Craig v. Potter, Cause No. 1:01-CV-406 (N.D. Ind. 5/12/2003), Cause No. 1:01-CV-406.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2003
• Docket Number: Cause No. 1:01-CV-406.
• Parties: JAMES W. CRAIG, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

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JAMES W. CRAIG, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant.

Cause No. 1:01-CV-406.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

May 12, 2003.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

ROGER B. COSBEY, Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiff, James W. Craig ("Plaintiff"), brings this action against the Defendant John E. Potter, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service ("USPS"), alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. Specifically, the Plaintiff, who suffers from multiple sclerosis ("MS"), claims that USPS discriminated against him when they failed to accommodate his disability by making him a postmaster at any one of five post offices.

Before the Court¹ are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. USPS filed its motion for summary judgment on September 6, 2002, and the Plaintiff timely filed his motion for summary judgment on November 8, 2002. However, the Plaintiffs January 10, 2003, reply brief on his cross-motion suggested that the Court disregard the affidavit of Sally Leath ("Leath") pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c). Subsequently, a hearing was held on this suggestion, and on January 27, 2003, the Court denied it, but allowed the Plaintiff to depose Leath, and ordered supplemental cross briefs and supplemental cross responses regarding whether the Plaintiff met USPS's prerequisites for the postmaster postions. Those briefs have been submitted and this matter is ripe for ruling.

The evidence consists of the depositions of the Plaintiff ("Pl. Dep. at __"), Gene Mills ("Mills Dep. at ___") and Leath ("Leath Dep. at __"); the affidavits of Ralph Harrison ("Harrison Aff ¶ __"), Dawn Partridge ("Partridge Aff ¶ ___"), Gary Soultz ("Soultz Aff ¶ __"), Nancy Knicely ("Knicely Aff ¶ __"), John Pochard ("Pochard Aff. ¶ __"), Clarence Colby ("Colby Aff. __"), Christine Melick ("Melick Aff. ¶ ___"), and Leath ("Leath Aff. at __"); and various documents.

For the following reasons, USPS's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED, and the Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment will be DENIED.

II. THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

The Plaintiff worked for USPS as a bargaining unit (i.e., unionized) letter carrier³ from 1971 until January 1992, when he was diagnosed with MS, and was no longer able to perform the essential functions of that job with or without reasonable accommodations. (Pl. Dep. at 7-8; Harrison Aff. ¶ 5.) In order to accommodate his disability, the Plaintiffs supervisor "detailed" him from the South Whitley post office to the small post office in Petroleum, Indiana, to serve as its temporary "officer-in-charge" and sole employee.⁴ (Pl. Dep. at 11-12; Harrison Aff ¶ 5.)

Petroleum is an extremely low-volume post office that services, at most, 30 people a day, and has average daily sales of less than $50.00. (See Pl.'s Dep. at 54; Partridge Aff, Ex. F at 3.) Although a postmaster position (or by extension, an officer-in-charge) is not classified as a light duty job, apparently the Plaintiffs supervisor believed, correctly it turned out, that the Plaintiff could do the work, at least as it was performed in Petroleum. (Harrison Aff. ¶ 6; Partridge Aff. ¶ 10.) Indeed, all the Plaintiff did each day was sell stamps and certified letters, and process some mail. (Pl.'s Dep. at 12.) Despite these rather minimal duties, USPS further accommodated his MS by requiring only a six-hour workday, and allowed him to lay down to rest during lunch if needed. (Harrison Aff ¶ 6; Pl.'s Dep. at 53-54.) Nevertheless, as the officer-in-charge, the Plaintiff retained his permanent classification as a bargaining unit letter carrier, receiving the same annual salary ($37,900.00) and benefits (including mileage to and from his home) as required by the CBA. (Mills Dep. at 7-8; Partridge Aff. ¶ 4; Harrison Aff ¶ 5, 7; Pl.'s Dep. at 13-14.)

Both the grade classification for a given post office and its postmaster's salary are tied to workload evaluations (in Postal Service parlance, a "PS Form 150"), which the postmaster or the officer-in-charge completes every three years and prior to posting a postmaster vacancy, or when a postmaster believes his post office's workload has changed. (Knicely Aff. ¶ 2-3.) Apparently, from the time the Plaintiff became the officer-in-charge in 1992, until 1998, the Petroleum post office was rated at a grade "EAS-11."⁵ (Pl.'s Dep. at 19.)

However, in the fall of 1998, the Plaintiffs supervisor, Gary Soultz ("Soultz"), determined that Petroleum needed a permanent postmaster, so he decided to officially offer the Petroleum postmaster position to the Plaintiff.⁶ (Soultz Aff. ¶ 5.) Nevertheless, before offering the position to the Plaintiff, another PS Form 150 had to be completed, which the Plaintiff did on October 1, 1998. However, that evaluation indicated that the Petroleum post office should be downgraded to next lower level, an "EPM-55." (Knicely Aff. ¶ 5; Soultz Aff. ¶ 6.)

