Craft v. Pace of South Holland, 87 C 3569.
| Decision Date | 08 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 87 C 3569.,87 C 3569. |
| Citation | 803 F. Supp. 1349 |
| Parties | Dwayne CRAFT, Plaintiff, v. PACE OF SOUTH HOLLAND, an Illinois corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
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Robert M. Hodge, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Frank M. Pawlak, Robert A. Borich, Jr., Burke, Wilson & McIlvaine, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
Plaintiff, Dwayne Craft ("Craft"), commenced this civil rights action against defendant, Pace South Division ("Pace"), improperly sued as Pace of South Holland. Plaintiff contends that Transit Management of Harvey, Inc. ("TMOH"), the predecessor of Pace, violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure and his right to privacy under Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution, when its managerial agents ordered him to provide blood and urine samples for drug and alcohol testing. Plaintiff was subsequently discharged when his urine sample tested positive for marijuana use. Plaintiff seeks an injunction directing defendant to reinstate him with no loss of benefits and seniority and an award of back pay from April 13, 1984, the date plaintiff was discharged.
South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. ("South Suburban") owned and operated a private mass transit system in Harvey, Illinois. On or about September 9, 1983, the Regional Transportation Authority ("RTA") became the owner of South Suburban. The RTA entered into a management services agreement with a private management firm, ATE Management and Service Company, Inc. ("ATE"). Pursuant to the agreement, ATE established a wholly-owned subsidiary, Transit Management of Harvey ("TMOH"), which managed the mass transit system and hired all transit employees. TMOH managed and operated the transit system until May 31, 1985, when management was undertaken by Pace of South Holland.
As of January 1, 1976, plaintiff was employed as a serviceman by South Suburban and subsequently TMOH. As a serviceman, plaintiff cleaned and fueled buses, put air in tires and went out on service calls when buses broke down. Plaintiff drove and parked buses within the transit system property. Plaintiff never drove buses containing fare-paying passengers.
In early April 1984, TMOH received an anonymous tip that employees were using drugs and alcohol on TMOH property during the night shift. Michael Perry ("Perry"), the general manager of TMOH, did surveillance of the night shift but determined that this was not an effective means to gather information. Perry then contacted Pat Jordan ("Jordan") of the Diamond Detective Agency to investigate the use of drugs and alcohol on the premises during the night shift.
On April 12, 1984, Jordan allegedly observed plaintiff and three other TMOH employees smoking marijuana on the premises. Jordan also allegedly saw plaintiff drinking alcohol and making various unspecified "transactions." Jordan telephoned Perry at around 9:00 p.m. that evening and informed him of the events he had witnessed. Perry then contacted three TMOH supervisors who met him at the bus barn at around 10:00 p.m. Plaintiff was in the bus barn with several other employees when Michael Perry, TMOH's general manager, burst into the barn with one uniformed Village of Harvey police officer and several officers of the Diamond Security Agency. The police officer searched each employee but no alcohol or drugs were discovered. Perry accused several employees of using and/or selling drugs on TMOH's premises and ordered that they be transported to a medical center in Olympia Fields for drug and alcohol testing. At the medical center, plaintiff signed a general form for consent to treatment at the hospital. Plaintiff provided a urine sample but refused to submit to a blood test, claiming it was against his religion. All tested employees were suspended pending the results of their tests.
The following day, Perry was informed that plaintiff had tested borderline positive for marijuana use. A second set of tests confirmed the result. Plaintiff did not test positive for alcohol, however, and two of the four men reportedly seen smoking marijuana did not test positive for marijuana.
On April 25, 1984, plaintiff received written notice of his termination. At the time of the incident, Rule 12(a) of TMOH's General Rule Book provided:
The following acts are not permissible:
(a) Use or possession of intoxicating liquors or narcotics of any kind from the time an employee reports for work until the conclusion of the employee's workday, or reporting for work in an impaired condition due to use of same. Use of illegal drugs is forbidden.
TMOH's drug testing policy was outlined in Rule 8 of the General Rule Book:
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment be entered if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c). In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the Supreme Court set forth the shifting burden of proof applicable to FRCP 56(c) motions for summary judgment. The moving party not bearing the burden of proof at trial must inform the district court of the basis for its motion and identify "those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Once the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the burden of proof shifts to the nonmoving party, who does bear the burden of proof at trial, to "go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of the elements essential to that party's case." Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. The court must determine Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." The Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976).
The Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, if effected by a private party on his own initiative. The Amendment protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the Government. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613, 109 S.Ct. at 1411; See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-114, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656-1657, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). Whether a private party should be deemed an agent or instrument of the government for Fourth Amendment purposes necessarily depends on the degree of the government's participation in the private party's activities. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613, 109 S.Ct. at 1411.
Judge Kocoras previously ruled that TMOH's actions in managing and operating the RTA's bus lines constituted state action, rendering the Fourth Amendment applicable to the facts of this case. The court does not revisit the state action issue previously determined by Judge Kocoras. Judge Kocoras ruled as follows:
From the present record, it appears that the RTA has consistently maintained ownership of the mass transit system formerly known as South Suburban Safeway Lines since its acquisition in 1983. By merely contracting with ATE to create TMOH to manage and operate the transit system, while retaining ownership of the assets thereof, the RTA did not and could not transform its public operation into a private one. Because the RTA never contracted away its ownership of the assets of South Suburban, the actions of TMOH, taken pursuant to its contractual duty to manage and operate the RTA's bus lines, may be fairly viewed as state action under the facts of this case. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment on this basis must be denied.
Craft v. Pace, No. 87 C 3569, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7, 1988 WL 13327 (February 12, 1988) (Kocoras, J.)
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...citizens that the intrusion is warranted by law and that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope." Craft v. Pace of South Holland, 803 F.Supp. 1349, 1355 (N.D.Ill.1992) (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987)). Where this comes i......