Cox v. State

Decision Date28 August 1991
Docket NumberNo. 07-KA-59331,07-KA-59331
Citation586 So.2d 761
PartiesRandy Edward COX a/k/a Randy Edward White, v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Paul R. Scott, Wilroy Scott & Rutherford, Hernando, for appellant.

Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER and BANKS, JJ.

PRATHER, Justice, for the Court:

Involved in this appeal is the question of the sufficiency of authentication of records used in a habitual offender hearing under Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-19-83 (Supp.1990). Randy Edward Cox, a/k/a Randy Edward White (Cox) was convicted in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County of arson. After a separate sentencing hearing, Cox was sentenced as an habitual offender under Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 99-19-83 (Supp.1990), to life, without the reduction or suspension of sentence, or eligibility for parole or probation, in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. This Court affirms the conviction, but reverses and renders the sentence as an habitual offender.

I. FACTS

A fire originated in the home of Eddie and Marjorie Sullivan in Southaven, DeSoto County, Mississippi, during the early morning hours of April 14, 1985. The Sullivans were out of town, but they left the house under the supervision of their son, Danny Sullivan.

William Marion Sullivan, of the Southaven Fire Department, responded to the fire and stated that upon entering the house he saw one fire and heard at least one more. Ronald L. White, Fire Marshall of the Southaven Fire Department, trained in arson and fire investigation, also responded to the Sullivan fire and began to investigate to determine the fire's origin and its cause. Fire Marshall White determined that there were at least three fires in the house and that they were all deliberately set.

On May 27, 1985, in connection with his investigation of the Sullivan fire, Fire Marshall White made a trip to the Criminal Justice Complex of Memphis, Tennessee, to interview Randy Edward Cox, who was being held there. Fire Marshall White advised Cox of his constitutional rights and informed him that he was the subject of an arson investigation. Cox waived his rights and signed a waiver of rights form. The form was also signed by Fire Marshall White and Lt. D. E. Strauser of the Metro Arson Division of Memphis, who was also present during the interview. Cox then made a handwritten statement describing the events surrounding the fire and admitting to setting one of the three fires, after Danny Sullivan started the first one. Cox responded negatively to a question as to whether he was "threatened, abused, kicked, beaten, or promised anything in order to obtain the statement."

During the trial, the State questioned Fire Marshall White about his interview with Cox and the written statement. 1 Cox objected to this testimony citing the State's failure to show that the confession was freely and voluntarily given. This was Cox' first challenge to the voluntariness of the confession. Outside the jury's presence, the trial court heard the suppression motion and found that the State had laid the necessary predicate of voluntariness to admit the evidence.

Fire Marshall White then testified before the jury that Cox had admitted in his interview to setting one of the fires by throwing a burning rag into a closet. Further testimony about the interview was elicited from Lt. Strauser. Lt. Strauser testified that Cox was advised of his constitutional rights and that he agreed to waive them. Lt. Strauser responded negatively when asked if Cox was in any way coerced, threatened, promised anything, or abused into making the statement. He responded affirmatively when asked if Cox knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently gave the statement. Lt. Strauser also testified that Cox admitted to setting one of the fires by picking up a burning rag and throwing it in a closet.

The State rested. Cox did not testify in his own behalf and did not call any witnesses. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. A separate hearing was held on the habitual offender portion of the indictment. The trial court found Cox to be an habitual offender and sentenced him to life without the possibility of reduction or suspension of sentence, or eligibility for parole or probation under Sec. 99-19-83.

Cox appeals his conviction and sentence, and asserts as error: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing Fire Marshall White and Lt. Strauser to testify as to the contents of his written statement; (2) that the verdict was not supported by evidence; (3) and that the trial court erred in allowing documents and letters into evidence during the sentencing phase of his trial.

II. VOLUNTARINESS OF COX' CONFESSION

Cox' first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Fire Marshall White and Lt. Strauser about his confession for failure to prove its voluntariness, and for the State's failure to present all witnesses to the confession.

The United States Supreme Court has pronounced the law regarding the admissibility of a defendant's waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Miranda requires proof that the waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. The trial judge makes that determination. Findings by a trial court that a confession was voluntary and that the confession is admissible will not be reversed by this Court as long as the trial court applies the correct principles of law and the finding is factually supported by the evidence. Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss.1989); Dedeaux v. State, 519 So.2d 886 (Miss.1988).

When the voluntariness of a confession is put into question, the defendant has a due process right to a reliable determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily given. Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 121 (Miss.1989). The State bears the burden of proving all facts prerequisite to admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis, 551 So.2d at 169; Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686, 697 (Miss.1984); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss.1984). This burden is met and a prima facie case made out by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. The defendant must offer testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession to rebut the State's prima facie case. If the defendant does this, then the State must offer all the officers who were present when the defendant was questioned and when the confession was signed, or show why they are not present. Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1376 (Miss.1987) quoting Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss.1966).

This procedure properly occurs before trial in a suppression hearing conducted out of the presence of the jury. M.R.E. 104. In the case sub judice no pre-trial motion to suppress was filed. The trial court conducted a hearing in chambers during the trial, after Cox' in-court objection to the voluntariness of the confession. The trial court found that the State had established a "proper predicate" on the testimony of Fire Marshall White. The onus was then on Cox to provide other evidence or testimony on the voluntariness issue as rebuttal to the State's predicate. Cox did not rebut the State's predicate during argument on the motion. Without rebuttal from the defendant, the State does not need to produce all of the witnesses to the confession to establish voluntariness, the prima facie case is sufficient. See Hemingway v. State, 483 So.2d 1335, 1337 (Miss.1986). Nevertheless, both officers who were present at the interview testified at trial after the court ruled their testimony regarding the confession admissible.

This Court holds that the trial court did follow the correct legal standards to determine the admissibility of the contents of Cox' confession to the officers and that there was substantial evidence to support his finding of voluntariness. Having met this test this Court may not disturb the trial court's finding. Jones, 461 So.2d at 697. This assignment is without merit.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Cox asserts that the evidence offered by the State was not sufficient to support the verdict of guilty. The standard of review for challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is provided in Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188 (Miss.1989). The Court stated:

Recently in McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130 (Miss.1987), this Court repeated its standard of review for challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.

When on appeal one convicted of a criminal offense challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, our authority to interfere with the jury's verdict is quite limited. We proceed by considering all of the evidence--not just that supporting the case for the prosecution--in the light most consistent with the verdict. We give the prosecution the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. If the facts and inferences so considered point in favor of the accused with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty and weight that, having in mind the beyond the reasonable doubt standard, reasonable and fairminded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, the verdict of guilty is thus placed beyond our authority to disturb. See e.g., Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss.1985); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984).

McFee at 133-134. See also Winters v. State, 449 So.2d 766 (Miss.1984).

Benson, 551 So.2d at 193.

Cox' challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence of his arson conviction rests on the argument that Danny Sullivan set the initial fire in the Sullivan home. The testimony of Fire Marshall White and Lt. Strauser shows that Danny Sullivan may have...

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