Crabbs v. Scott

• Citation: 880 F.3d 292
• Decision Date: 22 January 2018
• Docket Number: No. 17-3854,17-3854
• Parties: Keith CRABBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Zach SCOTT, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

880 F.3d 292

Keith CRABBS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Zach SCOTT, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-3854

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Decided and Filed: January 22, 2018

ON BRIEF: Michael Garth Moore, LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL GARTH MOORE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Nick A. Soulas, Jr., FRANKLIN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: NORRIS, SUTTON, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

Keith Crabbs filed a § 1983 claim alleging that the local police violated his Fourth (and Fourteenth) Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable searches. But he died before the case could be resolved. Anne Crabbs, Keith’s mother and the personal representative of his estate, filed a motion to substitute as a party. The district court found that Keith’s death extinguished his claim and dismissed the case. Because Keith’s § 1983 action qualifies as a "cause[ ] of action for ... injuries to the person" under the Ohio survivorship statute and thus outlasts his death, we reverse and remand.

I.

In December 2010, Keith Crabbs surrendered to the Franklin County Sheriff on charges of voluntary manslaughter. After spending a night in jail, the court released him on bond. Keith’s trial did not begin until March 2012.

Two days into the trial, the court revoked Keith’s bond after he arrived late and quarreled with a witness outside of the courthouse. Ohio law requires county sheriffs to collect a DNA specimen of anybody "arrested on or after July 1, 2011, for a felony offense." Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.07(B)(1)(a). The jail officials failed to collect a sample of Keith’s DNA when they took him back into custody, triggering an "ID hold" on him. R. 82-1 at 2. At the conclusion of trial, the jury acquitted Keith. But because of the hold, the County

880 F.3d 294

Sheriff required Keith to undergo a DNA cheek swab before releasing him.

Keith filed a § 1983 action against Sheriff Zach Scott in his official capacity alleging that the Sheriff’s DNA-collection and ID-hold policies, when applied to acquitted defendants, violate the Fourth Amendment. Before the litigation came to an end, however, Keith died. Anne Crabbs, Keith’s mother and the personal representative of his estate, moved the court to allow her to take Keith’s place under Civil Rule 25(a)(1). The district court denied the motion and dismissed the case. Anne appeals.

II.

"If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court may order substitution of the proper party." Civil Rule 25(a)(1). We tend to review substitution determinations for an abuse of discretion. See Bauer v. Commerce Union Bank , 859 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1988). But a district court necessarily abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law. United States v. Taylor , 286 F.3d 303, 305 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court denied Anne’s motion to substitute because it determined that Keith’s death extinguished his claim. All that was at issue then, and all that is at issue now, is whether Keith’s claim survived his death. That is a question of law. Fresh review applies. See Bailey v. City of Ann Arbor , 860 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2017).

To determine whether § 1983 claims survive, we first look to federal law for an applicable rule of decision. Robertson v. Wegmann , 436 U.S. 584, 588–95, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978). If no suitable federal rule exists, we use the law of the forum state to the extent it is "not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Id. at 588, 98 S.Ct. 1991 ; 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

No federal statute or rule says anything about the survivorship of § 1983 claims.

But Ohio law speaks to the issue. It contains a survivorship statute, which provides:

In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall survive; and such actions may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable thereto.

Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.21. The question, then, is whether Keith’s lawsuit amounts to a "cause[ ] of action for ... injuries to the person." Id. If yes, his mother may pursue his cause of action. If no, the lawsuit ended with his death.

Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), offers guidance in answering the question. At issue was how to characterize § 1983 claims under state statutes of limitations. In answering the question, Wilson said three useful things.

First , the characterization of § 1983 as a cause of action is itself a question of federal law. Id. at 269–70, 105 S.Ct. 1938. While we may look to state procedural rules, federal standards dictate the essential elements of a § 1983 claim and, in turn, which procedural rules to apply. See id.

Second , all § 1983 claims must be characterized in the same way. Id. at 271–75, 105 S.Ct. 1938. Section 1983 claims span an array of topics, including discrimination in public employment, illegal arrests and searches, deprivations of liberty and property without due process, violations of freedom of speech and religion, and deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates, just to name a few. See Fallon et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and The Federal System 750 (7th

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