Coyne v. City of Somerville

• Decision Date: 27 August 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 89-1751-T.
• Citation: 770 F. Supp. 740
• Parties: Robert P. COYNE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SOMERVILLE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

770 F. Supp. 740

Robert P. COYNE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SOMERVILLE, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 89-1751-T.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

August 27, 1991.

Joan A. Lukey, Hale & Dorr, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

John Christopher Foskett, Mary Jo Hollender, Deutsch, Williams, Brooks, DeRensis, Holland & Drachman, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

Robert L. Farrell, Parker, Coulter, Daley & White, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

ORDER

TAURO, District Judge.

This court hereby ACCEPTS the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff's complaint is, therefore, dismissed.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

May 8, 1991

LAWRENCE B. COHEN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (# 50) was referred to this court for report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3(a) of the Rules for United States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.

In a nutshell, plaintiff generally contends that the defendants violated his civil rights within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on account of their failure to promote him to various administrative positions in the Somerville School system.¹

I. The Parties

Plaintiff, Robert P. Coyne ("Coyne"), is, and has been since 1969, employed within the Somerville school system as a high school teacher.

Defendants in this action are 1) the City of Somerville ("Somerville"); 2) William Fasciano ("Fasciano"), the Director of Personnel and Assistant Superintendent of Somerville Schools — sued in both his official and individual capacities; 3) current members of the Somerville School Committee — specifically Patricia D. Jehlen, Maryann C. Cappello, Eugene C. Brune, Michael E. Capuano, Celia L. Courtney, Dorothy A.S. Gay, Stanley M. Koty, Jr., Julie A. DiPasquale, Paul L. Duhamel; 4) former members of the Somerville School Committee — specifically Dennis Mahoney, Charles Ciano, Mark Cronin, Harold Mollahan, Paul Dumas, Francis Bakey, Thomas August, Alan Kenney, Judith de la Paz, John Ciardi, Thomas Taylor, John Buonomo, Michael McKenna, Helen Corrigan; 5) Robert Watson ("Watson"), Superintendent of Somerville Schools through April of 1988; 6) Dr. John C. Davis ("Davis") Superintendent of Somerville Schools from 1988 to the present; and 7) John P. Joyce ("Joyce"), Assistant Superintendent of Somerville Schools through September of 1985.

II. The Factual Allegations²

Plaintiff began employment in the Somerville school system in 1969, as a high school teacher.

At all relevant time periods, he was certified by the Massachusetts Department of Education in various fields, particularly in the fields of Special Subjects Supervisor in Health and Physical Education and General Supervisor. These certifications were and are in accordance with the requirements of Mass.Gen.Laws, Ch. 71 § 38G. Under the provisions of that statute, vacancies, including administrative or supervisory positions, must be filled by persons certified in accordance with those provisions.

In addition to the state statutory certification requirements, the Regulations of the Somerville Schools and the Rules of the School Committee, required candidates for teaching or supervisory positions to satisfy the state's certification requirements.³

Over the past decade, plaintiff applied for various supervisory/administrative positions. While he possessed the necessary certification, he never received a promotion. Meanwhile, other candidates, who did not possess the requisite certification, received promotions over plaintiff.

In 1979, plaintiff applied for the position of Building Master. Plaintiff was the only finalist for this position who possessed the requisite certification. Despite his certification, he was bypassed in favor of a non-certified candidate, John Nunziato. This position was reposted in 1982, after a brief abolition of the position. Again plaintiff was bypassed in favor of Nunziato who still lacked the requisite certification.

In or about 1985, plaintiff applied for the position of Department Head, Health and Physical Education Department. Of the three finalists, plaintiff was, again, the only candidate who possessed the requisite certification. And, again, plaintiff was bypassed, this time in favor of Gerald Knight, who, at the time of his appointment, did not possess the appropriate certification.

Plaintiff first learned that the Somerville School Committee had appointed administrators without the requisite certifications through a newspaper article published on September 27, 1988. Upon learning of the School Committee's practice, plaintiff informed Dr. John Davis, Superintendent of Schools, that he (plaintiff) felt aggrieved by the past practice.⁴

In 1989, plaintiff, in his third attempt at a promotion, applied for the position of Chairperson of the Physical Education and Health Department. Although plaintiff possessed the requisite certification, he was not even selected as a finalist on this occasion.⁵

III. The Claims

Against this factual background, plaintiff makes the following claims against the various defendants:

A. Federal Claims

Count I, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on equal protection grounds;

Count II, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on substantive due process grounds;

Count III, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on First Amendment grounds;

B. Pendent State Law Claims

Count IV, alleging violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, M.G.L. c. 12, §§ 11H and 11I;

Count V, alleging breach of contract;

Count VI, alleging violation of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing;

Count VII, alleging violation M.G.L. c. 71;

Count VIII, asserting equitable estoppel; and

Count IX, alleging intentional interference with advantageous relations.

IV. The Motion to Dismiss Standard

In determining the merits of the motion to dismiss, this court assumes that all the material allegations set forth in the second amended complaint are true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-422, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848-1849, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969); O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543, 545 (1st Cir.1976); denied sub nom O'Brien v. Jordan, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977). The averments of the complaint, as well as the proper inferences arising from them, have been liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and dismissal is warranted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).⁶

V. The Federal Claims

A. Equal Protection — Count I

Simply put, plaintiff contends that defendants discriminated against him in violation of the equal protection clause — that is, that the conduct of the defendants constituted discriminatory conduct favoring one class, which plaintiff designates as a class consisting of "friends, cronies, and others in favorable relationships with decision-makers with the School System," and discriminating against his class — i.e., a class⁷ consisting of persons who are not "friends, cronies, and others in favorable relationships with decision-makers with the School System."

Claims of denial of equal protection of the laws can be divided into three categories — each supplying a different analysis. As set forth in E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1112 n. 5 (11th Cir.1987) —

Equal protection claims can be divided into three broad categories. See, J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 600 (2d ed. 1983). The first and most common type is a claim that a statute discriminates on its face. In such a case, a plaintiff can prevail by showing that there is no rational relationship between the statutory classification and a legitimate state goal. Hooper v. Bernalilo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 at 618, 105 S.Ct. 2862 at 2866, 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985), Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 at 485-86, 90 S.Ct. 1153 at 1161-62 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). When the statute facially discriminates against certain groups or trenches upon certain fundamental interests, courts have required a closer connection between the statutory classification and the state purpose. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-18 & nn. 14-16, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394-95 & nn. 14-16, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (plurality) (discussing "intermediate" and "strict" scrutiny).

The second type of equal protection claim is that neutral application of a facially neutral statute has a disparate impact. In such a case, a plaintiff must prove purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).

The third type of claim is that defendants are unequally administering a facially neutral statute. Plaintiffs' claim in this case falls into this third category.

In the circumstances of this case, it is clear that plaintiff's claim falls within this third category — i.e., that the defendants have unequally administered a facially neutral statute.⁸ And on that, the test, the analysis, is quite clear (Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, 401, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) —

The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, cf. McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86-7, 36 S.Ct. 498, 501, 60 L.Ed. 899, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design to favor one individual or class over another not to be inferred from the action itself, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-4 6

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