Cox v. Schlachter
Decision Date | 30 September 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 569A89,569A89,1 |
Citation | 23 Ind.Dec. 60,147 Ind.App. 530,262 N.E.2d 550 |
Parties | , 1 ERC 1681 Eldon J. COX, Appellant, v. Louis A. SCHLACHTER, Charlotte J. Schlachter, Appellees |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Lloyd L. DeWester, Jr., Ross P. Walker, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Grier M. Shotwell, Kothe, Shotwell & Kortepeter, Indianapolis, Russell I. Richardson, Stewart & Richardson, Lebanon, for appellees.
This is an appeal from the Boone Superior Court wherein plaintiffs-appellees brought an action against defendant-appellant to abate an alleged nuisance and for damages. Trial was to court without jury.
Appellees filed their complaint to abate a nuisance and for damages alleging they own property adjacent to property of defendant-appellant, and that defendant operates on his property an establishment for the breeding and raising of white mice for sale for biological use which daily emits vile odors damaging appellees and their property.
The issues were joined by appellant's answer in two paragraphs, the first denying that the operation of the plant daily emits vile odors, and the second alleging that defendant operates his business in a lawful, clean and scientific manner.
The second issue was raised by the amount of damages awarded. The court first entered an interlocutory order finding that the appellant operated an actionable nuisance on his property. The court ordered the appellan to report in writing to the court within thirty days as follows:
Thereafter, when appellant failed to respond to the order within the stipulated time, the trial court entered its final judgment for plaintiffs-appellees in the sum of $8,000.
After various proceedings which do not concern this court, appellant filed a motion for new trial containing three specifications of error as follows: 1) The decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence; 2) the decision of the court is contrary to law; and 3) the damages assessed are excessive.
Appellant's sole assignment of error is the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS SUSTAINED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
In specifying that the decision of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence, appellant has, in accordance with Rule 1--14B, Rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana, supported this specification of error with a memorandum which reads in pertinent part as follows:
'MEMORANDUM
'The defendant, Elden J. Cox, states that the decision of the Court is not sustained by sufficient evidence for the following reasons, towit:
'1. The evidence most favorable to the plaintiffs, if true, shows there is only an intermittant, so-called 'mousey' odor, which was not not caused physical damage to plaintiff's property but at most causes an occasional personal annoyance to them in the enjoyment of their property.
* * *.'
In considering the sufficiency of evidence, this court will consider only that evidence most favorable to the appellees and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Butler v. Forker, Bd. of Comm. (1966), 139 Ind.App. 602, 221 N.E.2d 570. Futhermore, if there is any evidence of probative value to support the verdict or decision, it is the duty of this court to affirm. Central Ind. Ry Co. v. Mikesell (1966), 139 Ind.App. 478, 221 N.E.2d 192, 201; Haley v. Williams, Trustee etc., et al. (1955), 125 Ind.App. 377, 380, 381, 123 N.E.2d 921, 922.
The evidence most favorable to the appellee may be summarized as follows:
Appellant-Cox is the owner of a business which produces mice for scientific research. Appellees' property is adjacent to appellant's place of business. An objectionable odor, produced by the accumulation of urine, droppings and dead mice, from among the thousands of mice raised by appellant, prevailed inside and outside the place of business prior to the filing of this action. After the filing of this action, and solely to safeguard the health and welfare of the mice, this odor, which increased in volume with the successive enlargements of the 'mouse house,' was expelled into plaintiffs' back yard by powerful fans, some of which face at close range the adjoining back yard and dwelling house of appellees.
These fans, operated automatically on a semi-hourly schedule, day and night, week by week and month by month, have done so through a period of years, forcing foul odors over, upon and into the home of appellees and their surrounding acreage.
The immediate area in which this business has expanded began principally as agricultural. This usage has diminished due to a steady increase in residential buildings.
The essence of private nuisance is the fact that one party is using his property to the detriment of use and enjoyment of property of another. Stover v. Fechtman (1966), 140 Ind.App. 62, 67, 222 N.E.2d 281. Appellant states that his business is operating in an area where zoning has so provided. However, a lawful business may be so conducted as to become a nuisance. Pritchett v. Board, etc. (1908), 42 Ind.App. 3, 85 N.E. 32. In determining what constitutes a nuisance, the question is whether the nuisance complained of produces such a condition as in the judgment of reasonable men is naturally productive of actual physical discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities, and of ordinary tastes and habits. Meeks v. Wood (1918), 66 Ind.App. 594, 598, 118 N.E. 591.
From the evidence most favorable to appellees, we are of the opinion the trial court was correct in holding that the operation of appellant-Cox's business constituted a nuisance.
We find it difficult to agree with appellant that the 'mousey' odor is but an occasional personal annoyance. The sight of maggots rolling through a fence, the collection of two gallons of blowflies by neighbors and a putrid smell which brings tears to the eyes of nearby residents, drives them from their...
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