Cozy v. Palmer
| Decision Date | 24 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | 3:09-cv-0250-RCJ-WGC |
| Parties | JOHN COZY, Petitioner, v. JACK PALMER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This action is a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by John Cozy, a Nevada state prisoner. This matter comes before the Court on the merits of the petition.
On March 23, 2004, petitioner and two co-defendants were charged with: Count I, conspiracy to commit larceny, and Count II, grand larceny. Petitioner was also charged with Count III, possession of credit or debit card without cardholder's consent and Count VI, possessing personal identifying information of another. (Exhibit 8).1 The State also filed a notice of intent to seek habitual criminal status against petitioner. (Exhibit 8).
The defendants' trial commenced on August 5, 2004.2 (Exhibit 12). During trial, the State amended the information, dismissing Count IV against petitioner. (Exhibit 11).
On August 6, 2004, the jury found petitioner guilty of Counts I, III, and III. (Exhibit 16). On Count I, petitioner was sentenced to 12 months in county jail. (Exhibit 22, at p. 5). The court adjudicated petitioner a habitual felon pursuant to NRS 207.010(b). (Exhibit 22). On Count II, petitioner was sentenced 10 years to life in prison, concurrent with Count I. (Id.) On Count III, petitioner was sentenced to 10 years to life, concurrent with Count II. (Id.). The judgment of conviction was entered on October 18, 2004. (Exhibit 24).
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction. (Exhibits 25 and 27). On March 28, 2006, while his direct appeal was still pending, petitioner filed a post-conviction habeas petition in the state district court. (Exhibits 61, 62). The state district court never ruled on petitioner's first state habeas petition.
On September 12, 2006, petitioner filed his opening brief on direct appeal in the Nevada Supreme Court. (Exhibit 81). Petitioner presented three issues on direct appeal: (1) defendant's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was compelled to stand trial in jail attire; (2) the evidence was insufficient; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct denied petitioner a fair trial. (Exhibit 81). On June 8, 2007, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's judgment of conviction. (Exhibit 87). Remittitur issued on July 5, 2007. (Exhibit 90).
On September 19, 2007, petitioner filed a second state post-conviction habeas petition, in which he raised three grounds for relief. (Exhibit 91). On December 18, 2007, the state district court denied petitioner's second habeas petition. (Exhibit 94). Petitioner appealed. (Exhibit 96).
On February 28, 2008, petitioner filed his third post-conviction habeas petition in the state district court. (Exhibit 103). On June 10, 2008, the state district court summarily dismissed the third habeas petition. (Exhibit 104). Petitioner appealed. (Exhibit 106).
On March 10, 2009, the Nevada Supreme Court consolidated petitioner's appeals from the denial of his second and third state habeas petitions. (Exhibit 110, at p. 1). The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's second and third state habeas petitions. (Exhibit 110). Remittitur issued on April 14, 2009. (Exhibit 112).
This Court received petitioner's federal habeas petition on May 14, 2009. (ECF No. 1). The Court directed the petition to be filed, by order entered on June 22, 2009. (ECF No. 3). The petition raises three grounds containing several sub-claims. (ECF No. 4). Respondents previously filed a motion to dismiss the petition. (ECF No. 13). By order filed August 24, 2010, this Court granted in part, and denied in part, the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 24). The Court dismissed with prejudice Grounds 1(D), 2(D), 2(E), and Ground 3 of the federal petition. The Court also dismissed with prejudice the equal protection claims of Grounds 1(A), 1(B), and 1(C). (Id.). The Court directed respondents to file an answer to the remaining grounds of the petition, which include the due process claims in Grounds 1(A), 1(B), and 1(C), as well as Grounds 2(A), 2(B), 2(C), and 2(F). (Id.).
Respondents have filed an answer to the remaining grounds of the petition. (ECF No. 27). Petitioner has filed a reply to the answer. (ECF No. 34). The Court now reviews the merits of the remaining grounds of the petition.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), provides the legal standard for the Court's consideration of this habeas petition:
The AEDPA "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-694 (2002). A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Supreme Court's] precedent." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) ().
A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). The "unreasonable application" clause requires the state court decision to be more than merely incorrect or erroneous; the state court's application of clearly established federal law must be objectively unreasonable. Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409).
In determining whether a state court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of federal law, this Court looks to the state courts' last reasoned decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 944 (2001). Moreover, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State courtshall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner "shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Petitioner alleges that his due process right to a fair trial was violated because he was compelled to stand trial in jail attire. (ECF No. 4, at pp. 3-4). The Nevada Supreme Court ruled on this issue, as follows:
Cozy next contends that his right to a fair trial was violated because he was compelled to stand trial in identifiable prison clothes. We disagree. Although Cozy was wearing his prison-issue blue trousers during trial, the trousers were turned inside out so that the prison stenciling could not be seen. Cozy also wore a plain, unidentifiable shirt. Although Cozy was wearing prison-issue socks and shoes, there were no visible markings that identified them as prison attire. Under the circumstances, we conclude that nothing in the record suggests that the clothes that Cozy was wearing were readily identifiable to jurors as prison attire, and we conclude that appellant was not prejudiced.
(Exhibit 87, at pp. 2-3) (footnotes omitted). The Nevada Supreme Court applied the correct federal standard, citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (). (Exhibit 87, at p. 2, n.2). The factual findings of the state court are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving that the Nevada Supreme Court's ruling was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or that the ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. This Court denies habeas relief as to Ground 1(A).
Petitioner claims that his due process right to a fair trial was violated because there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for conspiracy to commit larceny, grand larceny, or possession of a credit card without the cardholder's consent. (ECF No. 4, at pp. 4-6).
When a habeas petitioner challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction, the court reviews the record to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 2000). The Jackson standard does not focus on whether a correct guilt or innocence determination was made, but whether the jury made a rational decision to convict or acquit. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993...
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