Craig v. Donnelly
Decision Date | 24 December 1887 |
Citation | 28 Mo.App. 342 |
Parties | CORYDON F. CRAIG, Appellant, v. BERNARD DONNELLY et al., Respondents. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from Jackson Circuit Court, HON. TURNER A. GILL, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Statement of case by the court.
This is an action of forcible entry and detainer, begun before a justice of the peace, and removed by certiorari to the circuit court. At the close of the plaintiff's case a demurrer to the evidence was sustained and defendant appeals. It appears from the testimony that the controversy is over the possession of the " Gillis Opera House" in Kansas City; that plaintiff entered into the possession of the property under the following written paper:
The bond provided for in said writing is as follows:
The evidence showed that plaintiff occupied and run the house for three years, and until he was forcibly put out by defendants; that he hired the necessary servants, engaged and exhibited theatrical and other companies, during all this time. Plaintiff stated in his testimony that he took actual possession and control of the house on September 10, 1883, and that, in the summer of 1886, he went to New York, as was his custom, to engage companies for the ensuing season; that he had control and possession of the house at that time, and left his brother in charge, to act for him in his absence; that, having heard of some dissatisfaction on the part of defendants, and that they contemplated some sort of action, he went to one of them and asked if it was true, stating that if it was, he would not go to New York as he intended, but would stay and " fight it out; " that he would not go if he was to have any trouble, but would remain and " fight; " that, being assured nothing was contemplated by defendants, he left; on departing for New York he placed his brother, who had been in his employ for some two years, in charge. Other testimony showed that during plaintiff's absence, defendants gave notice of the termination of the agreement, by leaving it with one of the servants in the building, who handed it to plaintiff's brother; that, on the same day, defendants came in and demanded of the brother that he leave the house, which demand was refused, and instructions given to the servants not to get out, unless they were " dragged out or put out by law; " that defendants returned again the same day and said to plaintiff's brother that they had decided to take charge of the house; that he was laying himself liable to a fine and imprisonment, and in various other ways tried to intimidate him; that he told them he would not go out unless he was put out by force; that, finally, defendants took out a warrant for his arrest, and had him arrested and taken out by an officer. The complaint was, as is stated by the witness, " that they were in fear of their lives; that I was armed with a deadly weapon, and had taken forcible possession of the house; " that he gave bail, and, on returning to the house, found that new locks had been put on and that the doors were locked against him.
CRITTENDEN, MCDOUGAL & STILES, for the appellant.
I. The agreement under which plaintiff took possession and control was, in effect, a lease. At all events, it invested him with the right of possession. Mason v. Clifford, 4 F. 177; Fiske v. Mf'g. Co., 14 Pick. 491; Offerman v. Starr, 44 Am. Dec. 211; Rooks v. Moore, 57 Am. Dec. 569; Stanley v. Hotel Co., 29 Am. Dec. 485; Porter v. Merrill, 124 Mass. 534; McHose v. St. Louis F. I. Co., 4 Mo.App. 514; Jolly v. Single, 16 Wis. 298.
II. But whether a lease or not, the writing certainly invested the plaintiff with the right of possession. And in any view his actual possession shielded him from invasion. Rev. Stat sec....
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