Craft v. State

• Decision Date: 07 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 1-977A226,1-977A226
• Citation: 372 N.E.2d 472
• Parties: Gerald CRAFT, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 472

372 N.E.2d 472

Gerald CRAFT, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 1-977A226.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

Feb. 7, 1978.

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Robert W. Hammerle, Bobby Jay Small, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defenders, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Rollin E. Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

Defendant-appellant Gerald Craft (Craft) appeals from his conviction of second degree burglary ¹ and malicious trespass ² after trial by jury.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Testimony of the police officers at the hearing on Craft's motion to suppress and at trial reveals the following facts: Police Craft spent the night in jail. At 1:52 p. m. on Sunday, May 1, two officers questioned Craft in an office approximately fifteen feet by twenty feet, as a third officer in the room observed the interrogation which lasted between thirty and forty-five minutes. They again informed Craft of his rights, and this time he signed a waiver which was worded as follows:

officers arrested Craft, who was staggering across the parking lot of the IGA grocery store in Clinton, at approximately 10:30 p. m. on Saturday, April 30, 1977, and charged him with public intoxication. After he made an unsuccessful attempt to flee, the officers added charges of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. The officers advised Craft of his rights Saturday night, and he refused to waive those rights.

"I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me."

Immediately after Craft signed the waiver, the officers asked him whether he wanted to give a statement concerning a break-in at the Clinton Ford Garage which had occurred the preceding evening and for which Craft was a suspect. He refused. The officers "talked to him." He again refused to give a statement. After the officers asked him a third time whether he wished to give a statement, he said yes. Although one officer stated that only five minutes elapsed between the time Craft signed the waiver and the time he expressed willingness to give a statement, that same officer testified that the police officers employed a technique of sitting silently and looking at each other for periods of thirty to forty-five seconds after Craft indicated he did not wish to give a statement; the officer also stated that such a technique had proven successful in the past in persuading reluctant persons to give statements.

Craft was confused at first but "then he straightened out." He was thirty-one years old, possessed an eighth grade education, and could read and write. He tried two or three times to write a confession, but stated he "couldn't do it." An officer then wrote as Craft dictated, and Craft signed the statement. The officers had no idea why Craft could not write the statement himself. One officer testified that Craft may have had a hangover, but the general opinion of the officers was that Craft understood what he was doing when he gave the statement.

We reverse and remand.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in admitting Craft's confession into evidence?

2. Did the trial court err in giving the State's Final Instruction No. Ten regarding voluntary intoxication?

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One

Craft argues that the State did not sustain its burden of showing that Craft understood his constitutional rights or that he freely and voluntarily waived them.

Justice DeBruler set forth the applicable rules in Ortiz v. State (1976), Ind., 356 N.E.2d 1188, 1191:

"* * *eBr

In determining whether a statement was voluntarily given, we look to all the circumstances surrounding its giving to determine whether it was 'induced by any violence, threats, promises, or other improper influence.' Montes v. State, (1975) Ind., 332 N.E.2d 786, 792. The same test determines whether a waiver of the Miranda rights has occurred. Nacoff v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165. The burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the voluntariness of the statement or waiver. Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on the voluntariness of a statement or waiver, we do not weigh the evidence, but determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding. Raines v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 404, 269 N.E.2d 378.

* * *"ial

In summary, the record reveals that the police officers arrested Craft for public intoxication and asked him to waive his right to remain silent; he refused. Approximately fifteen hours later, after spending the night in jail, Craft signed a waiver of rights form that indicated he wished to give a statement and answer questions. Immediately thereafter he twice refused to give any statement....