Craig v. Mnuchin
| Decision Date | 21 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 14-1340 (RC) |
| Parties | B.B. CRAIG, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN MNUCHIN, Secretary of the Treasury Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Re Document Nos.: 110, 120, 121, 129
Plaintiff B.B. Craig, an official at the United States Mint, sued United States Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin, in his official capacity, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 ("Title VII").1 Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Mr. Craig, awarding him $5,485 in compensatory damages. With the verdict now in, Mr. Craig seeks injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. As explained below, the Court concludes that Mr. Craig is entitled to both forms of relief, though not to the extent he requests. Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part Mr. Craig's motions.
Mr. Craig has worked for the United States Mint, as a member of the United States Treasury's Senior Executive Service ("SES"), since 2008.3 See Am. Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 22. From 2008 to early 2013, he was the Associate Director of the Mint's Sales and Marketing Division ("A/D SAM"), having failed to receive his preferred position of Associate Director of the Mint's Manufacturing Division ("A/D Manufacturing") in 2008. See Dep. Tr. B.B. Craig ("Craig Dep.") at 24:25-26:1, 27:4-30:1, 128:1-4, ECF No. 51-3; Summ. J. Opp'n Ex. 4, ECF No. 41-6. As A/D SAM, Mr. Craig had authority to speak and act on behalf of the Mint, and he had significant supervisory authority over approximately ninety-four full-time-equivalent employees allotted to the SAM Division. See Decl. of B.B. Craig ("Craig Decl.") ¶¶ 3-4, ECF No. 40-2.
In 2012, Mr. Craig failed to meet the Mint's expectations on two critical SAM projects. Summ. J. Opp'n Ex. 11 at 4, ECF No. 41-11; Summ. J. Opp'n Ex. 24 at 5, ECF No. 41-19 (). These performance issues prompted the Mint's Chief Administrative Officer, Beverly Babers, to beginseeking a position in the Mint that would be a "better fit" for Mr. Craig. Id.; Craig Decl. ¶ 9. Around this time, Mr. Craig filed an informal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (an "EEO complaint"), alleging that certain individuals at the Mint discriminated against him based on his race and gender. Id. ¶ 10; Pls. Petition Award Reasonable Attorneys' Fees & Costs ("Fee Mot.") Att. D, ECF No. 121-9.
Ultimately, the "better fit" that Ms. Babers identified was a detail to a position called "Executive Lead" which, unlike Mr. Craig's previous position, had unclassified duties and no supervisory authority.4 Craig Dep. at 128:1-7, 180:8-13; Craig Decl. ¶¶ 13-14; Summ. J. Opp'n Ex. 6, ECF No. 41-7. Mr. Craig remained in the Executive Lead position until 2014, when he was reassigned to a permanent SES position as Associate Director of Environment, Safety, and Health ("A/D ESH"), having again failed to receive an appointment to the A/D Manufacturing position. Craig Dep. at 125:15-128:6; Craig Decl. ¶ 14. Mr. Craig has received performance bonuses and excellent performance reviews since assuming the A/D ESH position, where he remains to this day. See Def's Opp'n Partial Equitable Relief ( ) Ex. A, ECF No. 112-1.
Mr. Craig brought this action in 2014 and filed an amended complaint in 2015, alleging that the Mint violated Title VII by (1) failing to place Mr. Craig in the A/D Manufacturing position in 2008; (2) moving Mr. Craig out of the A/D SAM position in 2012; (3) giving Mr. Craig a sub-par performance review in 2012; (4) assigning Mr. Craig to the Executive Lead position for approximately 18 months, from 2012 to 2014; (5) declining to reassign Mr. Craig to the acting or permanent A/D Manufacturing or A/D SAM positions in 2014; and (6) reassigningMr. Craig to his current position, the A/D ESH. See generally Am. Compl. These claims were narrowed over several rounds of briefing. First, the Court granted the government's pre-discovery motion for summary judgment on Mr. Craig's claim that his non-selection to the A/D Manufacturing position in 2008 was discriminatory. Craig v. Lew (Craig I), 109 F. Supp. 3d 268, 284 (D.D.C. 2015). Next, the Court granted the government's post-discovery motion for summary judgment on Mr. Craig's claims that his sub-par performance review in 2012, his removal from the A/D SAM position in 2012, and the Mint's refusal to reassign him to the A/D SAM position in 2014 were discriminatory or retaliatory; and Mr. Craig's claims that his placement in the Executive Lead position from 2012 to 2014, his assignment to the A/D ESH position in 2014, and his non-selection to the A/D Manufacturing position in 2014 were discriminatory. Craig II, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 59, 65, 69, 72, 76.
