Cox v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 28 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:12CV11 CEJ,1:12CV11 CEJ |
| Parties | DERRICK COX, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD WALLACE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Richard Wallace.1 Plaintiff Derrick Cox filed a response, and defendant filed a reply. Also before the Court is plaintiff's motion for a Rule 16 conference and to stay the ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Southeast Correctional Center (SECC), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Richard Wallace and Billy Burrow2 , whom plaintiff identifies as employees of the Mississippi County Highway Department. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants acted negligently and withdeliberate indifference to his serious medical needs when they failed to provide him prompt medical treatment for burns he suffered while performing road repair work.
According to the complaint, plaintiff was a participant in an inmate work-release program sponsored by the Missouri Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that on June 6, 2011 he was taken to a work site in Mississippi County where defendants Wallace and Burrow directed him to perform asphalt patching on a road. This work required plaintiff to shovel hot asphalt from a hopper onto the ground. After performing the work, plaintiff was instructed by Burrow to clean the hopper and tools with gasoline pump-style sprayer. When plaintiff complied, the gasoline ignited and plaintiff was "engulfed" in flames.
Plaintiff alleges that Burrow failed to call for emergency services to respond to the work site, but instead waited until the fire burned out and then transported plaintiff to the Mississippi County Highway Department office. Approximately 15-20 minutes later, an SECC caseworker arrived and transported plaintiff back to the prison where he was initially evaluated by the medical staff and ultimately transported to a hospital. Plaintiff alleges he suffered third degree burns to his head and facial areas, his neck, shoulders, and wrists. After being treated at the hospital, plaintiff was transported back to SECC and remained in the prison infirmary for approximately 10 days.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint so as to eliminate claims "which are fatally flawed in their legal premises ... thereby sparing litigants the burden of unnecessary pretrial and trial activity." Young v. City of St. Charles, 244 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir.2001) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but it must contain facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," will not pass muster under Twombly.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the district court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007); Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008); Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 378 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2004). The taskof a court is then "to review the plausibility of the plaintiff's claim as a whole, not the plausibility of each individual allegation." Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n. 4 (8th Cir.2010) (citing Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir.2009) ().
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for a person who is injured as a result of being "depriv[ed] of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution" by a person acting under "color of state law." The Supreme Court has held that "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (citing Youngblood v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)). Indeed, a "special relationship" arises "when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs." Id. at 200. The special relationship also arises "when the stateaffirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the individual would not otherwise have faced." Carlton v. Cleburne County, 93 F.3d 505, 508 (8th Cir.1996) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, 199-200; Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir .1992)). The latter situation has been called the Id. (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, 198-200). When a special relationship exists, whether it be the result of a custodial relationship or the result of the state created danger exception, the Constitution imposes an affirmative duty of care and protection. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, 198-200; Carlton, 93 F.3d at 508; Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir.1995); Gregory, 974 F.2d at 1010.
Prison working conditions are "subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Stephens v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 198, 200 (8th Cir.1996). As stated above, to establish a violation of § 1983, a prisoner must show that prison or custodial officials acted with deliberate indifference. In the work assignment context, "prison officials are deliberately indifferent when they 'knowingly . . . compel convicts to perform physical labor . . . which is beyond their strength, or which constitutes a danger to their . . . health, or which is unduly painful.'" Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370 (8th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881, 882 (8th Cir.1997)).
To establish a violation of § 1983, in the context of a dangerous workplace, a prisoner must show "'more than ordinary lack of due care'" for the prisoner's safety. Stephens, 83 F.3d at 201 ). In particular, a prisoner must establish that the conditions challenged were "objectively, 'sufficiently serious,'" and that the prison official acted with a "'sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Stephens, 83 F.3d at 200 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 1110 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991))). The state of mind required is "'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, to sufficiently allege a constitutional violation, a prisoner must allege that the official who required him to work under the allegedly unconstitutional conditions "'acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.'" Id. (internal citation omitted).
The plaintiff claims that the defendants exposed him to harm by failing to properly train him to perform the work they directed him to do, failing to provide the proper cleaning materials needed for the work, failing to provide the necessary safety equipment at the job site, and by failing to seek emergency medical care for his injuries. Thus, plaintiff asserts that defendants enhanced the danger for him to be injured, and therefore, defendants are liable under the exception. The Court finds the plaintiff's allegations sufficient to state a claim for deliberate in difference in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Defendant Wallace asserts that plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a cause of action against him because he "does not allege that [Wallace] was at the job site when [plaintiff] was injured . . . [h]e does not allege that [Wallace] observed his alleged burned condition . . . [h]e does not allege that [Wallace] chose not to seek medical assistance on behalf of plaintiff." Construing plaintiff's pro se complaint liberally, as it must, the Court finds that the totality of plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to support claims of deliberate indifference, negligence, and a failure to train against defendant Wallace.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Wallace was defendant Burrow's supervisor at the Mississippi County Highway Department. He asserts that defendant Wallace "instructed" plaintiff to do the asphalt patching on a "Mississippi County Road between East Prairie and Mathews." Likewise, plaintiff asserts that he was never trained, by either defendant, in the proper process of asphalt patching. Importantly, plaintiff also alleges that the vehicle that was used to transport plaintiff to the county road site, although driven by defendant Burrows, but which defendant Wallace is purported to have supervisory control over, did not have fire extinguishers, fire suppression equipment, or proper first aid equipment. Plaintiff also asserts that"defendant Burrow had no training in E.M.S. to assess and treat plaintiff's severe burns." In conclusion, plaintiff asserts that the actions of both defendants constituted violations of the Eighth Amendment and "directly contributed to the severe injury of plaintiff and the skin scarring, discoloration and sensitivity suffered. He also asserts that "the failure of the defendants to properly train plaintiff and provide fire extinguishers on...
To continue reading
Request your trial