must show substantial probability of success.¹¹

The degree of probable success will vary somewhat in accordance with the showing made on the other relevant factors.¹²

2. Have the petitioners shown irreparable injury?¹³ Injuries, no matter how substantial, which can be ascertained or approximated and adequately compensated at law do not provide a basis for equitable relief. However, the sufficiency of an injury may vary somewhat with the strength of the showing or possibility of success on the merits.¹⁴

3. Will the granting of an injunction substantially impair the interests of the other parties to the proceedings?¹⁵ This Court must consider the effect of the requested relief on the defendant. Saving one party from irreparable injury at the expense of irreparable injury to another ordinarily does not qualify as equitable relief.

4. How will the granting of an injunction affect the public interest?¹⁶ The instant case involves a statutory scheme devised by Congress to regulate in the public interest the method and scope of economic bargaining between common carriers and the organizations representing their employees. Congress, mindful of the evils experienced by the public as a whole during period of uncontrolled labor strife, wisely determined that limits would have to be placed on the activities of both parties. It is the duty of this Court to give consideration to the interests of the public in having the services of the carrier resumed on a full time basis as soon as possible as well as to insure the parties to the dispute independence in their organization attempts and in pursuit of their economic goals.¹⁷

The foregoing factors must be considered by the Court in evaluating each of the petitioners' allegations.

VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 2 SEVENTH OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT (45 U.S.C.A. § 152)

Section 2 Seventh of the Railway Labor Act provides:

"No carrier, its officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or in Section 156 of this title."¹⁸

BRAC alleges that Northwest by paying wages in excess of those provided for in the collective bargaining agreement is violating Section 2 Seventh quoted above. They base this charge primarily upon the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, etc. v. Florida E. C. Ry.¹⁹ There, after exhausting mandatory procedures, the parties had failed to reach agreement over proposed changes in wages and working conditions. A Presidential Emergency Board, constituted under Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, made a recommendation that was accepted by all the carriers except Florida East Coast (hereafter F.E.C.). Further mediation under the Act still failed to bring any accord between the parties. Both parties refused arbitration and a strike by nonoperating unions ensued. Operating union members honored the picket lines. F.E.C. after a short shutdown resumed operation with a work force consisting of supervisory personnel and replacements with whom it made individual employment agreements which were...