The Plaintiff declined Soultz's offer because taking the postmaster position at the EPM-55 level would result in a significant annual pay cut (approximately $13,000) and a loss of mileage compensation. (Soultz Aff. ¶ 7; Pl.'s Dep. at 20, 26-27.) Nevertheless, the Plaintiff indicated that he would accept the position if he could retain his carrier pay and mileage compensation. (Soultz Aff. ¶ 5). Evidently, this was not an option because on October 13, 1998, Soultz posted a public vacancy announcement for the Petroleum postmaster position. (Soultz Aff. ¶ 8). At about the same time, USPS posted three other vacant postmaster positions for the Liberty Center, Yoder, and Zanesville post offices, all at higher grades and pay rates than Petroleum (i.e., Liberty Center was EAS-11, and both Yoder and Zanesville were EAS-13). (Knicely Aff. ¶ 7).

After his conversation with Soultz, the Plaintiff applied for the Liberty Center, Yoder, and Zanesville positions. (Knicely Aff ¶ 8). Among his competition for these positions were two other postal employees, who also applied for the Petroleum position. (Knicely Aff. ¶ 6, 12).

Between April 19-21, 1999, USPS informed the Plaintiff that he was not selected for any of the postmaster positions for which he applied.⁷ (Knicely Aff. ¶ 11). In fact, the Plaintiff was not even considered for these positions because he failed to complete his applications correctly.⁸ (Knicely Aff. ¶ 10; Pl. Dep. at 32-35). The two other individuals who applied were ultimately selected for the Zanesville and Yoder postmaster positions, leaving the Petroleum position still unfilled. (Knicely Aff. ¶ 12).

In June 1999, the Plaintiff submitted another application for a vacant postmaster position in Uniondale, Indiana, at a grade EAS-11. (Knicely Aff., ¶ 13; Pl.'s Dep. at 35). This time, the Plaintiff completed his application correctly, and was considered for the position. (Knicely Aff. ¶ 13). A three-person committee reviewed the applications, ranked each applicant according to certain selection criteria, and recommended that the three highest-scoring individuals be interviewed.⁹ (Cochard Aff. ¶ 2).

Before a decision was made regarding the Uniondale position, the Plaintiffs new acting supervisor, Dawn Partridge ("Partridge"), on June 16, 1999, again offered the Petroleum postmaster position to the Plaintiff, and gave him ten days to decide. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 7; Pl.'s Dep. at 35-36). On June 23, 1999, plaintiff wrote a letter to Partridge, officially declining the Petroleum position, withdrawing his application for the Uniondale position, and requesting a new permanent light duty position to accommodate his disability. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 8; Pl.'s Dep. at 36). Because the Plaintiff sought a light duty position, Partridge asked him to provide a Light Duty Certificate from his doctor showing his restrictions, so she could search for a vacant position meeting those restrictions. (Partridge Aff., ¶ 9).

After the Plaintiff submitted this certification, on July 22, 1999, Partridge determined that USPS had no available light duty carrier or clerical positions that would accommodate his restrictions. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 10-11). Nevertheless, she again offered him the Petroleum postmaster position as a permanent accommodation, and gave him ten days to accept her offer of accommodation.¹⁰ (Partridge Aff. ¶ 12).

The Plaintiff apparently decided not to accept the offer because on July 28, 1999, he contacted USPS's EEO counselor, alleging disability discrimination with respect to the denial of his permanent light duty request as a reasonable accommodation, and alleging a discrimination date of June 26, 1999. (Def's Ex. 1; Pl.'s Dep. at 42).

On September 24, 1999, the Plaintiff and his attorney met with USPS officials and a union representative to discuss his continued employment with USPS in light of his refusal to accept the Petroleum postmaster position and his inability to perform any vacant light duty assignments. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 12). Once again, Partridge offered the Petroleum position to the Plaintiff as an accommodation, but he again refused the offer. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 12-13).

Then, on October 5, 1999, the Plaintiff participated in disability retirement counseling, and stated that disability retirement was not an option. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 14.) The following day, Partridge offered him the Petroleum postmaster position for the final time, and told him that if he refused, the position would be posted, requiring him to apply for it to be considered. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 14 & Ex. E.)

Apparently the Plaintiff refused this final offer because on October 18, 1999, he went on extended sick leave, and Partridge detailed another employee to serve as Petroleum's officer-in-charge. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 15.) However, when the new officer-in-charge reviewed Petroleum's financials, she discovered a $567.21 shortage, and Partridge had its books audited. (Partridge Aff. ¶ 16-17.) The Plaintiff...