Cox v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 15 November 1895
• Citation: 70 F. 760
• Parties: COX v. ROBINSON.
• Court: United States Circuit Court, District of Washington, Southern Division

70 F. 760

COX v. ROBINSON.

United States Circuit Court, D. Washington, Southern Division.

November 15, 1895

Cotton Teal & Minor, for plaintiff

Wellington Clark and Thos. H. Brents, for defendant.

HANFORD District Judge (charging jury).

The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Richard T. Cox, sues as receiver of the First National Bank of Arlington, Or., to recover from the defendant, Mr. J. L. Robinson, the amount of a judgment which the bank obtained against a man named N. Cecil. The action is brought against Robinson for the reason that Mr Robinson became surety for any amount that the bank should recover in the action against Cecil in consideration of discharging a writ of attachment which had been levied on the property of Cecil. The fact that the judgment was recovered by the bank against Cecil is not denied. The fact that Robinson entered into an obligation to pay whatever amount should be recovered in the action is not denied. The suit is resisted on the ground that the bank, which Cox represents as receiver, is not the owner of the judgment, that judgment having been transferred by an assignment from the bank to the defendant, Mr. Robinson, for good consideration. There has been introduced in evidence a paper which is a certified copy of a purported assignment and transfer of this judgment on the record of the court in which the judgment was entered. This assignment and transfer purports to have been made by the First National Bank of Arlington, Or., by J. E. Frick vice president. The whole case turns upon the question whether or not Mr. Frick had authority to transfer this judgment to Mr. Robinson. That he was vice president of the bank is not disputed, but it is disputed that he had any authority to transfer this judgment. And it is also disputed that the bank received any consideration for the transfer of the judgment; that it was illegal on these two grounds,-- that Frick was not authorized to do that kind of business and that the bank received no consideration for the transfer of the judgment. On the question as to the consideration for the transfer, I instruct you: First, to constitute a sufficient consideration to give validity to a contract, it is necessary that the bank should have received a consideration, or that Robinson should have parted with something that would constitute a consideration. There must have been either something moving to the bank, or something moving from Robinson, to constitute a good consideration,-- to make the transfer legal. And it is immaterial whether it was the one or the other. It must be one. But, if Robinson parted with something of value in consideration of this transfer, it has the same effect, in law, whether the bank received it or not, that it would if the bank received something. But, further, on that point the evidence shows, that, that which Robinson gave as consideration was the assignment of a judgment in his favor against Hoy and Butler. That transfer was made to Frick. Now, if Frick received a valid assignment of a judgment in favor of Robinson, and a consideration for that moved from the First National Bank of Arlington to Mr. Robinson, so that the value which Robinson received came from the bank, and not from Mr. Frick, it would still be a valid consideration moving from Robinson to the bank, because there would be a resulting trust in favor of the bank. And whatever Frick...