Cpf Agency Corp. v. R&S Towing Service

• Decision Date: 16 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. D045017.,D045017.
• Citation: 132 Cal.App.4th 1014,34 Cal.Rptr.3d 106
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CPF AGENCY CORP., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. R&S TOWING SERVICE, Defendant and Respondent.

34 Cal.Rptr.3d 106

132 Cal.App.4th 1014

CPF AGENCY CORP., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. R&S TOWING SERVICE, Defendant and Respondent.

No. D045017.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One.

September 16, 2005.

Law Office of Sean Brew and Sean Brew for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Reiter and Ian K. Sweedler, Deputy Attorneys General, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

J. Parkeson Miller for Defendant and Respondent.

O'ROURKE, J.

Plaintiff CPF Agency Corp., on behalf of itself and the general public, sued R&S Towing (defendant), alleging defendant overcharged vehicle owners for vehicle storage fees in violation of Vehicle Code section 22658, subdivision (i)(2).¹ On defendant's motion, the superior court struck plaintiff's causes of action for fraud, negligence per se and violations of California's unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200 et seq., hereafter the UCL) on grounds the state regulation was preempted by federal law. On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in striking its causes of action because (1) defendant's motion was untimely, and (2) the storage fee regulation in section 22658 falls within express exceptions to the preemption provisions of the federal law at issue. The Attorney General has submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff's position. We reject plaintiff's procedural challenges, but find merit to its assertion that the state regulation is excepted from preemption. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter with directions that the court enter a new order denying defendant's motion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We limit our recitation of facts to those appearing in plaintiff's first amended complaint, which is the operative pleading in this matter, and to matters that are subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.)

Defendant is in the business of towing, impounding and storing vehicles. On July 9, 2002, defendant towed a vehicle owned by plaintiff and operated by one of its employees, Joel Fitzgerald, from private property located at 3902 Julie Lane in Spring Valley. Defendant impounded the vehicle and placed it in one of its storage facilities shortly after 1:00 p.m. Just before noon the next day, Fitzgerald arrived at defendant's business location to retrieve the vehicle and was presented with an invoice for $200, representing a towing fee of $150 and a storage fee of $50 for two days of storage ($25 per day). After questioning the storage fees on the invoice, Fitzgerald was told it was defendant's company policy to charge $25 for each calendar day the vehicle was in storage and if he wanted the vehicle released he would have to pay the full $200. Fitzgerald paid the amount and regained possession of the vehicle.

Plaintiff sued defendant alleging causes of action for fraud, negligence per se, and violations of the UCL. In its third cause of action, plaintiff alleged defendant "systematically, routinely, and knowingly failed to comply with the requirements of California Vehicle Code section 22658[, subdivision] (i)(2) when charging its excessive storage fees," thereby engaging in unfair business practices and unfair competition. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief. Defendant filed its answer in October 2003.

In March 2004, defendant filed a "motion to dismiss" plaintiff's first, second, and third causes of action for fraud, negligence per se, and violation of the UCL for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 396. It argued the three causes of action were subject to dismissal because Vehicle Code section 22658, subdivision (i), which limits the storage fees that may be charged by towing services, was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, title 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) sections 14501 et seq. (the FAAAA).

The court treated defendant's motion as a motion to strike and tentatively granted it without leave to amend. It ruled the storage fee regulation of section 22658, subdivision (i)(2) was related to the price, route or service of a motor carrier, and, implicitly rejecting plaintiff's argument it fell within exceptions provided for in the FAAAA, concluded the statute was preempted. Following arguments on the matter and with one additional comment concerning its interpretation of the FAAAA, the court adopted its tentative ruling as the final ruling. Plaintiff dismissed its remaining causes of action and the parties entered into a stipulated judgment and order of dismissal, which was entered by the trial court in July 2004. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Propriety and Timeliness of Defendant's Motion

Plaintiff contends this appeal may be resolved solely on procedural grounds, namely, that defendant's motion to dismiss was without authority in California law, and even if the motion was properly deemed a motion to strike, it was untimely because it was not filed before or at the same time as defendant filed its answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1) ["Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof"].) Defendant responds that the court had authority to rule on the motion at any time under Code of Civil Procedure section 436, and acted within its discretion in doing so.

We agree with defendant. "The proposition that a trial court may construe a motion bearing one label as a different type of motion is one that has existed for many decades. `The nature of a motion is determined by the nature of the relief sought, not by the label attached to it. The law is not a mere game of words.' [Citation.] Neither the Legislature, nor the California Supreme Court, nor any Court of Appeal has ever challenged that notion.... The principle that a trial court may consider a motion regardless of the label placed on it by a party is consistent with the court's inherent authority to manage and control its docket." (Sole Energy Company v. Petrominerals Corporation (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187, 193, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 128, subd. (a), 187; see also Lucas v. County of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 277, 284-285, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 655 [affirming court's grant of a motion for judgment on eve of trial even though procedurally irregular, under court's inherent "equity, supervisory and administrative" powers].)

Under these principles, the court had inherent authority to treat defendant's motion as a motion to strike, and to consider it on the merits even though the motion was filed after defendant had filed its responsive pleading. Code of Civil Procedure section 436 grants the trial court discretion to consider striking improper matter from pleadings "at any time in its discretion."² Plaintiff has not demonstrated how the trial court's decision to consider the preemption question on the merits was a clear abuse of discretion in view of the court's inherent powers, as well as the express statutory authority to consider the matter at any time. We do not ascertain any such abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision. Accordingly, we turn to the merits of plaintiff's appeal.

II. Preemption

We decide here whether a particular provision within California's Vehicle Code section 22658 — subdivision (i)(2), regulating storage fees charged by towing companies — is preempted by the FAAAA. The parties concede, and we agree, the issue presented is one of law. (People ex rel. Renne v. Servantes (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 (Servantes).)

A. Principles of Federal Preemption

"Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States `shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.'" (Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992) 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407.) Under the Supremacy Clause, state law that conflicts with federal law is "without effect." (Ibid., quoting Maryland v Louisiana (1981) 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 68 L.Ed.2d 576.) "Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' [Citation.] Accordingly, `"[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone"' of pre-emption analysis," and its intent may be express in the federal statute's language or implicit in the statute's structure and purpose. (Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) Absent an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if it actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field "`"as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."'" (Ibid.)

"When ... Congress considers the issue of preemption and adopts a preemption [provision in a] statute that provides a reliable indication of its intent regarding preemption, the scope of federal preemption is determined by the preemption [provision] and not by the substantive provisions of the legislation. [Citation.] The reason is that `Congress' enactment of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.'" (Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept. (9th Cir.1999) 195 F.3d 1065, 1069, citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) Whether a federal statute expressly preempts a state law is a "question, at bottom, ... of statutory intent." (Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157.)

B. The Interstate Commerce Act and FAAAA

"The Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the [F...