Crabtree v. Beech Aircraft Corp.

• Court: Kansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: McFARLAND
• Citation: Crabtree v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 229 Kan. 440, 625 P.2d 453 (Kan. 1981)
• Decision Date: 25 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 51554,51554
• Parties: Mae Bell CRABTREE, Appellee, v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION and State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, Appellants.

Page 453

625 P.2d 453

229 Kan. 440

Mae Bell CRABTREE, Appellee, v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION and State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters, Appellants.

No. 51554.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 25, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The purpose of temporary total disability compensation is to compensate an injured worker for loss of wages during the healing period, the time it takes the worker to recover from the injury.

2. An injury is no longer temporary when maximum recovery is reached or when the worker's condition becomes medically stationary or stable.

3. Awards based on temporary total and temporary partial disability are discussed and distinguished from awards based on partial or total permanent disability.

4. In an appeal from an award for temporary total disability in a worker's compensation case, the record is examined and it is held the award was erroneous for the reason that disability was no longer temporary.

John P. Woolf of Martin, Pringle, Fair, Davis & Oliver, Wichita, argued the cause and was on brief, for appellants.

Kelly W. Johnston of Johnston & Johnston, P.A., Wichita, argued the cause and was on brief, for appellee.

McFARLAND, Justice:

This appeal arises out of a worker's compensation claim made by Mae Bell Crabtree against her employer, Beech Aircraft Corporation. The district court affirmed the examiner's award for temporary total disability. Beech and its insurance carrier appealed. The Court of Appeals technically affirmed the result reached by the trial court in Crabtree v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 5 Kan.App.2d 440, 618 P.2d 849 (1980), with a modification discussed elsewhere herein. The matter is before this court on petition for review by the appellants.

There is no dispute as to either the facts in the case or claimant's entitlement to an award the sole issue being the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award based on temporary disability.

The chronological sequence of events must be stated in considerable detail. On June 22, 1977, claimant slipped and fell on the employer's premises resulting in a fractured coccyx. She was treated by Dr. Duane A. Murphy, an orthopedic surgeon. During the treatment Dr. Murphy learned that claimant had been diagnosed by the Wichita Clinic as having multiple sclerosis. Claimant was unaware of this diagnosis. It was the opinion of Dr. Murphy that claimant might benefit from surgical removal of the coccyx, and he referred her to Dr. Cline D. Hensley, a fellow orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion. Dr. Hensley was affiliated with the Wichita Clinic. Dr. Murphy believed that should the coccygectomy be performed it should be done by a surgeon with the Clinic in order that claimant's surgery and multiple sclerosis treatment could be coordinated and monitored.

Dr. Hensley examined claimant on October 17, 1977. He gave her the option of surgical removal of the coccyx or waiting to see if her condition would improve. Claimant elected to wait.

On February 22, 1978, claimant's application for preliminary hearing was heard. Temporary total disability compensation of $112.67 per week was ordered paid until "further order of the Examiner." This was consistent with all evidence introduced, including the testimony of claimant and her husband.

On June 27, 1978, Dr. Hensley again saw claimant. The suggestion that a coccygectomy be performed was renewed and again declined. This was apparently the last time claimant was seen by Dr. Hensley.

On August 30, 1978 claimant was last examined by Dr. Murphy and released for work as of September 5, 1978. Dr. Murphy concluded the fracture of the coccyx had healed and claimant's condition was then coccygodynia (painful coccyx). In the way of work restriction he listed avoidance of prolonged periods of standing, walking or sitting.

The matter came on for hearing before the examiner on November 9, 1978. The evidence consisted of the prior proceeding, stipulations of the parties, and the depositions of Drs. Murphy and Hensley.

There is little disparity in the medical testimony herein. The fracture of the coccyx had healed. Claimant had some discomfort in the area of the coccyx (coccygodynia). Removal of the coccyx would in all likelihood lessen the discomfort. Occasionally in such cases discomfort lessens in time without surgery. Activity would not physically harm claimant and restrictions against prolonged periods of sitting, standing or walking were for the comfort of claimant. Dr. Murphy was of the opinion that claimant was 10 percent functionally disabled without surgery, which could be reduced to 5 percent with successful surgery. Dr. Hensley placed claimant's functional disability rating at 20 to 25 percent, which could be reduced to 10 percent with successful surgery. Claimant was not employed at the time of the hearing.

The only issue before the examiner (and throughout this proceeding) was the award itself. The examiner awarded temporary total disability benefits from the date of injury of $112.67 per week until $50,000 has been paid or until further order. The examiner's award has been upheld through the director, district court, and essentially upheld in the Court of Appeals. The employer and insurance carrier have consistently contended the proper award should have been based on permanent partial disability and that the award entered is not supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, 5 Kan.App.2d at 442, 618 P.2d 849, correctly stated the general review of applicable law as follows:

"Before discussing the specific issues, a general review of applicable law is helpful in pinpointing the legal issues. The extent or degree of disability is a question of fact to be determined within the limits of the Workmen's Compensation Act by the trier of fact. Boyd v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 214 Kan. 797, 522 P.2d 395 (1974). Under K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-556(c), our scope of review is limited to questions of law. The question of whether a district court's judgment is supported by substantial evidence is one of law and if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, there is substantial evidence to support the district court's factual findings, this Court is bound by those findings and has no power to weigh the evidence or reverse the final order of the court. The term 'substantial evidence' when applied to workers' compensation cases means evidence that possesses something of substance and relevant consequence or evidence that furnishes a substantial basis for fact from which the issues presented can be reasonably resolved. Although this Court may feel the weight of the evidence as a whole is against the findings of fact made by the district court, it may not disturb those findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. Crow v. City of Wichita, 222 Kan. 322, 332-33, 566 P.2d 1 (1977).

"Medical evidence is not essential to the establishment of the nature and extent of an injured worker's disability, nor is a court limited by such evidence; the testimony of the claimant may be considered as well as the medical evidence. Chinn v. Gay & Taylor, Inc., 219 Kan. 196, Syl. P 3, 547 P.2d 751 (1976); Polston v. Ready Made Homes, 171 Kan. 336, 340, 232 P.2d 446 (1951); Conner v. M & M Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 100, 199 P.2d 458 (1948).

"Although this Court does not judge the credibility of witnesses nor determine the weight to be accorded their testimony, uncontradicted evidence that is not improbable or unreasonable cannot be disregarded by the district court unless it is shown to be untrustworthy and such uncontradicted evidence should ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Demars v. Rickel Manufacturing Corporation, 223 Kan. 374, Syl. P 5, 573 P.2d 1036 (1978); Anderson v. Kinsley Sand & Gravel, Inc., 221 Kan. 191, P 2, 558 P.2d 146 (1976)."

An unusual aspect of this case is that all the evidence is consistent and harmonious. The weighing of conflicting evidence is not involved. Claimant testified in essence that on February 22, 1978, and all relevant times prior thereto, she was totally disabled. Presumably, had Drs. Murphy and Hensley been called to testify at that time they would have agreed. She was then still under medical care and had not been released to return to work. It was undisputed that subsequent thereto claimant's fractured coccyx had healed and she had been released to...