Coyle v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 07 January 1884 |
| Citation | 104 Pa. 117 |
| Parties | Coyle <I>versus</I> The Commonwealth. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before MERCUR, C. J., GORDON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, GREEN and CLARK, JJ. PAXSON, J., absent
ERROR to the Court of Oyer and Terminer and General Jail Delivery of Adams county: Of May Term 1884, No. 1. Certified from the Middle District to the Western District of this court.
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H. L. Fisher and W. C. Chapman, for the plaintiff in error.
S. M. Swope, district-attorney for Adams county, and Edward D. Ziegler, district-attorney for York county, for the Commonwealth, defendant in error.
The question sought to be raised by the prisoner's special plea to the jurisdiction, is not properly before us. The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor; nor by any other, excepting in the form especially provided by law. A judge de facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power alone. If the question may be raised by one private suitor it may be raised by all, and the administration of justice would under such circumstances prove a failure. It is not denied that Judge McLEAN was a judge de facto, and if so he is a judge de jure as to all parties, except the Commonwealth. The attorney-general representing the sovereignty of the state, by a writ of quo warranto, might properly present this constitutional question for our consideration, but it cannot come before us from any other source, or in any other form. This is not a new question; it came before this court in Burrell's Case, 7 Barr 34; and in the case of Clark v. Commonwealth, 5 Casey 128. The same principle is distinctly asserted in Campbell v. Commonwealth, 15 Norris 344; and has been repeatedly applied in many others. This point was not pressed in the oral argument of counsel, but as it was the subject of the second assignment of error, we have been obliged to dispose of it. As the plea to the jurisdiction could not in any event have availed the prisoner, even to raise the question intended, it is not only unnecessary to discuss the grave constitutional question suggested, but the first assignment of error falling with the second, we need make no further reference to either.
The third and fourth assignments of error are without merit. It was proper for the court, in the exercise of its discretion to allow the witness, John Coyle, Sr., to be recalled for further cross-examination, the offer was in part at least to lay ground for contradiction, and the testimony of Imsweiler was afterwards properly received for that purpose.
Nor can we find any merit in the fifth or sixth assignments. The testimony on the part of the defence, as to the prisoner's habit of resorting to the woods, and remaining there in an apparently melancholy state was general, not specific, and the Commonwealth was therefore at liberty, by the introduction of specific facts, to explain the causes which on some occasions led to this result. If the proof on part of the prisoner had been of specific instances, the course of examination insisted upon by the prisoner's counsel, might, perhaps, have been the proper one. The testimony of Philip A. Altland was stricken out of the case by the court, and the jury was instructed to disregard it; but if it had not been stricken out it was certainly competent by the testimony of Jerry Altland, to contradict John Coyle, Sr., and his wife, who testified for the prisoner, in their statement that they were not present at the alleged interview in the jail.
The counsel for the prisoner having, in their opening address to the jury, referred to concussion of the brain from the discharge of a gun, as one of the original causes of the mental disturbances of the prisoner, and introduced evidence tending to show that, from that time, his conduct was such as to indicate unsoundness of mind, it was we think, proper to inquire of competent witnesses, whether the cause thus assigned, and attempted to be shown, was sufficient to produce the alleged result. The 7th assignment is therefore not sustained.
This brings us to the substantial and important question in the cause, as raised by the 8th and 10th assignments of error.
In the examination of experts it is only necessary to keep constantly in view, that their proper office is to instruct the court and jury in matters so far removed from the ordinary pursuits of life, that accurate knowledge of them can only be acquired by continued study and experience; the purpose is to enable both court and jury to judge intelligently of the force and application of the facts introduced in evidence, as they would have been able to do if they had been persons properly instructed upon the subjects involved. Expert testimony, owing perhaps to the greater extent of recent scientific research is much more frequently resorted to than formerly, and the rules regulating its introduction may be considered established; there seems to be no great conflict of authorities on the law applicable thereto.
In cases revolving the question of insanity a medical expert may of course give his opinion based upon personal examination and knowledge of the patient; but where he is not possessed of a personal knowledge, his opinion must as we have said in Rouch v. Zehring, 9 P. F. Smith 74 "be predicated of the facts proved or admitted, or of such as appear in evidence hypothetically stated," and this must be accepted with some modification.
The credibility of the witnesses is in all cases a question for the jury; what is "proved" is for their determination. An expert cannot, therefore, if the witnesses are contradictory, be interrogated as to the effect, produced upon his mind, by all the evidence in the cause; and, upon similar grounds, where the testimony, although not contradictory, is inconsistent or otherwise conflicting, an expert is not allowed to express an opinion upon the effect of it, even assuming the truth of the whole, as the question of the preponderance of the testimony is also for the jury; where the truth of the evidence, in such a case, is assumed, or admitted, before the question upon matters of science can arise, the witness must determine a question of fact, which is not a matter of science, and, it is impossible for the jury to determine of what conclusion of fact the opinion of the witness is predicated.
Where the facts are not conflicting however, and are either admitted or proved, the opinion of an expert, being a conclusion drawn from facts that are known, is admissible as a scientific deduction, according to the skill, experience and knowledge of the witness.
The mode of examination which is generally pursued, however, is to interrogate the witness in hypothetical form as to what state of mind is indicated by certain facts assumed, as testified by certain of the witnesses, or by all of them where they are not in conflict. Thus, by means of the hypothesis the jury is enabled to determine by the mere form of...
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