Coyle v. Gardner
Decision Date | 27 February 1969 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 2779. |
Citation | 298 F. Supp. 609 |
Parties | James W. COYLE, Plaintiff, v. John W. GARDNER, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Gerald W. Grimes, Honolulu, Hawaii (Hogan, Howell & Rother, Honolulu, Hawaii, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Michael David Hong, Asst. U. S. Atty., Yoshimi Hayashi, U. S. Atty., District of Hawaii, for defendant.
DECISION
In this decision references to the record ("R. 18" etc.) refer to pages of the record in this district court, whereas references to transcript ("Tr. 78" etc.) refer to the certified copy of the transcript of the record, including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based, which was filed in this court by the defendant, as required by section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405 (g).1
The following statement of the case made in defendant's brief (R. 18-19) and accepted by the plaintiff in his brief (R. 36), is adopted by the Court.
This action was brought under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, hereinafter called the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405 (g), to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare disallowing plaintiff's application for the establishment of a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 416(i), 423.
The plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits on April 27, 1965 (Tr. 64-67), alleging that he became unable to work on May 4 or 5, 1954, at age 31. The application was denied initially (Tr. 71-72) and on reconsideration (Tr. 78-80) by the Bureau of Disability Insurance of the Social Security Administration, after the Hawaii Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, upon evaluation of the evidence by a physician and a disability examiner, had found that the plaintiff was not under a disability (Tr. 74-77).
The plaintiff had previously filed applications for disability benefits on October 10, 1955, and November 3, 1960, alleging that he became disabled on May 5, 1954 (Tr. 50-52, 56-59). These applications were denied on initial determination by the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance, and the plaintiff did not request reconsideration. These decisions thus became the final decisions of the Secretary on these earlier applications which are not before this Court on this review of the Secretary's decision of September 29, 1967. 20 C.F.R. § 404.908.
Having carefully examined the transcript and the applicable law, this Court believes that the plaintiff is entitled to relief in this action.
The defendant contends that the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the question of whether or not the findings of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare are supported by substantial evidence. However, the transcript of the examiner's hearing (Tr. 16-46) indicates that a more fundamental question of basic fairness of the hearing is involved before we even reach the question of support of the findings by substantial evidence.
The hearing before the examiner held on May 24, 1967, at Honolulu, Hawaii, involved facts and events that happened during a period of 13 years, extending back to 1954. The plaintiff, a part-Hawaiian, with only a first year high school education, appeared before the examiner with his wife, also a part-Hawaiian.2
Adequate preparation for a proper presentation of this involved matter covering testimony by two simple, scantily-educated witnesses, would well have justified many hours of study by a skilled attorney, so as to bring out the facts in their proper sequence and significance. The transcript makes it obvious that neither plaintiff nor his wife had made any such preparation, not even by refreshing their memories from the exhibits produced by the examiner and intended by him to be offered in evidence. Since plaintiff and his wife were thus obviously unprepared, unskilled and ignorant of the significance of the facts, such a situation called for the examiner, in the position of both inquisitor and judge, to be extra careful to see that all relevant facts and circumstances,3 both favorable and unfavorable, to plaintiff, be brought out,4 just as, when a party appears in court unrepresented by counsel, it is the Court's duty to attempt to see that all the facts are fairly presented.
At the outset the examiner went through the motions of ostensibly informing the claimant, Coyle, of his right to be represented by a lawyer or other qualified representative. The statement and conversation was as follows (Tr. 17-18). First the examiner pointed out to Mr. Coyle that on the back of the Notice of Hearing there was a paragraph that had to do with representation:
If anything, Coyle was expressing a need for help here, and a desire to have his wife act as his representative, or at least to assist him. But what did the examiner do? He immediately discouraged such assistance, by saying:
The witness again indicated his ignorance of what the examiner was driving at, by answering:
Without permitting claimant to even finish his sentence, the examiner interrupted:
"
And here again the examiner does not even finish his explanation, and the witness answers:
"That's right."
What the witness is thus corroborating is certainly not clear, yet the examiner continues:
No reasonable person could fail to see that the claimant was utterly confused. Then, to compound the confusion, the examiner proceeds:
" * * *" (Emphasis added.)
That statement would tend to frighten an ignorant man with only a ninth-grade education from wanting to proceed any further with a representative who would be acting without his knowledge. The examiner continues:
* * *"(Emphasis added.)
Here the examiner is saying, in effect, that the wife can only be a witness, but can not assist him or be a representative for him—that he must choose one or the other. The examiner continues:
Reading the entire colloquy up to that point makes it clear that the witness did not really know what the examiner was driving at, but that, as an affable Hawaiian trying to be agreeable to authority, he accepted what the examiner had said without really understanding it. To continue, quoting from the transcript:
Mrs. Coyle, having in effect been previously told by the examiner's previous remarks that she was eligible to be a witness, but not a "representative," could hardly have said anything else; and plaintiff likewise.
It is evident to this Court from this colloquy, the preceding questions and answers, and the whole transcript, that Mrs. Coyle herself was not a well-educated person, that she did not understand the proceedings any more than Mr. Coyle did, but apparently had a somewhat better memory, and that, had she been allowed to sit by him and assist him, she could well have helped straighten out some of the facts which he failed to remember, remembered imperfectly, or explained incompletely.
The record only shows Mrs. Coyle's desire to be helpful to her husband, which the examiner peremptorily discouraged. In fact, when Mrs. Coyle stated that "knowing him so well I think I know him better than the doctor.", (Tr. 45), the examiner, instead of attempting to explore the significance of this claim by the one person who could know Coyle better than any doctor, simply says, "Possibly so," (Tr. 45) and then when Mrs. Coyle tries to explain why her husband is really unemployable, does not even allow her to finish, and interrupts her to ask when she moved to...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Floyd v. Finch
...an attorney, the hearing examiner has a duty not to be a mere umpire, but to see that all relevant facts are developed. Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F. Supp. 609 (D.Hawaii 1969); Hennig v. Gardner, 276 F.Supp. 622, 625 (N. D.Texas 1967) (treating failure to explore the facts adequately as an abuse......
-
Smith v. Secretary of Health, Ed. and Welfare
...469 (D. Puerto Rico 1973); Erwin v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 312 F.Supp. 179 (D. New Jersey 1970); Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F.Supp. 609 (D. Hawaii 1969). That duty was not met here. Given the illegibility of the medical records; the corroboration of Mrs. Cutler's subjective ......
-
Cutler v. Weinberger
...469 (D.Puerto Rico 1973); Erwin v. Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 312 F.Supp. 179 (D.New Jersey 1970); Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F.Supp. 609 (D.Hawaii 1969). That duty was not met here. Given the illegibility of the medical records; the corroboration of Mrs. Cutler's subjective co......
-
Rosa v. Weinberger
...are elicited. Floyd v. Finch, supra, 441 F.2d at 100; Stewart v. Cohen, 309 F.Supp. 949, 956 (E.D.N.Y.1970); Coyle v. Gardner, 298 F.Supp. 609 (D.Haw.1969); Hennig v. Gardner, 276 F.Supp. 622 (N. D.Tex.1967). This the ALJ did not In the proceedings there were only two witnesses, the claiman......