Finally, the case went to trial on Mr. Craig's claims that (1) his placement in the Executive Lead position from 2012 to 2014; (2) his assignment to the A/D ESH position in 2014; and (3) his non-selection to the A/D Manufacturing position in 2014 were retaliatory, in violation of Title VII. Of these three claims that went to the jury, the jury found for Mr. Craig only on his claim that the Mint retaliated against him by detailing him to the role of Executive Lead, and it awarded Mr. Craig $5,485 in compensatory damages. Jury Verdict, ECF No. 99. In 2018 the Mint received a new permanent Director, a position that had been unfilled since 2011. Pls. Mot. Award Partial Equitable Relief ( ) at 4-5, ECF No. 110.
Shortly after the trial, Mr. Craig filed a motion for partial injunctive relief. See generally Partial Inj. Mot. After the parties were unable to settle during mediation on injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, the Court ordered Mr. Craig to file motions for complete injunctive relief and complete attorneys' fees and costs. See Minute Order (Aug. 1, 2018). Mr. Craig dutifully filedthose motions, which are now, along with his earlier motion for partial injunctive relief and his later motion for interim attorneys' fees, ripe for the Court's consideration. See Partial Inj. Mot.; Pls. Mot. Complete Award Equitable Relief ( ), ECF No. 120; Fee Mot., ECF No. 121; Pls. Mot. Interim Award Reasonable Attorneys' Fees ("Fee Mot. II"), ECF No. 129.5
"[O]ne of the central purposes of Title VII is 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'" Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)). Accordingly, Title VII expressly provides for a wide range of remedies:
If the court finds that the [defendant] has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the [defendant] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
In considering what remedy is appropriate, the Court "must strive to grant 'the most complete relief possible.'" Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quoting Franks, 424 U.S. at 764). In other words, the Court's goal is to restore the plaintiffs, as nearly as possible, to the circumstances they "would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418-19). Infashioning a remedy which satisfies the objectives of Title VII, the district court is vested with "considerable discretion." Id.; see also Hayes v. Shalala, 933 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 1996).
Under Title VII, the Court is authorized, in its discretion, to award "the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Generally, "[a] reasonable fee is one that is 'adequate to attract competent counsel, but that does not produce windfalls to attorneys.'" West v. Potter, 717 F.3d 1030, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984)). In awarding reasonable attorneys' fees, a court must conduct a two-step inquiry. Craig v. District of Columbia, 197 F. Supp. 3d 268, 274-75 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Does I, II, III v. District of Columbia., 448 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140 (D.D.C. 2006)).
First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff is the prevailing party. Id. at 275. A plaintiff is considered a prevailing party, entitled to attorneys' fees, "if [he] succeed[s] on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the [plaintiff] sought in bringing suit." Harvey v. Mohammed, 951 F. Supp. 2d 47, 53 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). A litigant need not succeed at every step of the litigation in order to be a prevailing party under Title VII; "a litigant who is unsuccessful at a stage of litigation that was a necessary step to [his] ultimate victory is entitled to attorney's fees even for the unsuccessful stage." Craig, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 275 (quoting Ashraf-Hassan v. Embassy of Fr. in the U.S., 189 F. Supp. 3d 48, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2016)).
Second, the court must determine whether the plaintiff's fee request is reasonable. Does I, II, III, 448 F. Supp. 2d at 140. In analyzing the plaintiff's fee request, "[a] court must: (1)determine the ...
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