Cox v. Ratcliffe

• Decision Date: 16 February 1886
• Citation: 5 N.E. 5,105 Ind. 374
• Parties: Cox v. Ratcliffe.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

105 Ind. 374

5 N.E. 5

Cox

v.Ratcliffe.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Filed February 16, 1886.

Appeal from Howard circuit court.

F. Cooper and James N. Sims, for appellant.

Blacklidge & Blacklidge, for appellee.

Mitchell, J.

Timothy B. Cox brought suit against Andrew Ratcliffe, to recover possession of 80 acres of land in Howard county, which is described as the W. 1/2 of the S. E. 1/4 of section 34, township 23 N., of range 2 E. Issues having been joined on the complaint by an answer in general denial, a jury returned a general verdict for the defendant. With their general verdict the jury returned answers to 14 interrogatories submitted to them at the request of the plaintiff. In answer to the interrogatories, the jury found specially the following facts:

“(1) On January 31, 1877, the sheriff of Howard county executed a deed for the north half of the land in controversy to Lewis O. Lloyd. (2) This deed was made in pursuance of a sale made one year before its date, on an execution against the defendant. (3) The execution was duly issued on a valid judgment of the Howard circuit court against Ratcliffe. (4) The land was never redeemed from the sheriff's sale. (5) The defendant never acquired any other title to the land. (6) Lloyd and wife conveyed the title thus acquired to the plaintiff, December 21, 1877. (7) Defendant and his wife, about the same date, made a quitclaim deed for the same land to plaintiff. (8) De Witt C. Bryant also recovered judgment against the defendant in the Howard circuit court at its March term, 1876. (9) An execution was issued on this judgment. (10) The south half of the land in controversy was sold to satisfy this last execution. (11) The land levied on was purchased at this sale by Bryant, who afterwards transferred his certificate of purchase to the plaintiff, to whom the sheriff made a deed after the period for redemption expired. (12) There was a mutual agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, before or at the time of the delivery of the respective deeds, that if the defendant would repay to plaintiff the money he had paid out and expended, with interest, he would reconvey the land to him. (13) There was no specified time within which this agreement was to be performed by the defendant. (14) The defendant never paid any consideration for the extension of the time for redemption of the land bought by Lloyd.”

The plaintiff moved the court for judgment in his favor on the special finding, “and the documentary evidence in the cause,” notwithstanding the general verdict. This motion was overruled, and judgment was given for the defendant on the verdict returned.

The plaintiff asserted and still asserts an absolute title to the land. This claim is supported by the various deeds mentioned in the special findings. Upon the face of the deeds an apparently absolute title is vested in him. Conceding the plaintiff's apparent title, the defense proceeded upon the theory that, in consequence of a contemporaneous agreement, the deeds constituted nothing more than an equitable mortgage to secure the repayment of moneys advanced by the plaintiff for the defendant's use; that the plaintiff agreed, before the time for redemption expired, to take the title and extend the time for redemption. In the light of these conflicting theories, the influence of the facts specially found upon the general verdict may be considered.

If we correctly apprehend the position of appellant's counsel, their contention is that, because it appears from the special findings that the plaintiff was vested with a complete legal title to the land in controversy, he was also entitled to the possession, and that, therefore, it was error to refuse to sustain his motion for judgment on the special findings. The argument seeks to maintain the proposition that any parol agreement which might have been made to the effect that the plaintiff should take and hold title as a security was void, within the statute of frauds. The evidence, whether documentary or otherwise, cannot be looked to in determining a motion for judgment on the special findings notwithstanding the general verdict. Pennsylvania Co. v. Smith, 98 Ind. 42. The general verdict was for the defendant, and the rule is so well settled that the citation of authorities is not necessary, that unless it affirmatively appears that the facts specially found are irreconcilably in conflict with it, the general verdict must control. While the facts specially found established an apparently absolute title to the plaintiff, this would not of itself overthrow the general verdict, for the reason that the defendant may have been lawfully entitled to the possession notwithstanding the plaintiff's legal title. If it were required, when facts are found which, in one aspect of the case, are inconsistent with the general verdict, that the special findings should make it affirmatively appear that the general verdict was in all other respects sustained, there would be force in the appellant's contention; but the rule is the reverse. The special findings must present such a state of facts as that the general verdict is completely overthrown by the facts found. Against the facts found which show a legal title in the plaintiff, stands, first, the general verdict for the defendant; and, second, the facts specially found from which it appears that, at or before the delivery of...